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EDITOR’S NOTE
Every year, the ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law (ILSA 
Journal) attends the International Law Weekend (ILW) conference which is 
hosted annually by the American Branch of the International Law 
Association (ABILA) and the International Law Students Association 
(ILSA) at Fordham University School of Law. ILW is well-attended by 
individuals such as diplomats, prestigious scholars, students, attorneys, and 
members from governmental and non-governmental sectors. The theme for 
ILW 2017, “International Law in Challenging Times,” engaged the 
audience with compelling arguments about challenges the world faces
today, putting forth potential resolutions to those challenges, and discussing 
an array of relevant issues in international law.
This Issue is entirely concentrated on ILW and is best known as the 
International Practitioner’s Notebook (IPN).  Because ILSA Journal is 
responsible for publishing the IPN, we have the opportunity to both 
network with and solicit articles from the esteemed panelists and 
moderators.  The ILSA Journal thanks those who coordinated ILW, and 
especially Ms. Tessa Walker of ILSA and Mr. David P. Stewart of the 
ABILA for all of their assistance with access to authors. The Journal is 
also very appreciative and thankful for the panelists and authors who 
contributed to this Issue. The ILSA Journal is confident that these 
exceptional pieces chosen for publication best reflects ILW and the 2017 
overall theme.
Additionally, I want to thank the entire Executive Board of the ILSA 
Journal for all of their hard work during ILW, the Editorial Board for their 
editorial assistance, and the Senior and Junior Staff Members for their 
dedication to the Journal. It has been a complete honor to lead this 
respected Journal and work with you all.  Thank you to my husband, Jack 
Esau, and family for all of your support this year.
Finally, the ILSA Journal is proud to welcome the elected 2018–19 
Executive and Editorial Board. I know that you will all do amazing things 
and that Volume 25 will continue the tradition of producing high-quality 
publications and will be a testament to their hard work, dedication, and 
professionalism.
Lora Esau
Editor-in-Chief, 2017–18
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“Well, at least he’s got us moving.”1
I. INTRODUCTION: THE DAY AFTER
The day after Donald Trump’s inauguration, women and their 
supporters marched across the United States (and around the world), in 
what was probably the largest single day of protest in American history.2
                                                          
 Barbara Stark 2017.  Professor of Law and Hofstra Research Fellow, Hofstra Law School.  
Thanks to reference librarian Patricia Kasting for outstanding research assistance; to Jonathan Hafetz, 
Baher Azmry, and Azadeh Shashani for their participation in the panel on International Human Rights 
After Trump at International Law Weekend, Oct. 20, 2017, where an early version of this paper was 
presented, and to Joyce Cox, for her patience in preparing the manuscript.
1. “[W]hen Donald Trump beat Hillary Clinton it triggered a visceral response in masses of 
American women, and their trauma may be turning into a political uprising more powerful than the Tea 
Party.” Gail Collins, Donald Trump’s Gift to Women, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2017), https://www.ny
times.com/2017/12/13/opinion/donald-trump-women.html.
2. See Jenna Wortham, Who Didn’t Go to the Women’s March Matters More than Who Did,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/24/magazine/who-didnt-go-to-the-wome
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More than 500,000 people clogged the capital.3 Four hundred thousand
protested in New York City, Trump’s hometown.4 The official march was 
cancelled in Chicago after 250,000 overflowed Grant Park.5 One hundred 
seventy-five thousand showed up in Boston.6 Protests are fine, of course, 
but they are ephemeral.  Their significance may be especially questionable 
when they purport to represent such a large and fractious group.7
But I start with the March because that’s how women started, not even 
twenty-four hours after Trump took the oath of office.  I also start with the 
March because that astonishing outpouring, the sheer numbers of people 
who literally took to the streets, was not a one-off, but a harbinger. 
Trump’s presidency is for those who support women’s human rights, what 
Roe v. Wade8 was for abortion opponents, a “target,” as Justice Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg has characterized it, an event that has focused and united people 
who did not realize how much they had in common.9 “[A]nger over Roe
fuel[ed] a state-by-state campaign that has placed more restrictions on 
abortion.”10 As Justice Ginsburg has explained, “[t]hat was my concern,
that the court had given opponents of access to abortion a target to aim at 
relentlessly. . . .  My criticism of Roe is that it seemed to have stopped the 
momentum that was on the side of change.”11 Just as Roe did for the 
                                                          
ns-march-matters-more-than-who-did.html (noting photo of black woman holding sign, “Don’t Forget:  
White Women Voted for Trump.”).
3. Anemona Hartocollis & Yamiche Alcindor, Women’s March Highlights As Huge Crowds 
Protest Trump: ‘We’re Not Going Away’, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017
/01/21/us/womens-march.html (quoting homeland security director, Christopher Geldart).
4. Id. (quoting Mayor Bill deBlasio’s office). See also Emma G. Fitzsimmons, In Trump’s 
Hometown, A Clear Message of Defiance from Women, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2017), https://www.ny
times.com/2017/01/21/nyregion/womens-march-donald-trump-manhattan.html.
5. Hartocollis & Alcindor, supra note 3 (quoting the Chicago Tribune).
6. Id. (citing Mayor Martin Walsh’s office).
7. See Wortham, supra note 2 (noting that fifty-three percent of white women who voted, 
voted for Trump); see also Susan Chira, Since When Is Being A Woman A Liberal Cause?, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/11/sunday-review/since-when-is-being-awoman-a-
liberal-cause.html (noting that conservative women feel left out).
8. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
9. Associated Press, Ginsburg:  Roe Gave Opponents Target, POLITICO (May 11, 2013, 
9:56 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2013/05/ruth-bader-ginsburg-roe-v-wade-abortion-091218
[hereinafter Roe Gave Opponents Target].
10. Id.
11. Id. (emphasis added).
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radical right, this presidency has not only unified those concerned with 
women’s human rights but galvanized them.12
This Article focuses on three major areas of women’s human rights:
civil and political rights; the right to be free from sexual harassment; and 
the right to health. All of these rights were vigorously and creatively 
asserted during the marches.  The range of these rights shows the scope of 
women’s resistance to this Administration, and how women’s international 
human rights law supports that resistance.
II. CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: THE MARCH
I also begin with the March because the signs, posters, hats, chants, 
songs, and speeches addressed the full array of what the protesters were 
marching for.  These included:  an end to sexual harassment and domestic 
violence; support for women’s health, especially reproductive health, 
including contraception and abortion; support for a healthy environment, 
including international cooperation to combat climate change; peace in 
general and the elimination of nuclear weapons more specifically;13 a
reversal of unprecedented, and growing, economic inequality; the rejection 
of draconian immigration policies, including ‘Muslim bans’ that have been 
struck down by federal courts; and the rejection, and repudiation, of 
racism.14
This Part first sets out the legal grounds for these claims, ranging from 
blackletter American law to emerging norms of international human rights.  
Second, it sets out the civil and political rights which those who support 
women’s human rights exercised during the marches and have continued to 
exercise ever since.
                                                          
12. Editorial, Pumping Life into the Equal Rights Amendment, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 25, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/25/opinion/sunday/pumping-life-into-the-equal-rights-amendment.
html [hereinafter Pumping Life].
13. Months after the March, Trump’s repeated taunts of North Korea’s President Kim Jong-un
has fueled anxiety, and more protests. See, e.g., Choe Sang-Hun, Fearing Korean Nuclear War, Women 
of 40 Nations Urge Trump to Seek Peace, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com
/2017/04/26/world/asia/north-korea-trump-nuclear-war.html.
14. Trump’s public and private statements since the march, including Tweets and remarks 
leaked by aides, continue to stoke criticism and protest. See, e.g., Andrew Rafferty, Marianna 
Sotomayor & Daniel Arkin, Trump Says ‘Two Sides’ Share Blame for Charlottesville Rally Violence,
NBC NEWS (Aug. 16, 2017, 7:19 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/trump-defends-all-
sides-comment-n793001; Sophie Tatum, Trump:  NFL Owners Should Fire Players Who Protest the 
National Anthem, CNN POL. (Sept. 23, 2017, 4:05 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/09/22/politics/
donald-trump-alabama-nfl/index.html; Sierra Teller Ornelas, Donald Trump Would Make A Terrible 
Navajo, NY TIMES (Dec. 2, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/02/opinion/sunday/donald-trump-
navajo-pocahontas.html (describing Trump’s interruption of ceremony to “honor Navajo code talkers to
degrade Senator Elizabeth Warren by referring to her as Pocahontas”).
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A. Legal Grounds
Women’s resistance to the Trump administration’s position on the 
issues raised by the marchers is grounded in several distinct legal 
arguments.  First, some of Trump’s actions clearly violate American law, 
such as his admission in the Access Hollywood tapes that he has sexually 
assaulted women.15 He has not, however, called for the decriminalization 
of sexual assault.16
Second, other claims represented claims to women’s human rights that 
are not recognized as “rights” under United States law but are recognized as 
rights under well-established international human rights law.  These include
economic rights, such as the right to health and the right to an adequate 
standard of living.17 These claims are significant because they show the 
widespread influence of women’s human rights, and their rhetorical power 
even in a country that refuses to recognize them. They also show why
ratification of international human rights treaties is so important for 
American women.
Third, there were claims made by marchers that are better understood 
as emerging human rights law, such as the claims against discrimination on 
the basis of sexual orientation18 and the right to a healthy environment.19
Nor is there a specific human right to peace, freedom from the threat of a 
nuclear war; or freedom from staggering economic inequality.  The rights 
of immigrants and their families, similarly vary under domestic laws.  But 
these claims, like those that draw on international law not yet recognized in 
the United States, show that Americans who support women’s human rights 
are attuned to an international zeitgeist.  They show further that these 
Americans are ready and able to participate in the process of developing 
and crystalizing emerging human rights.
                                                          
15. See Maggie Haberman & Jonathan Martin, Trump Once Said the ‘Access Hollywood’ 
Tape Was Real. Now He’s Not Sure, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 28, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/2
8/us/politics/trump-access-hollywood-tape.html.
16. He has, however, subsequently questioned his own public admission of the legitimacy of 
the tapes.  Id.
17. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights arts. 11–12, Dec. 16, 
1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR].
18. The Yogyakarta Principles Plus 10, YOGYAKARATA PRINC. http://yogyakartaprinciples.
org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/A5_yogyakartaWEB-2.pdf; see, e.g., Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. 
Colorado Civil Rights Commission, OYEZ, https://www.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-111 (last visited Feb. 
10, 2018).
19. Our Mission, WOMEN’S MARCH, https://www.womensmarch.com/mission (last visited 
Feb. 27, 2018).
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B. Civil and Political Rights
The clearest human rights claims—by all of the roughly four million 
marchers—were the civil and political rights recognized under the 
Constitution, as well as the International Bill of Rights.20 These include the 
rights to freedom of expression, access to the courts, to associate with 
others, and the rights to vote and to be elected.21 Among other notable 
effects, the exercise of these rights culminated in victories for women in the 
first wave of national elections since Trump has occupied the White House.
The political resistance of those who support women's human rights is 
broad and deep.  It encompasses issues ranging from electing more women 
to public office to addressing gun violence to resuscitating the Equal Rights 
Amendment (ERA).22 It deploys a similarly broad range of tactics 
including litigation, lobbying, marches, town halls, and door-to-door 
canvassing.
1. Organizing
The marchers did not go home after the marches. In Chicago, women 
in their 60s, 70s, and 80s organized monthly meetings in which they 
planned, email and canvassing campaigns, organized phone trees, and 
developed strategies for electing more women to office.23 More than 100 
‘Solidarity Sunday’ groups formed throughout the United States, from New 
York to California, including groups in Missouri, Texas, and Louisiana.24
They meet every second Sunday to “tackle national issues at a local 
level.”25 By February, one month after the inauguration, the group had 
12,000 members, meeting in twenty-seven states.26
                                                          
20. See G.A. Res. 217A (III), Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948);
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter 
ICCPR]; ICESCR, supra note 17.  It is globally recognized as the definitive law of international human 
rights.  See The Limburg Principles on the Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, 9 HUM. RTS. Q. 122 (1987).
21. ICCPR, supra note 20, at arts. 14, 19(2), 22, 25.
22. Martha Holstein, Opinion, Ways to Resist Trump, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2017), https://
www.nytimes.com/2017/04/13/opinion/ways-to-resist-trump.html; Pumping Life, supra note 12.
23. Holstein, supra note 22.
24. Adam Gabbatt, Solidarity Sundays:  Women Resist Trump with Monthly Activism Meet-
ups, GUARDIAN (Mar. 31, 2017, 7:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/mar/31/trump-
resistance-movement-solidarity-sundays-meetup.
25. Id.
26. Ronda Kaysen, Home Is Where the Resistance Is, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2017), https://
www.nytimes.com/2017/02/17/realestate/home-politics-resistance.html.
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Plans included a strike by women on International Women’s Day 
(March 8, 2017).  More than 30,000 people registered to participate, mostly 
from California and New York.27 Women were encouraged to stay home 
from work, wear red, and refuse to spend money.28 While some schools in 
North Carolina, Virginia, and Maryland closed because of teachers’ 
absence, the national turnout was far from that seen on January 22nd.29 But 
the strike’s leaders said that that had never been the objective.30 “The 
object for us isn’t that we hope to shut the whole economy down, we see 
this as an opportunity to introduce women to different tactics of activism,” 
said one of the co-chairs.31 These women are looking forward to 2018 and 
to 2020.
2. The November 2017 Elections
Trump has energized women, who have begun to run for office in 
unprecedented numbers.32 According to the deputy press secretary at 
Emily’s List, more than 25,000 have contacted her organization expressing 
an interest in running for local or state office since Trump’s election.33 In 
the first nation-wide elections since Trump took office, there was a clear 
surge in women’s political visibility.34 “[A] wave of first-time female 
candidates stood for state and local office . . . across the United States—and 
they won.”35 In Virginia, women gained ten seats in the House of 
Delegates, bringing their total to twenty-seven.36 “Virginia’s blue wave ‘ . . 
                                                          
27. Susan Chira et al., ‘Day Without a Woman’ Protest Tests A Movement’s Staying Power,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 8, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/08/us/a-day-without-a-woman.html.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Karin Kamp, Women Becoming More Politically Engaged Since Trump's Win, MOYERS &
CO. (Mar. 31, 2017), http://billmoyers.com/story/women-becoming-politically-engaged-since-trumps-
win/.
33. 25,000 Reasons to Be Excited for 2018, EMILY’S LIST (Dec. 20, 2017), https://www.emily
slist.org/news/entry/emilys-list-announces-that-20000-women-are-ready-to-run-for-office.
34. Claire Zillman, 5 Ways Women Won Big on the First Trump-Era Election Night, FORTUNE
(Nov. 8, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/11/08/election-results-2017-women-trump/.
35. Tom McCarthy, ‘Women Are Pissed’:  Trump Protest Turns to Action – and Surge in 
Female Candidates, GUARDIAN (Nov. 24, 2017, 10:22 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/
2017/nov/24/trump-women-female-candidates-pennsylvania-the-promise.
36. Michelle Cottle, Women Exit the Party of Trump, ATLANTIC (Nov. 22, 2017), https://
www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/11/why-republican-women-arent-galvanized-bythetrumpera/
546533/.
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. was about Trump,’ [observed] a long-time [Republican] party strategist.”37
“It was not specific issues.  It was a visceral reaction to what people 
perceive of his representing.  And it’s not welcoming.  It’s not inclusive.  It 
makes people very uncomfortable.”38
Women won mayoral elections for the first time in Manchester, New 
Hampshire; Provo, Utah; and Milledgeville, Georgia.39 Seattle elected its 
first woman as mayor in almost a hundred years.40 Women won all seven 
of the open judicial posts in Pennsylvania.41 New Jersey elected a 
Democratic governor who received 55% of the women’s vote.42 The 
victories—including the election of the first transgender state legislator—
were encouraging, especially on the West Coast.43 And the Democrats are 
looking forward to the 2018 midterm elections.44
But American women remain far from meaningful political parity. 
Women in the United States comprise approximately 19.8% of the 
representatives in Congress, while women in Europe comprise between 
30% and 40% of their national parliaments.45 The first-time, candidates 
have few to mentor them. Here again, international women’s human rights
law and institutions could provide resources, experience, and guidance for 
American women.
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40. McCarthy, supra note 35.
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43. Cottle, supra note 36.
44. Rachel Shorey & Lilia Chang, Democrats Leave Few Seats Unchallenged in Quest for 
House Control, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/24/us/democrats-house-
control-2018-midterms.html (noting that, “[n]early a year out from the election, Democratic candidates 
have filed in all but 20 House districts held by Republicans”).
45. See, e.g., Women in the U.S. Congress 2018, CTR. FOR AM. WOMEN & POL., EAGLETON 
INST. POL., RUTGERS U., http://www.cawp.rutgers.edu/women-us-congress-2018 (last visited Mar. 18, 
2018); Facts and Figures:  Leadership and Political Participation, UN WOMEN, www.unwomen.org/
en/what-we-do/leadership-and-political-participation/facts-and-figures (last updated July 2017). See 
also Ruth Rubio-Marín, A New European Parity-Democracy Sex Equality Model and Why It Won’t Fly
in the United States, 60 AM. J. COMP. L. 99 (2012); Steven Hill, Why Does the US Still Have So Few 
Women in Office?, NATION (Mar. 7, 2014), https://www.thenation.com/article/why-does-us-still-have-
so-few-women-office/.
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III. SEXUAL HARASSMENT
A. In America
1. Title VII, the Women’s Movement, and Catharine MacKinnon
As Professor Joanna Grossman has succinctly explained, growing 
feminist consciousness in the late 1970s and early 1980s resulted in:
The eventual melding of outrage with the protections of Title 
VII, a statute that had been on the books for more than a decade 
already. In the background was the women’s rights movement,
and in the foreground was Catharine MacKinnon’s theory of why 
harassment should be deemed an actionable wrong.46
As Professor MacKinnon defined it in her groundbreaking book, 
“[s]exual harassment, most broadly defined, refers to the unwanted 
imposition of sexual requirements in the context of a relationship of 
unequal power.”47 The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(EEOC) adopted MacKinnon’s framework, issuing guidelines that 
recognized two forms of harassment under Title VII:  1) quid pro quo
harassment, in which sexual favors are demanded in return for a job or a 
promotion and 2) hostile environment harassment, in which people are 
demeaned or intimidated at their workplace because of their sex.48 As 
Professor Grossman concludes, however, after more than thirty years, 
“sexual harassment remains disturbingly common and unaddressed . . . the 
law has done little to change the cultural understanding of sexual 
misconduct.”49
2. Anita Hill and Clarence Thomas
Twenty-five years ago, Professor Anita Hill testified against Clarence 
Thomas in the hearings on his nomination to the United States Supreme 
                                                          
46. Joanna Grossman, Moving Forward, Looking Back:  A Retrospective on Sexual 
Harassment Law, 95 B.U.L. REV. 1029, 1032–33 (2015).
47. CATHERINE MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 1 (1979).
48. Grossman, supra note 46, at 1047.
49. Id. Rather, as she describes at length elsewhere, a growing body of affirmative defense 
case law inspired employers to adopt convoluted policies and procedures that did little to improve the 
workplace. See, e.g., Joanna L. Grossman, The Culture of Compliance:  The Final Triumph of Form 
Over Substance in Sexual Harassment Law, 26 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 3 (2003); Deborah L. Brake & 
Joanna L. Grossman, The Failure of Title VII as A Rights-Claiming System, 86 N.C. L. REV. 859 (2008).
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Court.50 Professor Hill had worked for Justice Thomas at two federal 
agencies, the Department of Education and the EEOC.  She told the all-
male Senate Committee that Thomas had repeatedly made unwelcome 
sexual comments and advances.51 The Committee was skeptical, and 
Thomas was confirmed.52
Although Professor Hill was criticized by many at the time of the 
hearings, and her testimony widely discredited, polls taken a year later 
showed that public opinion had reversed in her favor.  As Professor Hill 
described her subsequent experience:
The response to my Senate Judiciary Committee [t]estimony has 
been at once heartwarming and heart-wrenching.  In learning that 
I am not alone in experiencing harassment, I am also learning 
that there are far too many women who have experienced a range 
of inexcusable and illegal activities—from sexist jokes to sexual 
assault—on the job . . . . In letters to me, women tell of incidents 
that occurred fifty years ago when they were first entering the 
workplace, incidents they [have] been unable to speak of for that 
entire period.53
But the letters to Hill were private. Women came forward to support 
her, but not to join her in publicly exposing the men who had harassed 
them.
3. The 2016 Campaign
The conduct Trump bragged about on the Access Hollywood tape 
clearly constituted sexual harassment as well as sexual assault: “[W]hen 
you’re a star, they let you do it.  You can do anything . . . . Grab ‘em by the 
pussy.  You can do anything.”54 Millions of women were appalled, 
although their outrage took time to coalesce and to build.  Only 42% of 
                                                          
50. Clyde Haberman, Do We Believe Women Yet?  The Battle to End Sexual Harassment,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/17/us/retro-sexual-harassment.html.
51. Id.
52. For an analysis of the ways in which “the harassment of women of color is distinctive and 
cannot be fully understood simply as a more virulent form of harassment faced by white women,” see 
MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 246–50 (2d ed. 2003).
53. Anita F. Hill, Sexual Harassment:  The Nature of the Beast, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1445–46
(1992).
54. Ronan Farrow, From Aggressive Overtures to Sexual Assault: Harvey Weinstein’s 
Accusers Tell Their Stories, NEW YORKER (Oct. 23, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-
desk/from-aggressive-overtures-to-sexual-assault-harvey-weinsteins-accusers-tell-their-stories.
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women who voted, voted for Trump,55 compared to the 54% who voted for 
Clinton, including 94% of black women and 68% of Hispanic women.56
Even if 53% of white women who voted, voted for Trump,57 78% of them 
said that “they were bothered to some extent by his treatment of women.”58
In October, after the release of the Access Hollywood tape, Trump 
admitted that he had made the remarks attributed to him and he 
apologized.59 But, he emphatically denied that he had actually committed 
the assaults he bragged about.60 Several women came forward, however, to 
contradict him and corroborate his initial account.61 He called them all 
liars.62 One of the women, Summer Zervos, filed a defamation suit against 
him.63
The election was a wake-up call for millions of women who realized
that “a predator was in the Oval Office.”64 The co-workers who had 
harassed them were not outliers; norms of male behavior that they thought 
they could take for granted were not norms at all. Press coverage and social 
media picked up steam after the election. As Jessica Bennet, the new 
“gender editor” of the New York Times, explains it:
Some see it as the other shoe dropping after Donald J. Trump’s 
taped boasting about offensive behavior did not block his path to 
the presidency: He may have gotten away with it, but women 
                                                          
55. Clare Foran, Women Aren’t Responsible for Hillary Clinton’s Defeat, ATLANTIC (Nov. 13, 
2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/11/hillary-clinton-white-women-vote/507422/.
56. Id.
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58. Chira, supra note 7.
59. Michael D. Shear, Trump Sexual Misconduct Accusations Repeated by Several Women,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/11/us/politics/trump-accused-sexual-
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were no longer going to let that boss, that mentor, that colleague 
get away with it, too.65
Roger Ailes, founder of Fox News, had been forced out of his job the 
year before because of multiple, detailed complaints of harassment by over 
twenty women.66 But after the election, Bill O’Reilly, Bill Cosby, and 
Harvey Weinstein found their former impunity gone.67
As journalist Ronan Farrow explains, although Weinstein’s behavior 
was an “open secret” in Hollywood and beyond for over twenty years, 
victims and witnesses were afraid that their careers would be over, their 
lives ruined, and that they would be crushed if they spoke out.68 But after 
the election, they realized that they—and their daughters—would not only 
be crushed if they didn’t speak out, but that their harassers would persist, 
even more openly and unapologetically.69 As Farrow writes:
                                                          
65. Jessica Bennett, The ‘Click’ Moment:  How the Weinstein Scandal Unleashed A Tsunami,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/05/us/sexual-harrasment-weinsteintrump
.html.
66. Gabriel Sherman, The Revenge of Roger’s Angels, N.Y. MAG. (Sept. 2, 2016, 7:30 AM), 
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media”).
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for Decades, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/05/us/harvey-weinstein-
harassment-allegations.html; see Michelle Goldberg, Save the Phony Weinstein Outrage, Republicans,
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N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 21, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/20/opinion/a-thank-you-to-taylorswif
t.html (contrasting the subservience of women with the “overconfidence of mediocre men . . . . It is no 
coincidence that such men celebrated the triumph of Donald Trump, a man who has boasted about being 
able to grab women ‘by the pussy.’  The president is the very epitome of overconfident male mediocrity 
and, unsurprisingly, a big proponent of pliant, pretty femininity.”).
68. Farrow, supra note 54.
69. Editorial, Will Harvey Weinstein’s Fall Finally Reform Men?, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 28, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/28/opinion/sunday/harvey-weinstein-sexual-harassment.html (noting 
“Then, of course, there’s the current occupant of the Oval Office, who won the election only weeks after 
the public heard him brag about grabbing women’s genitalia, and who once said that if his daughter 
were ever sexually harassed at work, she should go find a new job.”). See also Kantor & Twohey, supra
note 67.
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It’s likely that the women who spoke to me have recently felt 
increasingly emboldened to talk about their experiences because 
of the way the world has changed regarding issues of sex and 
power.  Their disclosures follow in the wake of stories alleging 
sexual misconduct by public figures, including Donald Trump . . 
. .70
In response to a comment by Woody Allen, warning of “a witch hunt 
atmosphere,” Lindy West wrote an op-ed in the New York Times, “Yes, 
This is a Witch Hunt.”71 What Allen means, she says, is “an atmosphere in 
which [men] are expected to comport themselves with the care, 
consideration and fear of consequences that the rest of us call basic 
professionalism and respect for shared humanity.”72 West attributes this 
“whole catastrophic cultural moment” to our predator in chief.73
In Sacramento, “more than 140 women—including legislators, senior 
legislative aides and lobbyists—came forward to denounce what they 
describe as pervasive sexual misconduct by powerful men in the nation’s 
most influential legislature.”74 In early December, the focus shifted to 
Congress, as the Democrats pressured Congressman John Conyers and 
Senator Al Franken to resign in response to allegations of sexual 
misconduct.75 Republican Trent Franks also resigned after he was asked to 
do so by Paul Ryan, following his admission that he had discussed 
surrogacy with two of his female aides.76 A culture of silence and 
acquiescence had enabled many of these powerful men to maintain their 
positions, wealth, and reputations for decades.
The law had helped, through nondisclosure agreements and 
confidential settlements.  In fact, under the Congressional Accountability
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76. Id.
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Act of 1995, taxpayers have been paying for settlements to those who have 
accused members of Congress of violations of workplace safety, as well as 
employment and civil rights, including claims of sexual misconduct.77
Since 1997, more than $17 million has been paid to settle more than 260 
claims.78
But the law’s failure, or complicity, no longer means that there are no 
consequences.  On October 15th, actress Alyssa Milano tweeted, “[i]f 
you’ve been sexually harassed or assaulted, tweet #MeToo in response to 
this tweet.”  Twelve million people on Facebook tweeted the hashtag 
#MeToo in the first twenty-four hours.79 On December 6, Time Magazine 
named “The Silence Breakers” of the #MeToo movement the 2017 Person 
of the Year.80
In December 2017, in the wake of the #MeToo movement, post-
Weinstein, and after the first democrat had won a Senate seat in Alabama in 
twenty years,81 Professor Hill was asked to head a privately-funded Sex 
Abuse Commission to “tackle widespread sexual abuse and harassment in 
the media and entertainment industries.”82 A critical mass has been 
reachedʊenough women are willing to speak out and enough women have 
the money, clout, and political savvy, to establish institutions to support 
them.83 The announcement of the Time’s Up movement included a pledge 
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TIMES (Dec. 15, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/15/movies/anita-hill-hollywood-commission-
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83. See, e.g., Cara Buckley, Powerful Hollywood Women Unveil Anti-Harassment Action 
Plan, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/01/movies/times-up-hollywood-
women-sexual-harassment.html (describing the Time’s Up movement and the 300 prominent actresses 
and female agents, writers, directors, and entertainment executives supporting these women).
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of support for working class women.84 Despite the success of #MeToo, 
working class women have complained that little has changed for them.85
B. Women’s Human Rights Law
Even if the American justice system had failed to adequately address 
sexual harassment, moreover, it has been in the crosshairs of international 
human rights law for some time.  The Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) unequivocally 
condemns sexual harassment as a violation of women’s human rights.86 In 
July 2017, the Committee adopted General Recommendation No. 35 on 
Gender-Based Violence Against Women, updating General 
Recommendation No. 19 on Violence Against Women.87 The Committee
noted that in the twenty-five years since its adoption, “[t]he opinio juris and 
State practice suggest that the prohibition of gender-based violence against 
women has evolved into a principle of customary international law.”88 This 
means that even states that are not parties to the CEDAW, such as the 
United States, are bound since customary law is binding on all states that 
have not persistently objected to it.89 Violence against women explicitly 
includes “harassment.”90 The state is responsible for non-state actors as 
well as state actors.91
Human rights law also requires states to provide human rights 
education.  The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), for 
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example, requires that:  “Education shall be directed to the full development 
of the human personality and to the strengthening of respect for human 
rights.”92 The Economic Covenant, similarly, states that education shall 
“strengthen the respect for human rights.”93 The Convention on the Rights 
of the Child (CRC) repeats this language and further requires states to 
prepare children for “responsible life in a free society, in the spirit of . . . 
tolerance [and] equality of sexes.”94 The CEDAW goes further, requiring 
that states teach “the common responsibility of men and women in the 
upbringing and development of their children.”95
Despite the proliferation of international treaties, regional and 
domestic laws, reports by special rapporteurs, white papers by experts, 
country monitoring reports, and harassment-prevention training sessions, 
sexual harassment persists.  In part, this can be attributed to states’ failure 
to comply with their own obligations under CEDAW.  According to the 
WORLD Policy Analysis Center at UCLA, sixty-eight countries have no 
laws against sexual harassment at the workplace.96 While this might leave 
countries that are parties to the CEDAW in violation of their obligations 
under international human rights law, individuals cannot rely on that law to 
proceed directly against their employers until and unless they are authorized 
to do so under their own domestic law. This leaves 424 million working 
age women with no legal protection against harassment on the job.97
The #MeToo movement resonated globally. Over 1.7 million women
in more than eighty-five countries throughout the world responded to the 
tweet on Twitter.98 On October 29th, thousands of French women and men 
took to the streets in every major city in France protesting sexual 
harassment.99 Even in Sweden, that paradigm of gender equality, tens of 
thousands of women signed a series of appeals in the national press 
documenting harassment of women, not just by famous and powerful men,
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331 (noting that the hashtag in France is #balancetonporc, or “squeal on your pig”).
ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 24:2332
but by men in virtually every profession.100 Journalist Jenny Nordberg
characterizes the Swedish workplace as “more cold, correct, and asexual on 
the surface” than its American counterpart.101 So perhaps all those agencies 
promoting gender equality have had some effect. But after work, or after a 
drink, Nordberg continues, Swedish men lose their inhibitions.102 Perhaps 
in Sweden, as in other countries where women now work in fields 
traditionally dominated by men, there are simply more opportunities for 
harassment, and a corresponding, if inadequately unrecognized, need to nip 
it in the bud. Finally, no one ever suggested that law alone was enough to 
transform culture. But it can certainly help.  The on-going global shaming 
of harassers may contribute to such cultural transformation.103
IV. WOMEN’S HEALTH
This Part addresses the impact of the Trump administration on 
women’s health in general, and on women’s reproductive health more 
specifically. It also examines the ways in which those who support 
women’s human rights have challenged and resisted the onslaught of 
cutbacks and the denial of healthcare for women and their families.  The 
first section focuses on federal law, including the Affordable Care Act 
(ACA or Obamacare),104 Medicaid, and Medicare. The second section 
discusses Trump’s efforts to restrict reproductive healthcare, not only in the 
United States but throughout the world. This Part concludes by describing 
the right to health under human rights law recognized and accepted in 
virtually every other country, and what the human right to health, including 
reproductive health, would mean for American women.
A. The Affordable Care Act and Other Federal Programs
Medicare, which covers everyone over age sixty-five, and Medicaid,
which is available to those with low enough incomes, qualified pregnant 
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women and children; and those on SSI,105 were basically the only forms of 
government healthcare assistance until the passage of the ACA in 2010.106
Historically, insurance coverage was provided by employers. But with 
changes in the labor market, including the decline of union jobs, the growth 
of the non-unionized service worker sector, and the entry of women into the 
workforce, coverage was unavailable or unaffordable for many.  The ACA 
provided more than sixteen million people with health insurance.107 It is 
undisputed that having health insurance is consistent with better health.108
Yet the repeal of the ACA was among Trump’s earliest, and most 
frequently repeated, campaign promises. “If we don’t repeal and replace 
Obamacare, we will destroy American healthcare forever,” he reiterated at a 
rally in King of Prussia, Pennsylvania a week before the election.109
Despite his “repeated, confident assertions on the campaign trail that it 
could be done in just a day,” however, Trump and the Republican 
Congress, have been unable to do so to date.110 Rather, on July 18th, after 
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yet another healthcare bill failure,111 Trump gave up: “[W]e’ll just let 
Obamacare fail. We’re not gonna own it . . . .”112
But Obamacare has not imploded. 8.8 million people signed up during 
the last open enrollment period, only slightly less than the 9.2 million who 
had signed up during the previous open enrollment period, which had been 
twice as long and much better advertised.113 The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act 
(TCA) eliminates the public mandate, which required everyone to obtain 
coverage and imposed a penalty on those who did not.114 But the TCA did 
not repeal Obamacare, although Trump claims that it did.115 As Larry 
Levitt of the Kaiser Family Foundation explains, “[t]he heart of the ACA—
the premium subsidies, the Medicaid expansion, and protections for pre-
existing conditions—remain in place . . . . The premium subsidies should 
provide enough of an incentive for many healthy people to get coverage to 
keep the individual market reasonably stable.”116 In fact, by ending the 
public mandate, the Republicans are driving healthy people from the 
market, inadvertently increasing the role of Medicaid.117
The future of Medicaid and Medicare is an open question.  On one 
hand, another of Trump’s early, oft-repeated promises was, “[s]ave 
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Medicare, Medicaid and Social Security without cuts.  Have to do it.”118 At 
the same time, the 2018 White House budget proposal released in May, 
before passage of the TCA, cut Medicaid more than $600 billion “over [ten]
years, compared to current spending levels.”119 Medicare spending would 
be cut by more than $50 billion over the same period, again, compared with 
current levels.120 The TCA tax cut is projected to increase the deficit by 
more than a trillion dollars, according to the Congressional Budget 
Office.121 In December, Speaker Paul Ryan promised that Republicans 
would try to slow the growth of federal spending on healthcare because 
“it’s the health care entitlements that are the big drivers of our debt.”122 In 
contrast, Senator McConnell has indicated that the Republicans will not 
revisit health care, at least not in an election year.123
Threats to health care entitlements are threats to women. Women are 
disproportionately affected by cuts to such entitlements in two ways, as 
healthcare consumers and as healthcare providers. As Quoctrung Bui and 
Susan Chira explain, “in the United States, women tend to benefit from 
social safety net spending more than men.”124 As healthcare consumers, 
women receive sixty-nine percent of total Medicaid spending.125
As healthcare providers, women will also be hurt by cuts in 
Medicaid.126 Nursing homes, home care and community-based programs 
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for seniors account for roughly two-thirds of Medicaid spending.127 Unpaid 
family caregivers, who are overwhelmingly women, already spend about 
two weeks of full time work, or seventy-seven hours, per month, with 
dependent parents.128 As recent research from the Center for Retirement 
Research at Boston College shows, an already-overextended caregiving 
system is likely to collapse if there are deep cuts to Medicaid.129
B. Women’s Reproductive Health
Denying women control over their own bodies and their own 
reproductive capacity may well be the most effective way to disempower 
them.130 Trump has eliminated American support for women’s 
reproductive health from contraception131 to providing women with 
information about safe abortions—not only throughout the United States,
but everywhere in the world. As journalist Michelle Goldberg has shown, 
after merely six months in office, “Mr. Trump ha[d] already surpassed 
George W. Bush as the American president most hostile to reproductive 
rights and measures to promote sexual health.”132
1. In the United States
In the United States, the Trump administration has focused on 
reducing insurance coverage for contraception, tightening restrictions on 
clinics that provide abortion services, and forcing clinics to close.133 As 
Professor Grossman has explained, the Obama administration addressed
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contraception in 2011, requiring all employer-based health plans to pay for 
prescription contraceptives.134 This was grounded in solid, scientific, non-
partisan evidence that, “access to contraception is a necessity for women’s 
health.”135 As a result, fifty-five million women gained access to free 
contraceptives, expanding their workplace opportunities and reducing 
unintended pregnancies, abortions, and maternal deaths.136
Although unable to “repeal and replace Obamacare,”137 Trump has 
undermined it. For example, he repealed a regulation promulgated by 
Obama requiring states to pass along Title X funds to Planned Parenthood. 
Title X governs the federal family planning program. The repealed 
regulation was a response to more than twelve states that had blocked 
Planned Parenthood from receiving Title X funds.138 Trump told Planned 
Parenthood that it could continue to receive funding if it stopped providing 
abortions.139
In addition, in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby,140 the Supreme Court held, in 
a five to four decision, that closely-held, for-profit companies could deny 
contraceptive cover to employees on the basis of “sincerely held” religious 
beliefs.141 Trump compounded the Court’s error by promulgating a 
regulation allowing employers who disapprove of contraception on “moral 
convictions” to deny employees contraceptive coverage.142
Those who support women’s human rights have fought back on a 
number of fronts. Limits on contraceptive coverage have been addressed 
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on the state level.143 In addition, “[i]n a massive public comment 
submission effort . . . more than a dozen leading reproductive and civil 
rights organizations, members of Congress, and allies [from all fifty states] .
. . delivered over a half-million public comments” opposing the new 
regulation to the Department of Health and Human Services.144
As noted above,145 those who oppose women’s right to choose, have 
made abortion the subject of a long, fierce campaign. Abortion, of course, 
is a constitutionally-protected right under Roe.146 But because rights are 
generally framed negatively under the Constitution, i.e., as freedom from
state interference rather than as an affirmative obligation on the part of the 
state, the state is not required to fund abortions. In Harris v. McRae, the 
Supreme Court upheld the Hyde Amendment of 1976, barring the use of 
federal Medicaid funds for abortion, even for medically necessary 
abortions, unless the mother’s life was in danger.147 Thus, poor women 
effectively have a right without a remedy; woman have a right to an 
abortion, but only if they can afford one. As Professor Reva Siegel has 
shown, the overwhelming majority of American woman who give birth 
raise their children, regardless of their circumstances.148 By 2011, low-
income women were more than five times as likely to become pregnant 
unintentionally than better-off women.149 Those who sought an abortion 
but were unable to obtain one “were three times as likely to fall into poverty 
over the following two years as those women who were able to get one.”150
Women who can’t afford an abortion can’t afford a child.
In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, the 
Court upheld Roe but allowed states to impose restrictions on abortions as 
long as they did not amount to an “undue burden” on the pregnant woman’s 
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right to choose.151 The states responded by passing a wide range of 
requirements making abortions harder to obtain.152 Almost 400 restrictions 
on abortion have been passed at the state level since 2010, including 
twenty-two in Texas alone.153
Those who support women’s human rights have filed lawsuits 
challenging some of the more egregious restrictions. On November 22, 
2017, the federal district court in Austin struck down a Texas measure 
banning one of “the safest and most common methods of ending a 
pregnancy after approximately [fifteen] weeks” in Whole Woman’s Health 
v. Paxton.154 “Every court that ha[d] looked at a ban [like the Texas 
measure] ha[d] blocked it, including courts in Alabama, Arkansas, Kansas 
and Oklahoma.”155
2. Abroad
The Helms Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1973 already 
bans the use of United States foreign aid for abortions “as a method of 
family planning.”156 The Mexico City Policy, also known as the Global 
Gag Rule, adopted by Ronald Reagan in 1984, goes much further.157 It bars 
any United States aid to any foreign non-governmental organization (NGO) 
that even counsels women regarding abortion in the course of providing 
family planning services.158
Trump has taken the Gag Rule to a new level. His plan, protecting life 
in “global health assistance” extends the Gag Rule beyond the $600 million 
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family planning funding to which it has historically been applied.159 Under 
Trump’s plan, it applies to “$8.8 billion in global health funding [from] the 
State Department, United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID), and the Department of Defense (DoD).”160
The consequences are likely to be far-reaching. As Nicholas Kristof 
has recently noted, this will be devastating for countries like Liberia, where 
American aid historically benefitted half the population.161 Trump’s plan 
also includes cutting the United States’ annual contribution to the United 
Nations (U.N.) Population Fund, which promotes family planning. As 
Eugene Linden, author of The Alms Race, recently observed, “Remember 
the Population Bomb?  It’s still ticking.”162 The “population bomb” has 
been used since the 1970s to refer to the risks posed by unchecked 
population growth given the finite resources of the planet.163 The Green 
Revolution and globalization may have postponed the reckoning, Linden 
argues, but the risks are even greater now, in view of the current population 
figures (approximately 7.6 billion) and the impact of climate change.164
The Senate Appropriations Committee voted in September to overturn 
the Mexico City Policy.165 While this is likely to be symbolic, symbols 
matter.  Eliminating funding from the budgets of the State Department, 
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USAID, and the DoD, moreover, may well inspire more concrete 
opposition.
As Professor Martha F. Davis has shown, under international human 
rights law, abortion is not viewed primarily as a question of women’s 
rights.166 Nor is contraception. Rather, state support for both are situated 
squarely within women’s right to health.167 This approach would help 
address the illusory right to abortion of poor women under Harris v. McRae
and Maher v. Roe.168
Viewing contraception and abortion as part of a continuum of 
women’s reproductive health, which also includes infertility, pregnancy, 
and postpartum care, makes it possible to deal with the ways in which 
reproductive healthcare has been shaped by racism. Abortion in the United 
States has often been viewed as a concern of white women, while women of 
color have historically been more concerned with efforts to discourage their 
childbearing, through “denial of welfare benefits, forced contraception, or 
even sterilization.”169
In addition, as Professor Davis demonstrates, “contextualizing”
abortion as an element of women’s broader right to health has had strategic 
advantages, as pro-choice advocates in the United States increasingly 
recognize.170 Analyzing decisions from Colombia, Mexico, and the 
European Court of Human Rights, Davis shows that where the right to 
health was already recognized, and incorporated in a national health plan 
(like the ACA), extending coverage to abortion “generated little 
controversy.”171
V. CONCLUSION: A YEAR OF RESISTANCE
The Women’s March was the beginning of a year of resistance.172
Each Part of this Article has shown how Trump’s attacks against women’s 
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human rights have inspired a backlash and fueled a movement.  Part I 
showed how millions of women, and their supporters, took to the streets 
following his inauguration. Rather than return home after the marches, they 
organized powerful and effective get-out-the-vote initiatives that produced 
a wave of progressive victories in the first national elections following 
Trump’s move to Washington. As impressive and promising as these 
efforts were, however, they are unlikely to produce greater political parity 
for women absent express demands for such parity.  Ratification of the 
CEDAW, and United States appearances before the committee that 
monitors the CEDAW, would help clarify the need for gender parity, and 
provide tools for achieving it.
Part II focused on the impassioned outcry against sexual harassment,
sparked by the Access Hollywood tapes and fueled by the Weinstein 
scandal.  Outrage against Trump’s crude misogyny inspired actresses, like 
Ashley Judd, to speak out and journalists to investigate their allegations.
Wealthy, powerful men lost their positions, their power, and their once-
unrestricted access to vulnerable women. It soon became clear, however, 
that American anti-harassment law alone cannot identify and remediate the 
wide-ranging harms.
Again, women’s international human rights law could be useful. 
Legal instruments addressing a range of harms have already been drafted 
and ratified by many states.173 These have been clarified by the Reports of 
the Special Rapporteurs on Violence Against Women and applied to 
country-specific situations by the CEDAW Committee in its reviews of 
countries’ self-monitoring reports. Americans do not have to re-invent the 
wheel.
Part III analyzed Trump’s attacks against women’s health, at home and 
abroad, and the real dangers they pose for us all, as well as the planet itself.  
His plan to abruptly terminate desperately needed funding for health 
services, including former President George W. Bush’s campaign for H.I.V. 
prevention, will devastate women and their families throughout the world.
This Article has focused on the response of American women and their 
supporters to Trump’s physical, rhetorical, and fiscal attacks.  It has pointed 
out how human rights law can be used to counter or deflect such attacks.
But, human rights law also connects Americans to the rest of the world and 
shows how this President seeks to undermine the human rights of women 
everywhere.
                                                          
/12/25/opinion/america-is-not-yet-lost.html (suggesting that, “[i]f American democracy survives this 
terrible episode, I vote that we make pink pussy hats the symbol of our delivery from evil.”).
173. See, e.g., Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combatting Violence Against 
Women and Domestic Violence, Apr. 7, 2011, C.E.T.S. No. 210; Inter-American Convention on the 
Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication of Violence against Women, 33 ILM 1534, 1537 (1994).
2018] Stark 343
Now, even as Trump congratulates himself on the Tax Cuts and Jobs 
Act (that promises to slash the few remaining safety nets to further engorge 
the richest Americans, including himself and his family);174 he continues to 
fuel a growing resistance. Though many were dumbfounded a year ago, the 
shock has been replaced by commitment and determination. As Paul 
Krugman recently noted, “tens of millions of Americans have risen to the 
occasion,”175 organizing, canvasing, protesting, filing lawsuits, and running 
for office. As Trump’s approval ratings continue to sink, women and their 
supporters continue to build on their momentum.176
                                                          
174. Editorial, The Tax Bill That Inequality Created, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2017), https://
www.nytimes.com/2017/12/16/opinion/sunday/tax-bill-inequality-created.html (noting that “the top 
[one] percent of the population by wealthʊthe group that would primarily benefit from the tax 
billʊcontrols nearly [forty] percent of the country’s wealth.”). Susan Faludi, The Patriarchs Are 
Falling. The Patriarchy is Stronger than Ever., N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 31, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/12/28/opinion/sunday/patriarchy-feminism-metoo.html (noting that the Act “systematically guts 
benefits that support women who need support the most”).
175. Krugman, supra note 172.
176. See Kate Zernike, The Trump Resistance Found Early Success. Can It Also Find 
Momentum?, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 9, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/09/health/the-trumpresis
tance-found-early-success-can-it-also-find-momentum.html. See also Editorial, What Trump Doesn’t 
Get About the State of the Union, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/01/30/opinion/editorials/donald-trump-sotu-boasting.html (noting that, “If not exactly ‘woke,’ this 
country might certainly be described as awakening, with a shot at shedding the civic apathy that has 
afflicted it for far too long.  It is with backhanded gratitude that we might all thank President Trump for 
that.”).
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I. INTRODUCTION
Since 2011, the conflict in Syria has caused the death of hundreds of 
thousands of individuals and the displacement of millions.1 Efforts to refer 
the Syrian situation to the International Criminal Court (ICC) have 
consistently failed despite well-documented reports about the commission 
of serious crimes in Syria, including the use of chemical weapons against 
civilians, torture, the use of child soldiers, and crimes of sexual violence.2
Only a handful of situations have been investigated thus far, mostly within 
national jurisdictions of western European nations.3 While the Security 
Council has been deadlocked with respect to Syria, the General Assembly 
passed a resolution in December 2016, establishing the International, 
Impartial and Independent Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation and 
Prosecution of Persons Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes Under 
International Law Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 
2011 (Mechanism or IIIM).4 As of today, it is unclear whether the evidence 
gathered through the Mechanism will be used in a subsequent prosecution, 
and whether the work of the Mechanism will lead toward accountability for 
those responsible for Syrian atrocities.
                                                          
* Associate Dean for Academic Enrichment and Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall 
College of Law.  The author would like to thank the organizers of International Law Weekend 2017 for 
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1. Jack Moore, Syria War Death Toll Hits 321,000 with Further 145,000 Missing: Monitor,
NEWSWEEK (Mar. 13, 2017, 1:14 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/sixth-anniversary-syrian-conflict-loo
ms-war-monitor-says-465000-killed-or-567181 (reporting that as of March 2017, the war in Syria has 
resulted in 321,000 deaths and that an additional 145,000 individuals were missing).
2. Press Release, Security Council, Referral of Syria to International Criminal Court Fails As 
Negative Votes Prevent Security Council from Adopting Draft Resolution, U.N. Press Release 
SC/11407 (May 22, 2014).
3. See infra Part II.
4. Beti Hohler & Elizabeth Pederson, The Syria Mechanism: Bridge to Prosecutions Or
Evidentiary Limbo?, E-INT’L REL. (May 26, 2017), http://www.e-ir.info/2017/05/26/the-syria-mechanis
m-bridge-to-prosecutions-or-evidentiary-limbo/.
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Parallel to the ongoing quest for accountability, the international 
community has been concerned with negotiating peace for Syria in order to 
end the violent civil war, which has already claimed thousands of lives.5
Achieving peace in Syria may not necessarily lead toward immediate 
accountability, and conversely, a focus on accountability may derail the 
peace process.  This Article will explore whether the dual goals of peace 
and justice can be reconciled in the Syrian context, and how these goals 
may be properly sequenced, in order to potentially achieve long-lasting 
peace in Syria without sacrificing justice.  Part I will explore the tension 
between the dual goals of peace and justice in both a theoretical manner, as 
well as in the Syrian context.  Part II will describe existing accountability 
models in the international community and how these may be applicable in 
the Syrian situation, and Part III will focus on the work of the Mechanism, 
an already established model of preliminary accountability for Syria. This 
Article will conclude that peace and justice may appear irreconcilable in 
some contexts, but that such goals may co-exist if properly sequenced and 
applied to a particular situation, such as Syria.
II. DUAL GOALS OF PEACE AND JUSTICE
Peace and justice may co-exist in some contexts and societies.  Peace 
and justice may however appear irreconcilable in other transitional justice 
scenarios.  In some situations, the pursuit of justice and accountability may 
be viewed as undermining the prospects of peace. In such transitional 
justice societies, the pursuit of peace may appear more important than the 
quest for accountability, and the latter may be sacrificed in order to halt 
bloodshed and achieve peace.6 In other situations, however, it may be 
possible to sequence peace and justice—to seek the end of violence first but 
to focus on accountability later.
In several Latin American countries, dictators which had ruled such 
countries in the late 1970s and early 1980s peacefully stepped out of power, 
but requested blanket amnesties for themselves and other members of their 
oppressive regimes.7 In such instances, it may be argued that accountability 
                                                          
5. News Focus: Syria, UN NEWS CTR., https://www.un.org/apps/news/infocusRel.asp?infoc
usID=146 (last visited Jan. 18, 2018) (reporting on ongoing Syrian peace negotiations, and that parties 
to the peace process have met in Geneva four times during 2017, and three times during 2016; reporting 
also that parties to the peace process attended, in parallel, Astana peace talks in Kazakhstan in early 
2017).
6. See TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN LATIN AMERICA: THE UNEVEN ROAD FROM IMPUNITY 
TOWARDS ACCOUNTABILITY 1–6 (Elin Skaar et al. eds., 2016).
7. Steven R. Ratner, New Democracies, Old Atrocities: An Inquiry in International Law, 87
GEO. L.J. 707, 720–29 (1999); see Jo-Marie Burt, The Torture Report: Latin America’s Lessons for the 
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was sacrificed toward the pursuit of peace and a peaceful transition to 
democracy.  In many Latin American countries, however, accountability 
has become important and amnesty laws have been overturned or ignored.  
Thus, criminal trials have moved forward in several countries, including 
Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Peru, and Guatemala.8 It may be argued that 
while the pursuit of peace and the goal of a peaceful transition to 
democracy trumped accountability in the first instance in many Latin 
American societies, but that accountability remained important nonetheless 
and is currently at the forefront in many such countries and societies.
In other instances, peace and justice have always co-existed, either 
through peace accords coupled with modified accountability mechanisms, 
or through peace accords and concurrent prosecutions. South Africa is an 
example of the former.  When the South African apartheid regime 
negotiated its surrender of power and agreed to transition to a democratic 
regime, questions of accountability prominently surfaced.9 Would 
members of the apartheid regime face accountability for the atrocities 
which they committed while in power? If so, pursuant to which model of 
accountability? Accountability became a stumbling stone in the transition 
process, with the ruling apartheid party members requiring immunity from 
prosecution as a condition of their peaceful exit from power.10 A solution 
was negotiated with the creation of the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (TRC)—a commission equipped with issuing amnesty (from 
domestic prosecution) to those who testified before it and were able to 
establish that the acts which they committed had a political purpose.11
Ultimately, the TRC granted 1167 applications for amnesty, out of a total of 
7000 applications received; those who did not receive amnesty from the 
TRC remained subject to the possibility of criminal prosecution in South 
African courts.12 In South Africa, the goal of peace resulted in the creation 
                                                          
United States, NACLA (Dec. 10, 2014), https://nacla.org/news/2014/12/10/torture-report-latin-america’s-
lessons-united-states.
8. Burt, supra note 7.
9. Jasmina Brankovic, Responsabilidad y Reconciliación Nacional en Sudáfrica 
[Accountability and National Reconciliation in South Africa], EDICIONES INFOJUS: DERECHOS 
HUMANOS 2, no. 4, 2013, at 55–86.
10. Unit 6. The End of Apartheid and the Birth of Democracy, S. AFR.: OVERCOMING 
APARTHEID BUILDING DEMOCRACY, http://overcomingapartheid.msu.edu/unit.php?id=65-24E-6 (last 
visited Feb. 4, 2018); Alex Boraine, Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa: The Third Way, in
TRUTH V. JUSTICE: THE MORALITY OF TRUTH COMMISSIONS 141, 143–44 (Robert I. Rotberg & Dennis 
Thompson eds., 2000).
11. TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION, http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/ (last visited 
Feb. 4, 2018).
12. TRC Category - 3.  Amnesty, TRACES TRUTH, http://truth.wwl.wits.ac.za/cat_descr.php?
cat=3 (last visited Feb. 4, 2018).
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of a modified accountability mechanism, the TRC.  While many have 
applauded the TRC as an appropriate mechanism for achieving peace and 
reconciliation in South Africa, some have questioned whether such 
commissions in general provide appropriate accountability for those 
responsible of the most serious atrocities and violations of international 
law.13 It may be concluded that in South Africa, peace and justice co-
existed, but that justice took on a modified accountability form through the 
TRC.
The former Yugoslavia and Sierra Leone are examples of transitional 
justice scenarios where peace and accountability co-existed almost 
simultaneously.  In the former Yugoslavia, the civil war ended with the 
Dayton Peace Accords of 1995; the accords did not include an immunity 
clause for any Serbian, Croatian, or Muslim leaders and their respective 
regimes.14 The International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY), 
which was established through Security Council Chapter VII powers a few 
years before the Dayton Peace Accords, was ultimately able to prosecute 
most senior leaders of former Yugoslav states.15 Thus, in the former 
Yugoslavia, justice was not sacrificed for peace, and the pursuit of peace 
did not derail the pursuit of accountability.  Instead, peace and justice were 
correctly sequenced and it may be argued that both were achieved.
In Sierra Leone, the 1999 Lome Peace Accord contained an amnesty 
provision.16 When the Special Court for Sierra Leone was established in 
2002, the Court determined that it could impose accountability of those who 
may have been subjects of the amnesty provision of the Lome Peace
Accord, because the amnesty concerned domestic prosecutions only and the
Court was of an international/hybrid character.17 In Sierra Leone, like in 
                                                          
13. See Azanian Peoples Org. (AZAPO) et al. v. President of the Republic of South Africa
1996 (4) SA 1 (CC) at 22 para. 21 (S. Afr.).
14. See generally General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bosn. 
& Herz.-Croat.-Yugo., Dec. 14, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 75; see also John R.W.D. Jones, The Implications of 
the Peace Agreement for the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 7 EUR. J. INT’L
L. 226, 234 (1996) (noting that the Dayton Peace Accords did not contain an amnesty clause).
15. The ICTY “was established by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the United 
Nations Charter as an enforcement measure aimed at restoring and maintaining international peace and 
security in the region (S/RES/827 (1993)).”  Jones, supra note 14, at 226 n.2 (1996).  For a general 
discussion of the relationship between the Dayton Peace Accords and the ICTY, see id. at 226–44.
16. Peace Agreement Between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United 
Front of Sierra Leone, Sierra Leone, Sierra-Leona-R.U.F./S.L., July 7, 1999.
17. Special Court for Sierra Leone Appeals Chamber, May 25, 2004, SCSL-2004-14-
AR72(E), (SL); Press Release, Amnesty International, Sierra Leone: Special Court Rejects Amnesty for 
the Worst Crimes Known to Humanity (Mar. 18, 2004) (“The Special Court for Sierra Leone held that, 
in accordance with international law, the general amnesty granted in the 1999 Lomé peace agreement 
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the former Yugoslavia, peace and justice were properly sequenced and 
somewhat simultaneously achieved.
The above examples demonstrate that peace and justice may co-exist, 
and that, if sequenced properly, both may be achieved in a transitional 
society.  In Syria, the goal of peace should not altogether trump the goal of 
accountability.  Peace and accountability could co-exist, similar to the 
South African, Yugoslav, and Sierra Leonian experiences.  Peace and 
justice could co-exist either pursuant to the South African model, where 
accountability took the form of a TRC, or pursuant to the former 
Yugoslavia and Sierra Leone models, where a peace treaty was signed and 
accountability imposed, through an international or hybrid tribunal, in the 
short term following the achievement of peace.  The section below will 
briefly discuss existing accountability options for Syria.
III. EXISTING ACCOUNTABILITY AND JUSTICE MODELS
Several accountability models exist and have already been utilized in 
different international and non-international conflicts.  Such accountability 
models include national prosecutions, internationalized domestic war 
crimes chambers, hybrid tribunals, international ad hoc tribunals, and the 
ICC.18 In addition, truth and reconciliation commissions, as mentioned 
above, have been formed and analyzed as alternative models of 
accountability.19 This section will briefly describe such existing models of 
accountability while assessing whether they could be utilized in the Syrian 
context.
Perpetrators of atrocities such as war crimes, crimes against humanity, 
genocide, or other violations, can be prosecuted in national courts, provided 
that such national jurisdictions have penal laws which have codified such 
international crimes as well as appropriate jurisdictional statutes.20 As of 
today, many national jurisdictions have penal codes which embrace 
international crimes.21 In addition, perpetrators of international offenses 
                                                          
was ‘ineffective’ in preventing international courts, such as the Special Court, or foreign courts from 
prosecuting crimes against humanity and war crimes.”).
18. See generally Milena Sterio, The Future of Ad Hoc Tribunals: An Assessment of Their 
Utility Post-ICC, 19 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 237 (2013) (noting different types of models of 
accountability and existing tribunals).
19. Abdul Rahman Lamin, Building Peace Through Accountability in Sierra Leone: The 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Special Court, 38 J. ASIAN & AFR. STUD. 295 (2003) 
(discussing truth and reconciliation commissions and accountability).
20. See, e.g., Helmut Kreicker, National Prosecution of International Crimes from A 
Comparative Perspective, 5 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 313 (2005).
21. DAVID A. KAYE, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL., COUNCIL SPECIAL REP. NO. 61, JUSTICE 
BEYOND THE HAGUE: SUPPORTING THE PROSECUTION OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMES IN NATIONAL 
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can often be charged and prosecuted for domestic law offenses, such as 
murder, torture, rape, kidnapping, etc.22 Most national jurisdictions require 
a nexus between the perpetrator or investigated alleged crime and their own 
territory.23 Thus, many national courts will exercise jurisdiction over an 
offender if the offender is a national of the prosecuting state, if victims were 
nationals of the prosecuting state, or if the national security interests of the 
prosecuting state were somehow harmed by the underlying criminal 
offense.24 Some countries have codified the principle of universal 
jurisdiction and allow for prosecutions of all alleged criminals for 
particularly heinous offenses, such as genocide, torture, slavery, etc.25
Perpetrators of atrocities in Syria could be prosecuted in Syrian 
national courts for domestic/Syrian law offenses under Syrian criminal 
law.26 Syrian courts would surely have jurisdiction over Syrian perpetrators 
for alleged crimes committed on Syrian territory.  This scenario, although 
theoretically possible, is not feasible in the current political climate and 
leadership of President Assad.  It is unlikely that President Assad would 
allow Syrian courts to investigate atrocities which may potentially implicate 
his own regime.  In addition, because of the ongoing conflict in Syria, it is 
uncertain how much capacity Syrian domestic courts would have to 
undertake a complex investigation and prosecution, which could implicate a 
multitude of evidentiary documents, witnesses, and other resources.27
                                                          
COURTS 6 (June 2011), https://www.cfr.org/sites/default/files/pdf/2011/05/Beyond_The_Hague_CSR
61.pdf (noting that countries such as Argentina, Bosnia, Colombia and Germany have established 
national courts and specialized chambers capable of prosecuting individuals for war crimes and crimes 
against humanity, and that many NATO countries have the practice of prosecuting their own military 
personnel accused of war crimes).
22. See, e.g., Courts of First Resort: Prosecuting International Crimes at the National Level,
ICTJ (Oct. 24, 2012), https://www.ictj.org/news/courts-first-resort-prosecuting-international-crimesnati
onal-level (reporting on the Greentree Conference on Complementarity, at which conference 
participants assessed national prosecutions for the purposes of ICC complementarity with respect to 
Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Guatemala, and Ivory Coast.); see also
National Prosecutions of International Crimes, MAX-PLANCK-INSTITUT FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES UND
INTERNATIONALES STRAFRECHT, https://www.mpicc.de/en/forschung/forschungsarbeit/strafrecht/nation
ale_strafverfolgung.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2018) (reporting on conferences and reports issued for 
various countries around the world and their capacity to prosecute international crimes, in the context of 
ICC complementarity regime).
23. Kreicker, supra note 20.
24. Id.
25. See generally Elizabeth B. Ludwin King, Big Fish, Small Ponds: International Crimes in 
National Courts, 90 IND. L.J. 829 (2015).
26. Kreicker, supra note 20. This conclusion flows from the principle of territoriality of 
jurisdiction: the idea that states have territorial jurisdiction over offenses committed on their territory.
27. Mark Chadwick, Jusice in Syria:  Five Ways to Prosecute International Crime,
CONVERSATION (July 10, 2017, 9:05 AM), http://theconversation.com/justice-in-syria-five-ways-toprose
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Moreover, it is uncertain whether the Syrian judiciary is truly independent
and neutral, and whether it would be able to lead a politically charged 
investigation without interference from the Assad regime.28
National courts of other states, however, could investigate and
possibly prosecute perpetrators of atrocities in Syria.  These types of 
proceedings can occur either in situations where the prosecuting authority 
has a nexus to the alleged crime (for example, if the perpetrator is a national 
or resident of the prosecuting state), or in countries where universal 
jurisdiction statutes exist and where the heinous and universal nature of the 
alleged crime justifies prosecution by any state’s courts.29 According to 
recent reports, investigations into Syria are already occurring in France, 
Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland.30 In 
Sweden, three individuals have been separately tried and convicted of 
crimes committed in Syria’s war after they left the country and traveled to 
Sweden.31 In addition, German authorities have successfully prosecuted 
perpetrators of Syrian atrocities.32 More investigations and cases of this 
sort could take place in the future, and it is human rights defenders’ hope 
that the Mechanism will continue to assist with such prosecutions and 
cases.33 While prosecuting perpetrators of Syrian atrocities in national 
courts under universal jurisdiction constitutes imperfect justice (because 
such cases are often piecemeal, unlikely to satisfy all victims, result in trials 
in absentia, and may result in dismissals), slow and imperfect justice may 
                                                          
cute-international-crime-75908 (“Prosecution of atrocities in the Syrian courts would present 
considerable logistical and financial difficulties for a ruined state. Even if national trials were feasible 
(if funded externally, for instance) they would risk being politically vulnerable to manipulation by the 
ruling elite, whoever that may be.”).
28. Id.
29. Justice for Syria, AMNESTY INT’L, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2017/03/
justice-for-syria/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2018) [hereinafter AMNESTY INT’L].
30. Q&A: First Cracks to Impunity in Syria, Iraq, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Oct. 20, 2016, 12:01 
AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/10/20/qa-first-cracks-impunity-syria-iraq [hereinafter HUM. RTS.
WATCH: Q&A]; see also Chadwick, supra note 27 (reporting that in Sweden, Finland, Germany and 
Switzerland refugees present in those countries and suspected of international crimes are being 
prosecuted under the doctrine of universal jurisdiction).
31. Vera Padberg, Prosecutions of Syrian War Crimes, ILAWYER BLOG (Feb. 18, 2017), http://
ilawyerblog.com/prosecutions-of-syrian-war-crimes/.
32. Syria:  First Atrocities Trials Held in Europe, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Oct. 3, 2017, 12:00 
AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/10/03/syria-first-atrocities-trials-held-europe (reporting that 
German courts have successfully prosecuted and convicted Syrian perpetrators, albeit on terrorism 
charges, and that Swedish courts have also successfully prosecuted and convicted perpetrators of Syrian 
atrocities).
33. See AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 29.
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be beneficial to no justice at all.34 According to war crimes prosecutor 
Stephen Rapp, “the slow-moving wheels of justice eventually caught up 
with Chile’s Augusto Pinochet and Slobodan Milosevic of the former 
Yugoslavia.”35 As of today, it appears that the Mechanism will cooperate 
with national jurisdictions and will share some of its investigative work 
with national prosecutors and that national prosecutions may represent the 
only near-future model of accountability for Syria.
Because national prosecutions often suffer from “defects,” such as 
inexperienced judges, prosecutors, and defense counsel, inadequate 
criminal laws and jurisdictional statutes, and insufficient resources, some 
countries have created specialized war crimes chambers within their 
existing judiciaries to investigate and prosecute cases involving 
international crimes and atrocities.36 Such war crimes chambers already 
exist in Bosnia and Herzegovina.37 The advantage of specialized war 
crimes chambers is that they may receive assistance from the international 
community through programs to train judges, prosecutors, and defense 
counsel, assistance with the possible re-drafting of national penal laws as 
well as with communications and outreach strategies, and other financial 
resources.  Some domestic war chambers may become “internationalized” 
in light of significant involvement and assistance by the international 
community.38 Examples of internationalized domestic war crimes 
chambers include the Iraqi Special Tribunal, as well as the new Kosovo 
Specialist Chambers.39
                                                          
34. See HUM. RTS. WATCH: Q&A, supra note 30.
35. James Reinl, Could Syria’s ‘Prosecutor Without A Tribunal’ Work?, ALJAZEERA (May 
31, 2017), http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/05/syria-prosecutor-tribunal-work-17052911
0910869.html.
36. Sterio, supra note 18, at 244.
37. Id. at 245 (noting that the Bosnian War Chamber “is a specialized domestic chamber that 
handles various war crimes cases, either handed down by the ICTY as part of its completion strategy, or 
investigated on its own,” that the Chamber applies local law and is located in the capital city of 
Sarajevo, and that the Chamber “employs a mix of international staff, as well as local Bosnian Serbs, 
Croats, and Muslims”).
38. Id.
39. Id.; see KOSOVO SPECIALIST CHAMBERS & SPECIALIST PROSECUTOR’S OFF.,
https://www.scp-ks.org/en (last visited Jan. 31, 2017) [hereinafter KOSOVO] (“Kosovo Specialist
Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor’s Office are part of the judicial system of Kosovo. The Chambers 
are attached to each level of the Kosovo court system . . . .  They are of temporary nature with a specific 
mandate and jurisdiction, namely over certain crimes against humanity, war crimes and other crimes 
under Kosovo law which allegedly occurred between 1 January 1998 and 31 December 2000 . . . . The 
Specialist Chambers have a seat in The Hague, the Netherlands, and are to be staffed with international 
judges, prosecutors and staff.”).
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Under the current Syrian leadership of President Assad, it is unrealistic 
to expect the creation of a specialized war chamber.  The same deficiencies 
which would plague a national prosecution in Syria would similarly affect a 
specialized tribunal or chamber.  Because of resources necessary to create a 
specialized war crimes chamber, it is also unrealistic to expect that a 
foreign jurisdiction would create a specialized chamber within its own 
judicial system solely for the benefit of prosecuting Syrian atrocities.  The 
existing and past war crimes chambers and tribunals, in Bosnia, Kosovo, 
and Iraq have all been created toward the purpose of prosecuting 
individuals responsible for atrocities committed in those same countries.40
A specialized war crimes chamber, or a national prosecution, in Syria could 
however exist if a new regime were to be put in place or elected. If
President Assad were to step down, a new leadership committed to 
transitional justice may be interested and able to prosecute perpetrators 
either in Syrian national courts or in a specialized war crimes chamber.  As 
of today, this is a remote possibility.
A third model of accountability which has been utilized by some 
countries over the past two decades is the creation of a hybrid tribunal.  
Hybrid tribunals are typically established through an agreement between 
the host nation, affected by a conflict and resolving transitional justice 
issues, and the international community, typically the United Nations.41
Recent examples of hybrid tribunals include the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon.42 Hybrid tribunals typically 
apply a mixture of domestic and international law and are typically 
composed of judicial chambers consisting of domestic and international 
judges.43 They may be located in the host country and thus may have a 
stronger territorial nexus to the conflict which they are trying to address.44
In theory, one could envision the creation of a hybrid tribunal for Syria
in the future.  Academics have already proposed the creation of such a 
tribunal.45 In the United States, a group of senators recently introduced a 
                                                          
40. See KOSOVO, supra note 39; Sterio, supra note 18.
41. Sterio, supra note 18, at 240–41.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 241.
44. See, e.g., Lindsey Raub, Positioning Hybrid Tribunals in International Criminal Justice,
41 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1013, 1023–25 (2009).
45. See Blue Ribbon Panel of Experts to Unveil Draft Statute for Syrian Tribunal on October 
3, 8:30-9:30 AM, At the National Press Club in Washington D.C., PILPG (Sept. 25, 2013), https://
www.publicinternationallawandpolicygroup.org/blue-ribbon-panel-of-experts-to-unveil-draftstatuteforsy
rian-tribunal-on-october-3-830-930-am-at-the-national-press-club-in-washington-d-c/ (reporting that a 
panel of former international tribunal chief prosecutors, international judges, and leading experts has 
prepared a Draft Statute for a Syrian Extraordinary Tribunal to Prosecute Atrocity Crimes).
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bipartisan bill—Syrian War Crimes Accountability Act—aimed at 
investigating war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide in Syria 
and at imposing accountability on Syrian President Assad.46 In this bill, the 
senators called on the United States Secretary of State to assist in creating a 
hybrid tribunal to investigate and prosecute those responsible for most 
heinous abuses in Syria, as part of “credible transitional justice efforts.”47
Nonetheless, the hybrid tribunal option remains difficult to implement 
while President Assad is in power.  The establishment of a hybrid tribunal 
presupposes the host country’s agreement, and as mentioned above, it is 
unlikely that the Assad regime would agree to an investigation and 
prosecutions by a hybrid tribunal which would implicate itself.48 If Syrian 
leadership changed and a new regime accepted to work with the 
international community to establish a hybrid tribunal, this option may be 
attractive for a conflict such as the one in Syria.  One of the main 
advantages of hybrid tribunals is their ability to tailor their statutes to the 
particular conflict they are seeking to address, by incorporating both 
domestic and international law offenses.  A hybrid tribunal for Syria could 
prosecute perpetrators for international crimes, but could also incorporate 
Syrian penal law offenses, if necessary.  Another advantage of such 
tribunals is their proximity to the conflict, if they are located in the host 
country. This is helpful because in terms of outreach to the Syrian people, 
reconciliation, and national healing, a hybrid tribunal located in Syria 
would be able to more easily investigate and collect evidence and would 
likely perform better.49 As of today, because the probability of regime 
change in Syria remains low for the near future, a hybrid tribunal remains a 
theoretical but unlikely option.
A fourth model of accountability involves the creation of an ad hoc 
international criminal tribunal.  The United Nations Security Council, 
through its Chapter VII powers, created two such tribunals in the 1990s, for 
the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda.50 These tribunals were created 
against the wishes of the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda and were located 
outside of these two countries, at The Hague and in Arusha, Tanzania, 
                                                          
46. US Senators Call for ‘Hybrid Tribunal’ for Syrian War Crimes, RT (Apr. 8, 2017, 11:16), 
https://www.rt.com/usa/384024-hybrid-tribunal-syria-bill/.
47. Id.
48. Chadwick, supra note 27 (“If the Bashar al-Assad regime is to remain in power in Syria 
this may create significant difficulties for this approach. Its success would depend on the government’s 
willingness to cooperate and submit itself to investigation alongside opposition groups.”).
49. See Sterio, supra note 18, at 240.
50. Marieke L. Wierda, What Lessons Can Be Learned from the Ad Hoc Tribunals?, 9 U.C.
DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL'Y 13, 13–14 (2002) (noting the establishing of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)).
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respectively.51 International ad hoc tribunals are composed of international 
judges and apply international criminal law; they typically do not 
incorporate any of the features of domestic criminal systems and do not 
employ local judges.52 Although such tribunals do not necessitate the 
relevant country’s approval, they do require a Security Council resolution 
because they involve a process which breaches the affected country’s 
sovereignty.  In the Syrian context, Russia and China have already vetoed 
resolutions which would have authorized the referral of the Syrian situation 
to the ICC, and it is highly likely that Russia and China would also veto a 
resolution seeking to establish the creation of a new ad hoc tribunal for 
Syria.53 Thus, this option remains of limited utility today.  If the geo-
political situation were to change drastically and if Russia and China ceased 
to support Assad, or if Assad were to step down and a new regime, less pro-
Russian and pro-Chinese, were put in power in Syria, then an international 
ad hoc tribunal could be possible.  In the short term, this is unlikely to
occur.
Last, the ICC is another model of accountability, where perpetrators of 
atrocities, such as those committed in Syria, can be prosecuted.  The ICC 
has jurisdiction over three main categories of crimes: genocide; crimes 
against humanity; and war crimes.54 In order for a case to come within the 
ICC’s jurisdiction, the alleged crime or crimes must have been committed 
on the territory of a member state, or the perpetrator must be a national of a 
member state.55 Additionally, cases may be referred to the ICC by the 
Security Council.56 Syria is not a member of the ICC.57 Assuming war 
crimes and crimes against humanity took place in Syria, the ICC would 
have jurisdiction only over cases involving so-called “foreign fighters”—
individuals who are nationals of an ICC member state and who chose to 
fight in the Syrian conflict.58 The court would not have jurisdiction over 
                                                          
51. Id.
52. Sterio, supra note 18, at 238.
53. See Chadwick, supra note 27.
54. See, e.g., James F. Alexander, The International Criminal Court and the Prevention of 
Atrocities: Predicting the Court's Impact, 54 VILL. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (2009) (describing the establishment 
of the International Criminal Court, Situations and Cases).
55. Id. at 3.
56. Simi Singh, The Future of International Criminal Law: The International Criminal Court 
(ICC), 10 TOURO INT’L L. REV. 1, 8–9 (2000); see also Sterio, supra note 18, at 239–40.
57. Chadwick, supra note 27.
58. See Jennifer Trahan, New Paths to Accountability for Crimes in Syria and Iraq (Including 
ICC Jurisdiction over Foreign Fighters), JUST SECURITY (Nov. 12, 2014), https://www.justsecurity.org
/17308/paths-accountability-crimes-syria-iraq-including-icc-jurisdiction-foreign-fighters/ (noting that 
the ICC would have jurisdiction over “foreign fighters”).
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cases involving Syrian nationals, because the alleged crimes occurred in 
Syria, on the territory of a non-member state, and the Syrian perpetrators 
are not nationals of a member state.59 As mentioned above, the United 
Nations Security Council can refer any case to the ICC; in the case of Syria, 
however, Russia and China have already exercised their respective veto 
powers over a proposed resolution referring the Syrian situation to the 
ICC.60 Thus, the ICC is of limited utility in the Syrian context, as it can 
only assume jurisdiction over cases involving foreign fighters who are 
nationals of ICC member states.
This relative lack of accountability mechanisms for Syria—as detailed 
above, in the current situation, where the only viable accountability model 
is national prosecutions of perpetrators in the courts of third countries 
which are willing and able to take such remote cases—has led the General 
Assembly to envision a more creative solution.  Thus, in December 2016, 
the General Assembly passed a resolution creating a Mechanism for Syria.61
The section below will discuss the Mechanism’s main features and will 
assess whether the Mechanism can lead toward accountability in Syria.
IV. IIIM
As mentioned above, the United Nations General Assembly created a 
Mechanism for Syria in December 2016.62 The Mechanism is not a 
tribunal, and its purpose instead is to collect and preserve evidence, which 
will later be shared with relevant international and national tribunals that 
may in the future prosecute those responsible for crimes committed in 
Syria.63 The Mechanism’s mandate is to focus on the most serious crimes: 
genocide; crimes against humanity; and war crimes.64 The Mechanism will 
be located in Geneva, and it will be staffed with an international judge or 
prosecutor and renown experts in international criminal law.65 The 
Mechanism’s primary purpose will be to collect and organize evidence 
                                                          
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Syria:  UN General Assembly Adopts Resolution on War Crimes Investigations, HUM.
RTS. WATCH (Dec. 21, 2016, 5:15 PM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/12/21/syria-un-general-assemb
ly-adopts-resolution-war-crimes-investigations.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism on 
International Crimes Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic, UNITED NATIONS HUM. RTS. OFF. HIGH 
COMMISSIONER (Feb. 27, 2017), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?News
ID=21241.
65. Id.
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(both inculpatory and exculpatory), which will in the future be shared with 
competent tribunals and which will contribute toward future prosecutions of 
perpetrators of Syrian atrocities.66 The Mechanism, however, will not share 
information with jurisdictions and authorities which impose the death 
penalty, and/or which do not abide by basic international human rights 
standards, such as the right to a fair trial.67 According to one set of 
commentators, “[t]he Mechanism is an important addition to the 
international justice landscape” which may “provide a bridge between the 
contemporaneous collection of evidence and its use in trials that may take 
place years or even decades later.”68 Overall, the Mechanism’s ultimate 
goal “is to ensure justice for the victims of these crimes and for all the 
Syrian people affected by the violence.”69
For now, according to Kenneth Roth, executive director of Human 
Rights Watch, the Mechanism is a “prosecutor without a tribunal,” and it 
remains to be seen how the evidence it collects may be used in the future, 
and whether the Mechanism will ultimately contribute toward the 
protection of human rights.70 Because of Russian and Chinese veto, 
Security Council has been deadlocked and it is unlikely that the Syrian 
situation will be referred to the ICC in the near future, or that an ad hoc 
tribunal will be established for Syria.71 Thus, it appears more likely that the 
Mechanism will share evidence and information with national jurisdictions, 
prosecuting perpetrators of Syrian atrocities under a universal jurisdiction 
model.
In sum, it may be argued that the Mechanism is the first step necessary 
toward protecting human rights in Syria, by collecting evidence necessary 
toward successful future prosecutions and by initiating the accountability 
conversation regarding Syria within the international community.  As 
mentioned above, in light of the Russian and Chinese veto, it is unlikely 
that the Security Council will refer the Syrian situation to the ICC in the 
near future.72 It is more likely that the Syrian situation will be investigated 
within national jurisdictions.  If President Assad were to step down and if a 
new regime were to be elected or otherwise installed in Syria, a new hybrid 
tribunal could be established for Syria.  Such a hybrid tribunal in Syria 
                                                          
66. Id.
67. Hohler & Pederson, supra note 4.
68. Id.
69. Kailey Love, Will U.N.’s Accountability Mechanism Provide Justice in Syria?, WASH.
REP. ON MIDDLE E. AFF., https://www.wrmea.org/jordan/lebanon/syria/will-u.n.s-accountabilitymechan
ism-provide-justice-in-syria.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2018).
70. Reinl, supra note 35.
71. Trahan, supra note 58.
72. Id.
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could build upon the legacy of the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the 
Special Tribunal for Lebanon, and it could contribute further toward the 
protection of human rights in the international community.  The Mechanism 
is likely to work with both national jurisdictions as well as with any Syria 
hybrid tribunal in the future; it is, therefore, the first important step toward 
accountability for Syria.
V. CONCLUSION
With respect to Syria, it may be that the war ends in regime transition 
and that members of the Assad leadership face accountability, either in the 
ICC (assuming no Russian or Chinese veto), or in an ad hoc tribunal, set up 
by the Security Council or negotiated by the new Syrian leadership and the 
international community.  If Assad were to step down from power, a new 
Syrian government could also choose to initiate national prosecutions, or to 
establish a specialized war crimes chamber to try those responsible for the 
most serious atrocities during the Syrian civil war.  Because many 
accountability options remain open in the future, the ongoing quest for 
peace in Syria should not sacrifice accountability.  Peace negotiators should 
focus instead on ending violence without promising blanket immunity to 
those involved in the conflict, thereby leaving open the option of near-
future accountability, through domestic or international prosecutions.  
Peace and justice can be sequenced properly in Syria, as both of these goals 
are fundamental to the achievement of global peace and stability.
THE INCONSEQUENTIAL CHOICE-OF-LAW 
QUESTION POSED BY JESNER V. ARAB BANK
Beth Van Schaack*
In Jesner v. Arab Bank,1 the United States (U.S.) Supreme Court has 
taken up the question of whether victims of human rights abuses can sue 
corporations and other legal entities for violations of the law of nations 
under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS).2 In Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum 
Co. (Kiobel I), the Second Circuit ruled that they cannot because—by its 
analysis—international law does not affirmatively provide for corporate tort 
liability.3 By contrast, all the other circuits to consider the issue have ruled 
or assumed that such cases can go forward in U.S. courts,4 yielding a 
decidedly lopsided circuit split.5 Indeed, the Second Circuit itself is now 
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1. In re Arab Bank, PLC Alien Tort Statute Litig., 808 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 2015); see also
Jesner v. Arab Bank, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/jesner-v-arab-bank-
plc/ (last visited Oct. 29, 2017).
2. The First Congress enacted the ATS as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which created 
the federal court system; it states that “district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action 
by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”  
Alien’s Action for Tort, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
3. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010) (“Kiobel I”), aff’d on 
other grounds. See also Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108 (2013) (“Kiobel II”).
4. See, e.g., In re Arab Bank, 808 F.3d at 151 (“[O]n the issue of corporate liability under the 
ATS, Kiobel I now appears to swim alone against the tide.”); Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 
758 F.3d 516, 530–31 (4th Cir. 2014); Doe v. Nestle USA, Inc., 766 F.3d 1013, 1022 (9th Cir. 2014), 
aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 527 App’x 7 (D.C. Cir. 2013); Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 57 
(D.C. Cir. 2011); Romero v. Drummond Co., Inc., 552 F.3d 1303, 1315 (11th Cir. 2008).
5. There is some irony to the fact that the Second Circuit now stands as the only circuit to 
hold firm to this conclusion. In an era when its judges were less hostile to ATS litigation, it was the 
Second Circuit that launched the corporate cases in the first place. In Kadic v. Karadžiü, 70 F.3d 232 
(2d Cir. 1995), the defendant Radovan Karadžiü argued that he could not be sued for many of the causes 
of action alleged because he was a private citizen. Curiously, he also argued—in an inconsistent 
alternative—that he was head of state of the self-proclaimed Republika Srpska and was thus entitled to
immunity. In an opinion evincing a sophisticated understanding of international law, the Second Circuit 
concluded that some causes of action under international law require a showing of state action as an 
element of the offense—such as the prohibition against torture—whereas others are undifferentiated and 
apply equally to non-state actors—such as the prohibitions against genocide and crimes against 
humanity. Id. at 239–40. Indeed, U.S. courts have also made clear that still other international rules are
oriented towards non-state actors, such as the prohibitions on terrorism and piracy. See Ali Shafi v. 
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subject to an intra-circuit split, with subsequent panels “grudgingly”
following Kiobel I, while urging their brethren to abandon an increasingly 
isolated position.6
Inherent to the dispute at hand is an a priori choice-of-law issue: 
Should courts look to international law or federal common law to resolve 
the question presented? While the Supreme Court established that 
international law provides the elements of plaintiffs’ substantive cause of 
action in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,7 the Court did not specify which body 
of law governs ancillary rules of decision8—such as the standards for aiding 
and abetting liability9 or the rules governing statutes of limitation, damages, 
standing, personal jurisdiction, and the like.10 As such, some judges have 
looked to federal common law (or to U.S. choice-of-law rules) to answer 
these questions that go beyond the strict contours of the plaintiff’s cause of 
action.11 Although contentious, this choice-of-law debate proves to be 
inconsequential when it comes to the availability of corporate tort liability, 
given that both bodies of law point in the same direction and hand victory, 
                                                          
Palestinian Auth., 642 F.3d 1088, 1096 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“[P]iracy in violation of the law of nations is 
by definition perpetrated by nonstate actors.”) (citing United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153, 163, n.h 
(1820)). By recognizing that some international law prohibitions govern private actors, the Second 
Circuit effectively opened the door to suits against corporate entities.
6. In connection with the denial of en banc review in Jesner, several Second Circuit judges 
indicated their disappointment that the Circuit “yet again missed an opportunity to correct the panel’s 
majority opinion” in Kiobel I.  In re Arab Bank, Plc Alien Tort Statute Litigation, 822 F.3d 34, 40–41
(2d Cir. 2016) (Pooler, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc). Subsequent Second Circuit 
panels have considered themselves bound by Kiobel I per Second Circuit practice. See Jones v. 
Coughlin, 45 F.3d 677, 679 (2d Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (holding that a decision by a panel of the 
Second Circuit “is binding unless and until it is overruled by the Court en banc or the Supreme Court”).
7. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 712 (2004) (holding that the ATS enables 
“federal courts to hear claims in a very limited category defined by the law of nations and recognized at 
common law”).
8. See Doe v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 965–66 (9th Cir. 2002) (Reinhardt, J., 
concurring), vacated by Doe v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003) (making a distinction 
between the underlying tort of summary execution alleged to have been committed by the Burmese 
military from the “ancillary legal question” of the corporate defendant’s liability as an accessory). That 
case settled while the en banc review was pending.
9. See, e.g., Chimène I. Keitner, Conceptualizing Complicity in Alien Tort Cases, 60 
HASTINGS L.J. 61, 64 (2008) (arguing that the aiding and abetting standard is a conduct-regulating norm 
that should be governed by customary international law under Sosa in contradistinction to other 
secondary rules of decision governed by domestic law).
10. Paul L. Hoffman & Daniel A. Zaheer, The Rules of the Road: Federal Common Law and 
Aiding and Abetting Under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 26 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 47, 52 
(2003) (noting disagreement around how to identify the body of law that should answer “such nuts and 
bolts questions”). 
11. See, e.g., Khulumani v. Barclay National Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 284 (2d Cir. 2007) (per 
curiam) (Hall, J., concurring); Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 487 F.3d 1193, 1202 (9th Cir. 2007).
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at least in this round, to the plaintiffs. In other words, regardless of whether 
courts look to U.S. law or to international law, the ATS supports corporate 
tort liability.
By way of background, in Sosa, the Supreme Court ended a 
longstanding academic debate by characterizing the ATS as “in terms only 
jurisdictional.”12 Nonetheless, it found that the statute provides a “limited, 
implicit sanction to entertain the handful of international law cum common 
law claims understood in 1789.”13 The Court then set out the methodology 
to be employed to determine which causes of action are actionable under 
the ATS: claims brought under the ATS must “rest on a norm of 
international character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a 
specificity comparable to the features of the 18th-century paradigms,” such 
as piracy, offenses against ambassadors, or violations of safe conduct.14
The choice-of-law exercise presented by Jesner turns in part on how courts 
should construe an enigmatic footnote in Sosa.15 There, the Court noted 
that whether an international norm satisfies this test gives rise to a “related 
consideration”: “whether international law extends the scope of liability for 
a violation of a given norm to the perpetrator being sued, if the defendant is 
a private actor such as a corporation or individual.”16
Corporate defendants and their supporters contend that international 
law speaks to the question of who or what kind of actor can violate 
international law. Accordingly, it is argued, the footnote dictates that the 
international law delict invoked by the plaintiff must itself be specifically 
addressed to corporate defendants.17 This is the position adopted by the
Kiobel I majority, which ruled that international law must affirmatively 
extend liability to “a particular class of defendant[s], such as 
corporations,”18 and that corporate liability did not meet the Sosa standard 
because “[n]o corporation has ever been subject to any form of liability 
(whether civil, criminal, or otherwise) under the customary international 
                                                          
12. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 712.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 694, 725. See also id. at 732 (reaffirming standard).
15. Id. at 732.
16. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732.
17. Brief for Respondent On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit, 15, 21, Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 137 S.Ct. 1432 (2017) (No. 16–499) http://www
.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/16-499-bs.pdf (last visited Jan. 25, 2018) [hereinafter 
Jesner]. 
18. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 127 (2d Cir. 2010) (“Kiobel I”), aff’d 
on other grounds.
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law of human rights.”19 This camp makes much of the fact that there are 
few international fora that assert jurisdiction—criminal or civil—over legal 
persons for breaches of international law and point in particular to the 
unsurprising fact that none of the international criminal tribunals convened 
from Nuremberg onward has exercised criminal jurisdiction over 
corporations for international law violations.20
By contrast, plaintiffs and their supporters interpret footnote 20 to be 
making a distinction between private actors and state actors—given that 
some international law norms require a showing of state action as a
constitutive element of the offense21—rather than suggesting that there are 
different classes of private actors that may not be amenable to suit for any 
cause of action at all. They argue that, in any case, the question of which 
private actors may be subject to tort liability should be resolved according 
to standard domestic law tort principles, on the theory that while 
international law addresses substantive standards of conduct, it leaves 
procedural modes of enforcement to individual states.22 In Kiobel I, Judge 
Leval urged this approach in his concurrence, reasoning that international 
law contains less developed liability rules and so “leaves the manner of 
enforcement . . . almost entirely to individual nations.”23 Reasoning that 
ATS cases are—at base—tort cases,24 plaintiffs often argue that default 
federal common law rules governing the tort liability of corporations and 
                                                          
19. Id. at 148.
20. Jesner, supra note 17, at 24–26.
21. For example, the conventional prohibition against torture requires a showing that the 
prohibited acts are “inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public 
official or other person acting in an official capacity.” Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment art. 1, Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20, 1465 
U.N.T.S. 85. See Kadic v. Karadžiü, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995); see also Ali Shafi v. Palestinian Auth.,
642 F.3d 1088, 1096 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
22. An analogy can be drawn to choice-of-law rules in diversity actions in the United States. 
See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471–72 (1965) (discussing importance of differentiating between 
rules that modify substantive rights and those that affect the administration of remedies in the context of 
choice-of-law determinations in federal diversity cases); see also id. at 475 (Harlan, J., concurring) 
(arguing courts should consider whether “the choice of rule would substantially affect those primary 
decisions respecting human conduct which our constitutional system leaves to state regulation”).
23. Kiobel I, 621 F.3d at 152 (Leval, J., concurring).
24. See Richard Herz, Symposium: It’s Just a Tort Case, SCOTUSBLOG (July 27, 2017, 2:24 
PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/07/symposium-just-tort-case/.
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other legal entities should apply25 absent compelling reasons for 
departure.26
The Second Circuit’s observation about the lack of corporate liability 
before international criminal courts is, of course, largely true,27 although 
there are some important exceptions. Starting with the World War II 
(WWII) era, defendants overlook the fact that the Nuremberg Tribunal did 
exercise a form of enterprise liability by declaring certain Nazi
organizations to be criminal.28 By contrast, today’s ad hoc international 
criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, East 
Timor, and Cambodia only assert criminal jurisdiction over natural persons
                                                          
25. Plaintiffs also point out that the same result is reached with a strictly textual read of the 
ATS, which identifies the class of plaintiffs who can sue but not the class of defendants that can be sued,
implying that there are no limits on the latter.
26. In addition to being amenable to tort liability as a matter of course, corporations can 
conceivably be charged for many international crimes codified in U.S. law. For example, Title 18’s 
prohibitions on torture, war crimes, and recruiting child soldiers encompass legal persons in addition to 
natural persons. See, e.g., Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal years 1994 & 1995, 18 U.S.C. § 
2340 (1994) (“Whoever outside the United States commits or attempts to commit torture shall . . . .”);
War Crimes, 18 U.S.C. § 2441(a) (2006) (holding accountable “whoever . . . commits a war crime”); 18
U.S.C. § 2442 (2008) (applying to “whoever knowingly . . . .”); Words Denoting Number, Gender, and 
So Forth, 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) (defining “whoever” to include “corporations, companies, associations, 
firms, partnerships . . . as well as individuals”).
27. There is no international tribunal dedicated to holding either corporations or natural 
persons civilly liable for international law violations. The International Court of Justice exercises civil 
jurisdiction, but only over claims between states. See Statute of International Court of Justice, 1945 
I.C.J, ch.II, at art. 34 (Oct. 24) [hereinafter I.C.J.]. Likewise, the human rights treaty bodies call states 
to account, although signatories do have obligations not only to “respect” human rights but also to 
“ensure” that individuals within their territories and jurisdiction enjoy those rights, which allows states 
to be held liable for insufficiently preventing or responding to harm caused by non-state actors,
including corporations. See Human Rights Committee, The Nature of the General Legal Obligation
Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, General Comment No. 31 [80], ¶ 8, 18th Sess., U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/21/Rev. 1/Add.13 (May 26, 2004) (“[T]he positive obligations on States Parties to ensure 
Covenant rights will only be fully discharged if individuals are protected by the State, not just against 
violations of Covenant rights by its agents, but also against acts committed by private persons or entities 
that would impair the enjoyment of Covenant rights in so far as they are amenable to application 
between private persons or entities.”).
28. See TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS 501 (1st ed. 1992) 
(discussing criminal indictment of Nazi organizations). The World War II-era tribunals also prosecuted 
corporate principals for international crimes and dissolved a number of corporations that participated in 
or benefited from such criminality in order to pay reparations to victims. In obiter dicta, the tribunals 
made clear that they considered corporations to be capable of violating international law and to being
held accountable for doing so.  See generally Brief for Nuremberg Scholars as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Petitioners, Jesner v. Arab Bank, No. 16-499 (U.S. June 27, 2017), http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-
content/uploads/2017/07/16-499-tsac-Nuremberg-Scholars-rev.pdf.
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given the terms of their constitutive statutes.29 In dicta, however, these 
tribunals have on occasion indicated that they consider legal persons—such 
as paramilitary organizations and business entities—to be capable of 
violating international law.30 For example, the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda clearly considered Radio Télévision Libre des Mille 
Collines to be responsible for instigating genocide, although it could only 
convict individual principals of the organization due to constraints 
contained within its statute.31
Drafters of the treaty establishing the permanent International 
Criminal Court (ICC) considered empowering the ICC to prosecute 
corporations involved in international crimes in connection with a proposal 
tabled by France.32 However, as explained in an amicus curiae brief by the 
former head of the United States delegation to the treaty drafting 
negotiations,33 states could not reach consensus on how such liability would 
operate and what penalties would follow a finding of guilt, particularly 
given the high degree of variation within national systems, the fact that 
imprisonment would be the primary form of punishment available to the 
Court, and the short time allotted for the negotiations.34 As a result, the 
ICC can exercise jurisdiction only over natural persons per Article 25.35
During the negotiations, there was no consideration given to corporate civil
liability, given that such a concept was outside the scope of the project to 
construct an international criminal court.36 In the process by which the ICC 
                                                          
29. See, e.g., Updated Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia art. 6, May 25, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1192.
30. The International Court of Justice recognizes that corporations can have an “independent 
and distinct legal personality” under international law. See Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Guinea v. Dem. 
Rep. Congo), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. 582, at 605 (May 24); Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co., Ltd. 
(Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, at 33–39 (Feb. 5) (looking to municipal (domestic) law to determine 
Belgium’s standing to sue on behalf of Belgian shareholders of a corporation injured during the Spanish 
Civil War). The U.S. Supreme Court has cited Barcelona Traction in a case involving expropriation 
claims arising under international law brought by a corporation. First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Para el 
Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 623, 630 (1983).
31. Nahimana et al. v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR 99-52-A, Judgement, ¶ 498 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for Rwanda Nov. 28, 2007) (discussing RTLM’s instigation of genocide).
32. See Harmen van der Wilt, Corporate Criminal Responsibility for International Crimes:
Exploring the Possibilities, 12 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 43, 43 (2013) (discussing French proposal).
33. Brief for Ambassador David J. Sheffer, Northwestern University Pritzker School of Law, 
as Amicus Curiae In Support of the Petitioners, 8–10, Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 137 S.Ct. 1432 (June 
26, 2017), http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/16-499-tsac-davidjscheffer.pdf
[hereinafter Sheffer].
34. Id.
35. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, A/CONF.183/9, art. 25, ¶ 1 (July 
17, 1998).
36. Sheffer, supra note 33, at 10.
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and other international criminal tribunals were established, there was never 
a question of whether corporate liability—civil or criminal—was legally 
available to states; the decision to exclude reference to corporate liability 
was based upon logistical and policy concerns, rather than the existence of 
any legal impediment. Nonetheless, as states have ratified the treaty that 
created the ICC, they have incorporated a range of international crimes into 
their domestic legal frameworks and made them applicable to corporate 
entities in addition to natural persons.37
The Special Tribunal for Lebanon offers an interesting 
counterexample of an international court asserting criminal jurisdiction over 
legal entities. Although devoted to prosecuting acts of terrorism under 
Lebanese law, it recently held that it had inherent jurisdiction over juridical 
persons accused of contempt—specifically media outlets that released the 
names of protected witnesses—because the operative provision (Rule 60
bis) applied to all “persons.”38 That conviction was confirmed by the 
Appeals Chamber, which issued an exhaustive and erudite survey of 
international and domestic law that concluded that corporate liability, both 
civil and criminal, is a general principle of law,39 one of the sources of 
international law recognized by the International Court of Justice40 and the 
United States Supreme Court.41 Further, the African Union has recently 
promulgated a draft statute for an African Court of Justice and Human 
Rights, not yet in force, that would include a penal chamber with 
jurisdiction over legal persons (Article 46C), upon “proof that it was the 
policy of the corporation to do the act which constituted the offense.”42
The absence of international criminal jurisdiction over corporations 
does not signify that international law does not govern corporate conduct.
Bilateral43 and multilateral treaties increasingly govern corporate conduct or 
                                                          
37. See, e.g., W. Cory Wanless, Corporate Liability for International Crimes Under Canada’s
Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act, 7 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 201 (2009).
38. New TV S.A.L. & Ms. Karma Al Khayat, 2 Oct. 2014, Case No. STL 14-
05/PT/AP/AR126.1, ¶¶ 36–42 (Leb.).
39. Id. ¶¶ 51–67.
40. I.C.J., supra note 27, at art. 38.
41. First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 623 
(1983); see also id. at 628–29 (holding that “the principles governing this case are common to both 
international law and federal common law, which in these circumstances is necessarily informed both by 
international law principles and by articulated congressional policies”).
42. See Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice 
and Human Rights, June 27, 2014, A.U. Doc. No. Assembly/AU/Dec.529 (XXIII).
43. See Tara Van Ho, International Legal Personality of Corporations: How Investment Law 
Answers the Supreme Court Question in Jesner, JUST SECURITY (Oct. 2, 2017), https://www.justsecurity
.org/45543/international-legal-personality-corporations-investment-law-answers-supreme-courtquestion
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empower and/or oblige their signatories to implement a full range of 
remedies for corporate breaches. Most importantly for the Jesner case is 
the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of 
Terrorism. This treaty explicitly states at Article 5 that, “[e]ach State Party
. . . shall take the necessary measures to enable a legal entity located in its 
territory or organized under its laws to be held liable when a person 
responsible for the management or control of that legal entity has, . . .
committed an offen[s]e” in violation of the Convention, including by 
funding terrorist activities.44 At Article 18, the treaty also requires member 
states to prohibit the “illegal activities of persons and organizations that 
knowingly encourage, instigate, organize or engage in the commission” of 
acts in violation of the treaty.45 Upon ratification, the United States 
implemented this treaty with the passage of the Anti-Terrorism Act,46
invoked in the Jesner case by the U.S. citizen plaintiffs who prevailed in 
their action at trial following the severance of their case from that of the 
alien plaintiffs.47 In the immediate aftermath of the attacks of September 
11th, the United Nations (U.N.) Security Council, in an effort sponsored by 
the United States government, adopted a binding resolution obliging all 
states to implement the suite of terrorism treaties already in existence,
including the Terrorist Financing Convention, by inter alia criminalizing 
acts of terrorism and terrorist financing within their domestic legal 
systems.48 The terms of the Terrorist Financing Treaty are now effectively 
binding on all U.N. member states by virtue of their U.N. Charter 
obligations to implement Chapter VII resolutions.49
Treaties addressed to other international and transnational law 
violations also mandate the imposition of corporate liability and a range of 
penalties, reflecting the role business entities play in perpetrating and 
enabling these violations. Examples include treaties devoted to combating 
                                                          
-jesner/ (noting that international investment law delineates international rights and responsibilities for 
corporations, which, as a matter of public international law, are distinct from their shareholders).
44. International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, Dec. 9, 1999, 
2178 U.N.T.S. 197 (adopted by the General Assembly in Resolution 54/109 of 9 Dec. 1999).
45. Id. at art. 18.  See also Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism art. 
10, May 16, 2005, C.E.T.S. No. 196.
46. Civil Remedies, 18 U.S.C. § 2333 (2016).
47. The case is Linde v. Arab Bank PLC, 97 F. Supp. 3d 287, 298–99 (E.D.N.Y. 2015).  A 
jury found for the plaintiffs in Linde; the bank settled before the district court could set damages. 
Elements of the settlement are before the Second Circuit. See Nate Raymond & Joseph Ax, Arab Bank 
Settles U.S. Litigation Over Attacks by Militants, REUTERS (Aug. 14, 2015, 3:11 PM), https://uk.reuters.
com/article/uk-arab-bank-jo-settlement-hamas/arab-bank-settles-u-s-litigation-over-attacks-by-militants-
idUKKCN0QJ21A20150814.
48. S.C. Res. 1373 ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001). 
49. U.N. Charter art. 25.
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transnational organized crime,50 human and other forms of trafficking,51 and 
bribery.52 Some of these treaties place enforcement obligations on states; 
others impose international obligations on legal entities themselves.53
Likewise, a treaty dedicated to crimes against humanity being drafted by 
the U.N. International Law Commission envisions corporate liability for 
breaches.54 Together, these international instruments attest to the fact that 
international law contains no categorical bar to the exercise of domestic 
jurisdiction over corporations when they commit violations of international 
law. Accordingly, states are free to adopt a variety of responses to 
corporate malfeasance, including criminal sanctions and civil suits, such as 
those proceeding under the ATS. As such, the fact that most international 
war crimes tribunals do not assert criminal jurisdiction over legal entities is 
not dispositive of the question presented in Jesner.
The choice-of-law decision is thus inconsequential. Whether domestic 
law or international law governs the question presented in Jesner should 
land the Court in the same place: Corporate tort liability is a standard 
feature of domestic law and there is nothing in international law that would 
prevent the United States from providing a tort remedy for corporate 
breaches of international law under the ATS. That said, preserving 
corporate liability will not result in an immediate win for the plaintiffs in 
Jesner. There are a number of other grounds upon which this case could be 
resolved for defendants, including on prudential political question or comity 
grounds.55 Furthermore, the Kiobel II presumption against 
                                                          
50. See, e.g., United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, annex, 1 
art. 10(2), Nov. 15, 2000, T.I.A.S. 13127, 2225 U.N.T.S. 209 (indicating that “[s]ubject to the legal 
principles of the State Party, the liability of legal persons may be criminal, civil or administrative.” See 
also Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their 
Disposal art. 2(14), Mar. 22, 1989, 1673 U.N.T.S. 57 (defining “person” to include legal persons).
51. See Council of Europe Convention on Action Against Trafficking in Human Beings art. 
22, May 16, 2005, C.E.T.S. 197 (“Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be
necessary to ensure that a legal person can be held liable for a criminal offence established in 
accordance with this Convention.”).
52. Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions art. 2, Nov. 21, 1997, S. Treaty No. 105-43, 2802 U.N.T.S. 285 (“Each Party shall take 
such measures as may be necessary, in accordance with its legal principles, to establish the liability of 
legal persons for the bribery of a foreign public official.”).
53. See Flomo v. Firestone Nat. Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1020 (7th Cir. 2013) (listing 
treaties).
54. See Sean Murphy, Corporate Liability and Crimes Against Humanity, JUST SECURITY 
(Oct. 24, 2017), https://www.justsecurity.org/46242/corporate-liability-crimes-humanity/.
55. The fact that this case involves the ever-controversial Middle East should not prompt the 
Court to craft an overly broad rule of corporate immunity; rather, the Court should leave it for the lower 
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extraterritoriality remains to be considered and particularly the question of 
whether automated transactions that route through the United States touch 
and concern this country with sufficient force to displace the presumption 
against extraterritoriality.56 An overly broad and categorical rule of 
corporate immunity, without basis in domestic or international law, is a
poor vehicle to address any such concerns that might be raised by this 
litigation. Rather, the Court should continue to leave the door open to 
corporate liability under the ATS57 and remand to allow the lower courts to 
address remaining arguments as to why plaintiffs should, or should not, 
recover for the proven harm that has befallen them on account of the Arab 
Bank’s actions.58 
                                                          
courts to consider the unique facts of the case, and particularly the importance of the U.S.-Jordan 
bilateral relationship, through a case-specific application of such principles.
56. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 124–25 (2013) (“Kiobel II”).
57. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 729 (2004) (holding that “the judicial power 
[under the ATS] should be exercised on the understanding that the door is still ajar subject to vigilant 
doorkeeping, and thus open to a narrow class of international norms today.”).
58. See Raymond & Ax, supra note 47.
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Abstract
Saudi human rights lawyer and pro-democracy activist Waleed Abu 
Al-Khair was convicted for “inciting public opinion” and “harming the 
reputation of the King.” As a result, he is currently serving a fifteen-year 
prison sentence in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. This Article analyzes 
Abu Al-Khair’s criminal conviction under international law, with a focus 
on the universal standard for the protection of freedom of expression.
Specifically, this article explores international law rules that call for narrow 
constructions of the offenses of “incitement” and “defamation” under 
domestic law when dealing with public figures and public affairs. Portions 
of this paper have been reproduced with updates from a prior 2016 Human 
Rights Foundation Report, written by the same authors of this article. This 
Article is intended to replace the 2016 Report previously published.***
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article analyzes the case of Waleed Abu Al-Khair, a human 
rights lawyer in Saudi Arabia, under international law. Abu Al-Khair was
convicted for “inciting public opinion” and “harming the reputation of the 
King,” and is currently serving a fifteen-year prison sentence in Saudi 
Arabia. Part I provides a succinct overview of the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia’s legal system. Part II lays out the standards of international law for 
the protection of freedom of expression as applicable to the case of Waleed 
Abu Al-Khair. Part III analyzes all the actions and omissions by the 
government of Saudi Arabia under international law. Part IV summarizes 
the conclusions reached in each part of this Article.
II. SAUDI ARABIA’S LEGAL SYSTEM
Saudi Arabia is an absolute monarchy,1 which bases its legal system2
                                                     
*** See infra note 39.
1. Article 5 of the Basic Law of Governance of Saudi Arabia states:
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on Shari’a law,3 as advocated by the Wahhabi movement.4 The Shari’a, 
which translates as the law of God, is a set of moral precepts interpreted as 
binding law primarily sourced in the Qur’an and the Sunnah of the 
Prophet.5 Shari’a law regulates all areas of Muslim life,6 including family, 
                                                     
Monarchy is the system of rule in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Rulers of the 
country shall be from amongst the sons of the founder King Abdulaziz bin 
Abdulrahman Al-Faisal Al-Saud, and their descendants. The most upright among 
them shall receive allegiance according to Almighty God's Book and His 
Messenger's Sunna (Traditions) . . . Government in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
derives its authority from the Book of God and the Sunna of the Prophet (PBUH), 
which are the ultimate sources of reference for this Law and the other laws of the 
State.
Basic Law of Governance of Saudi Arabia, art. 5 (adopted by decree) (1992) [hereinafter Basic Law of 
Governance]; ANN BLACK ET AL., MODERN PERSPECTIVES ON ISLAMIC LAW 256 (2013).  Saudi Arabia 
is the “best model of the authoritarian view” of Shari’a law. BLACK ET AL., supra note 1.
2. See SHARIA INCORPORATED: A COMPARATIVE OVERVIEW OF THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF 
TWELVE MUSLIM COUNTRIES IN PAST AND PRESENT 157 (Jan Michiel Otto ed., 2010) [hereinafter 
SHARIA INCORPORATED].
It is often claimed that Saudi law is nothing but Islamic Shari’a. However, 
supplemented by government-issued regulations concerning labor, commerce 
companies and so forth, the law is more encompassing than at first glance. Also, 
one cannot rule out the importance of tribal values and customs in Saudi society, 
like in most Middle Eastern societies.
See BLACK ET AL., supra note 1, at 71 (“In the domestic law of some Muslim countries, such as Saudi 
Arabia, Iran and Malaysia, Islam is either the principal source of law or a source of law and, therefore, 
being a Muslim has significant legal consequences under these domestic legal systems”).
3. See SHARIA INCORPORATED, supra note 2, at 23 (internal citation omitted) (“According to 
Islamic jurisprudence, theology and historiography, the rules of sharia are based on the revelation by 
God of his plan for mankind to the Prophet Muhammad until his death in 632.  In order to interpret 
God’s will from the available sources, religious scholars developed Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) from the 
eighth century onwards.  The scholars (ulama) put God’s revelation into effect, drafting a scientific, 
legal corpus of behavioural rules.” “There is no such thing as a, that is one, Islamic law, a text that 
clearly and unequivocally establishes all the rules of a Muslim’s behaviour.  There is a great divergence 
of views, not just between opposing currents, but also between individual scholars within the legal 
currents, of exactly what rules belong to Islamic law.”). See BLACK ET AL., supra note 1, at 10 (“the 
assumption is that there are four major sources of Islamic law: the Quran, the Sunna, analogical 
reasoning (qiyas) and consensus of opinion (ijma)”).
4. The term “Wahhabi” derives from the religious scholar and jurist Muhammad ibn Abd al-
Wahhab, (1703-1793) who “based his ideas on the works of the Salafi tradition within Islam,
particularly as [adopted] by two legal scholars, namely Ahmad ibn Hanbal, founder of the Hanbali 
School of Law . . . .  The Hanbali doctrine distinguishe[s] itself from other Sunni schools of law by its 
strict adherence to the holy sources.”  See SHARIA INCORPORATED, supra note 2, at 142.  “The Wahhabi 
interpretation of the Shari’a necessitates the abandonment of precedent and jurisprudence, providing 
individual Saudi judges with wide discretion.” AMERICANS FOR DEMOCRACY & HUMAN RIGHTS IN 
BAHRAIN, THE PRETENSE OF PROGRESS iii (2015) http://www.adhrb.org/wp-content/uploads/
2015/03/ADHRB_Pretense-of-Progress_v1_web.pdf [hereinafter PRETENSE OF PROGRESS].
5. The Sunnah is defined as
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tort, contract, commercial, property, and criminal law. 7 In addition, 
religious scholars have developed Islamic jurisprudence (“fiqh”) for all 
matters that are not addressed in the Qu’ran and the Sunnah.8 Islamic 
jurisprudence provides an additional authoritative source to the Shari’a law 
and is used by judges in their administration of justice.9
Unlike most Muslim majority states, Saudi Arabia has not codified the 
Shari’a principles in local statutes or codes.10 Furthermore, Saudi Arabia 
has no codified laws with the exception of the Basic Law of Governance 
and additional regulations enacted by royal decrees.11 As a consequence, 
most areas of the law, including criminal law, are regulated by religious 
principles that are not embodied in a written legal instrument and are
therefore subject to the discretion of Saudi judges. Under the Wahhabi 
doctrine, the law is subject to judicial interpretation of holy texts and 
jurisprudence is based on a particular judge’s religious beliefs and personal 
understanding of Islam.12 Saudi judges are not bound to resort to previous 
decisions relating to similar cases.13 Therefore, neither the stare decisis nor 
the jurisprudence constante doctrines are followed in Saudi Arabia.
                                                     
[A] body of established customs and beliefs that make up a tradition. In Muslim 
legal and religious thought, the term became associated more specifically with the 
actions and sayings of the Prophet Muhammad. Inspired by God to act wisely 
and in accordance with his will, Muhammad provided an example that 
complements God's revelation as expressed in the Qur'an. His actions and 
sayings became a model for Muslim conduct as well as a primary source of 
Islamic law.
Sunnah, OXFORD ISLAMIC STUD. ONLINE, http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t243/e33
(last visited Jan. 20, 2018).
6. See BLACK ET AL., supra note 1, at 243 (in “Islamic monarchies, like Saudi Arabia, . . . 
Sharia is pivotal to all aspects of law and governance”).
7. Toni Johnson & Mohammed Aly Sergie, Islam:  Governing Under Sharia, COUNCIL ON 
FOREIGN REL., https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/islam-governing-under-sharia (last updated July 25, 
2014).
8. See ABU AMEENAH BILAL PHILIPS, THE EVOLUTION OF FIQH (ISLAMIC LAW & THE
MADH-HABS) 8 (1990), https://d1.islamhouse.com/data/en/ih_books/single/en_evolution_of_fiqh.pdf.
9. See Law of the Judiciary, ROYAL EMBASSY SAUDI ARABIA, art. 1, https://www
.saudiembassy.net/law-judiciary (last visited Jan. 20, 2018) (in the administration of justice judges 
should apply the “provisions of Sharia and laws in force,” which in this case include ‘fiqh.’).
10. Nathan J. Brown, Why Won’t Saudi Arabia Write Down Its Laws?, FOREIGN POL’Y (Jan. 
23, 2012, 2:10 PM), http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/01/23/why-wont-saudi-arabia-write-down-its-laws/.
11. See SHARIA INCORPORATED, supra note 2, at 156 (“The King can promulgate regulations 
(called nizams) where the Shari’a law does not provide a direct answer to certain legal questions but 
where regulations are nevertheless necessary such as in commercial matters.”).
12. See MAHA A. Z. YAMANI, POLYGAMY AND LAW IN CONTEMPORARY SAUDI ARABIA 139
(2008).
13. Id.
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Due to the overt control of the executive power over prosecutors and 
judges, the judiciary is not an independent authority in Saudi Arabia.14
Furthermore, the wide authority given to Saudi judges in interpreting and 
applying Islamic laws contribute to creating a judicial system characterized 
by pervasive arbitrariness and abuse of power. This has led in practice to a 
considerable amount of arbitrary prosecutions of peaceful activists and 
dissenters on politically motivated charges.
Saudi Arabia is among the worst violators of basic human rights, in 
particular the right to freedom of opinion and expression.15 The Kingdom 
scored the worst possible grade in Freedom House’s 2015 Freedom in the 
World index, which focuses on civil liberties and political rights in a 
particular country.16 Although the Kingdom has signed several United 
Nations (U.N.) human rights treaties,17 it has firmly opposed the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) for allegedly being in contradiction 
with the principles of the Shari’a Law.18
III. STANDARD FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
The legal framework for the freedom of expression, a fundamental 
human right, is firmly established in the UDHR and the International 
                                                     
14. See GAN BUS. ANTI–CORRUPTION PORTAL, SAUDI ARABIA CORRUPTION REPORT (2016), 
https://www.business-anti-corruption.com/country-profiles/saudi-arabia.
15. Arch Puddington & Tyler Roylance, Anxious Dictators, Wavering Democracies:  Global 
Freedom Under Pressure, FREEDOM HOUSE (2016), https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-
2016/overview-essay-anxious-dictators-wavering-democracies.
16. Freedom in the World—Saudi Arabia (2015), FREEDOM HOUSE, https://freedomhouse.org/
report/freedom-world/2015/saudi-arabia#.VSWKSktN1Zg (last visited Jan. 20, 2018).
17. See, e.g., International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195; Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination 
against Women, Concluding Comments of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against 
Women, Saudi Arabia, 40th Sess., U.N. Doc CEDAW/C/SAU/CO/2 (Apr. 8, 2008); Convention against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 
85; Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3. (noting that the Kingdom 
ratified these conventions with reservations).
18. See Jonathan Russell, Human Rights:  The Universal Declaration vs. The Cairo 
Declaration, LSE MIDDLE E. CTR. BLOG (Dec. 12, 2010), http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mec/2012/12/10/1569/.
Most Muslim-majority countries including Egypt, Iran and Pakistan signed the 
UDHR in 1948, but crucially Saudi Arabia, where the King must comply with the 
Shari’a and Qur’an, did not sign the declaration, arguing that it violated Islamic 
law and criticising it for failing to take into consideration the cultural and 
religious context of non-Western countries.
See also id. (explaining that Saudi Arabia refused to sign the UDHR believing that it violated the Qur'an 
and Sharia law).
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Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).19 One hundred and sixty-
nine countries, excluding Saudi Arabia, are parties to the ICCPR. 20
Additionally, Saudi Arabia is both a member of the U.N. and the U.N.
Human Rights Council (UNHRC) and is thus bound to promote and 
encourage respect and human rights for all. 21 In fact, the rights and 
freedoms provided in the ICCPR are inspired by the principles proclaimed 
in the Charter of the U.N., which binds member states to “promote
universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental
freedoms,”22 pursuing the “ideal of free human beings enjoying civil and 
political freedom”23 in accordance with the UDHR.
The freedom of expression maintains universal recognition, evidenced 
by its inclusion in every regional human rights treaty, including Article 10 
of the European Convention on Human Rights, 24 Article 13 of the 
American Convention on Human Rights,25 and Article 9 of the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.26
                                                     
19. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 
[hereinafter ICCPR]; G.A. Res. 217A (III), art. 19, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 
1948).
20. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, UNITED NATIONS TREATY 
COLLECTION, ch. IV, https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV-4&chap
ter=4&lang=en (last visited Jan. 20, 2018).
21. G.A. Res. 16/18, at 1 (Apr. 12, 2011). 
22. ICCPR, supra note 19, pmbl.
23. Id.
24. Freedom of Expression:
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression.  This right shall include 
freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without 
interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers.  This article shall not 
prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema 
enterprises.
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and 
responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or 
penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in 
the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the 
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the 
protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of 
information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and 
impartiality of the judiciary.
Freedom of Expression, Eur. Conv. on H.R. art. 10, ¶¶ 1–2.
25. Freedom of Thought and Expression:
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Similarly, Saudi Arabia maintains obligations under the regional 
human rights framework. Article 32 of the Arab Charter on Human Rights 
holds that the “Charter shall ensure the right to information, freedom of 
opinion and freedom of expression, freedom to seek, receive and impart 
information by all means, regardless of frontiers.” 27 Saudi Arabia has 
ratified the Arab Charter on Human Rights, 28 and must honor the 
obligations it undertook under Article 32. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia has 
been a member state of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation29 (OIC) 
                                                     
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought and expression. This right 
includes freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas of all kinds, 
regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing, in print, in the form of art, or 
through any other medium of one's choice.
2. The exercise of the right provided for in the foregoing paragraph shall not be 
subject to prior censorship but shall be subject to subsequent imposition of 
liability, which shall be expressly established by law to the extent necessary to 
ensure:
a. respect for the rights or reputations of others; or
b. the protection of national security, public order, or public health or 
morals.
3. The right of expression may not be restricted by indirect methods or means, 
such as the abuse of government or private controls over newsprint, radio 
broadcasting frequencies, or equipment used in the dissemination of information, 
or by any other means tending to impede the communication and circulation of 
ideas and opinions.
4. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 2 above, public entertainments 
may be subject by law to prior censorship for the sole purpose of regulating 
access to them for the moral protection of childhood and adolescence.
5. Any propaganda for war and any advocacy of national, racial, or religious 
hatred that constitute incitements to lawless violence or to any other similar action 
against any person or group of persons on any grounds including those of race, 
color, religion, language, or national origin shall be considered as offenses 
punishable by law.
Freedom of Thought and Expression, Am. Conv. on H.R., art. 13, ¶¶ 1–5.
26. Afr. Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights art. 9, ¶¶ 1–2. (stating that “[e]very individual 
shall have the right to receive information [and] [e]very individual shall have the right to express and 
disseminate his opinion within the law”).
27. League of Arab States, Arab Charter on Human Rights, May 22, 2004, reprinted in 12
INT’L HUM. RTS. REP. 893 (2005) (entered into force Mar. 15, 2008), translated in UNIV. OF MINN. HUM.
RTS. [hereinafter Arab Charter].
28. See Mohamed Y. Mattar, Article 43 of the Arab Charter on Human Rights:  Reconciling 
National, Regional, and International Standards, 26 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 91, 93 (2013) (listing the 
Middle East and North Africa Region (MENA) states that have thus far ratified the Arab Charter on 
Human Rights).
29. History, ORGANISATION ISLAMIC COOPERATION, https://www.oic-oci.org/page/?p_id=52
&p_ref=26&lan=en (last visited Jan. 20, 2018).
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since 1969. Among the objectives stated in the Charter of the OIC is the 
promotion of “human rights and fundamental freedoms, good governance, 
rule of law, democracy and accountability in Member States in accordance 
with their constitutional and legal systems.”30
By adopting the ICCPR, the international community legally
recognized that “everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; 
this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and 
ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, 
in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.”31 This 
includes the right of individuals to “hold opinions without interference.”32
The U.N. Human Rights Committee33, charged with compliance and 
oversight of the ICCPR, stated in its observations on the subject that
“[f]reedom of opinion and freedom of expression are indispensable 
conditions for the full development of the person. They are essential for 
any society.” 34 The [Human Rights Committee] also affirmed that
“[f]reedom of expression is a necessary condition for the realization of the 
principles of transparency and accountability that are, in turn, essential for 
the promotion and protection of human rights.”35 In addition, respect of 
freedom of opinion should be binding on all branches of the state and on all
                                                     
The Organi[z]ation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) [formerly Organization of the 
Islamic Conference] is the second largest inter-governmental organization after 
the United Nations with a membership of 57 states [and] spreads [across] four 
continents.  The [OIC] is the collective voice of the Muslim world . . . [and 
ensuring] to safeguard and protect the interests of the Muslim world in the spirit 
of promoting international peace and harmony among various people of the world.  
The [OIC] was established upon a decision of the historical summit which took 
place in Rabat, Kingdom of Morocco on 12th Rajab 1389 Hijra (September 25, 
1969) following the criminal arson of Al-Aqsa Mosque in occupied Jerusalem. Id.
30. Charter of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, art. 1, ¶ 14.
31. ICCPR, supra note 19, art. 19.
32. Id.
33. The United Nations Human Rights Committee is the body responsible for overseeing and 
advising ratified States on the implementation of the ICCPR treaty principles within that State.  As of 
April 2012, 160 States had ratified the ICCPR.  Introduction: Monitoring Civil and Political Rights,
UNITED NATIONS HUM. RTS. OFF. HIGH COMMISSIONER, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CCPR/
Pages/CCPRIntro.aspx (last visited Jan. 23, 2018).
34. Human Rights Committee, Article 19:  Freedoms of Opinion and Expression, General 
Comment No. 34, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/34, (Sept. 12, 2011) [hereinafter General Comment No. 
34].
35. Id. ¶ 3.
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governmental authorities at whatever level.36 Furthermore, the scope of 
protection of this right “includes expression of views and opinions that 
offend, shock or disturb.” 37 Therefore, and especially in a context of 
political debate, restrictions to the right to freedom of opinion should not be 
applied to “expression of opinion and dissent, religion or belief.”38
The international standard of freedom of expression protects against 
abusive use of defamation laws aiming at criminalizing legitimate criticism 
and stifling freedom of expression.
A. Defamation Under the International Standard of Freedom of 
Expression
1. General Prohibition Against the Criminalization of Speech
The Human Rights Committee stated that criminalizing the holding of 
an opinion is incompatible with Article 19, Paragraph 1 of the ICCPR.39 In 
fact, any efforts to coerce the holding or not holding of any opinion is 
prohibited,40 and “harassment, intimidation or stigmatization of a person, 
including arrest, detention, trial or imprisonment for reasons of the opinions 
they may hold, constitutes a violation of Article 19, Paragraph 1.”41
2. Special Prohibition Against the Criminalization of Speech 
Directed at Public Officials
Under the universal standard of the ICCPR, defamation laws must not 
stifle freedom of expression.42 For official defamation law to comply with 
international law requirements, it must satisfy the following six-prong test.
                                                     
36. Human Rights Committee, Nature of the General Legal Obligation on States Parties to the 
Covenant, General Comment No. 31, ¶ 4, 80th Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (Mar. 29, 
2004).
37. Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection 
of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, Frank La Rue, ¶ 37, 17th Sess., U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/17/27 (May 16, 2011) [hereinafter HRC 17th Sess.].
38. Human Rights Council, Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the 
Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, Frank La Rue, ¶ 81, 14th 
Sess., U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/23 (Apr. 20, 2010) [HRC 14th Sess.].
39. JAVIER EL-HAGE & CELINE ASSAF BOUSTANI, HUMAN RIGHTS FOUND., THE CASE OF 
WALEED ABU AL-KHAIR 25 (2016).
40. Id. See also Yong-Joo Kang v. Republic of Korea, Commc’n No. 878/1999, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/78/D/878/1999 (2003).
41. EL-HAGE & BOUSTANI, supra note 39, at 25; see Andre Alphonse Mpaka-Nsusu v. Zaire, 
Commc’n No. 157/1983, U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/41/40) at 142 (1986) [hereinafter HRC Zaire].
42. General Comment No. 34, supra note 34, ¶ 47.
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The first prong requires that laws on defamation are drafted in 
accordance with the elements used to measure limitations on freedom of 
expression, as set forth in Article 19, Section 3 of the ICCPR, namely the 
legality, legitimacy, necessity and proportionality of those limitations. 43
First, restrictions on freedom of expression must be formally provided for 
by law.44 In other words, they must be codified by a country’s statutes. 
Moreover, they must not be overbroad and must be precise enough that it is 
clear what particular types of behaviors are precluded by the law.45 Second,
those limitations must emanate from a need to protect a legitimate state 
interest.46 Recognized state interests include protecting the rights of others, 
maintaining national security, ensuring public order and health, and/or 
preserving morals.47 Third, restrictions on freedom of expression must be
necessary.48 In other words, a restriction should only be applied if it is the 
only way to achieve protection of the legitimate state interest.49 Finally, 
restrictions on the freedom of expression must be proportional.50 Methods 
of limiting expression, if necessary and for a legitimate purpose, must be 
implemented in the narrowest possible manner. In other words, criminal or 
civil penalties discouraging particular forms of expression must not be 
overboard, 51 and must be proportionate to the interest being protected. 
Proportionality requires applying the minimum criminal or civil sanction 
possible to expressions that must be limited for necessary and legitimate 
purposes.52
The second prong requires the defamatory statement in question to be 
a fact statement instead of an opinion that is not subject to verification.53
The third prong imposes a heightened standard for public officials and 
                                                     
43. Id. ¶¶ 24–25, 33–34.
44. Id. ¶ 22.
45. Id. ¶¶ 34–35.
46. Id. ¶¶ 29, 34.
47. General Comment No. 34, supra note 34, ¶ 21.
48. Id. ¶ 33.
49. Id. See also Human Rights Committee, Ballantyne, Davidson, and McIntryre v. Cananda, 
Commc’n Nos. 359/1989 and 385/1989, ¶ 11.4, 47th Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/47/D/359/1989 and 
385/1989/Rev.1, (Mar. 31, 1993) [hereinafter HRC 47th Sess.].
50. General Comment No. 34, supra note 34, ¶ 34.
51. Id.
52. See Human Rights Committee, Article 12 (Freedom of Movement), General Comment No. 
27, ¶ 14, 67th Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.9, (Nov. 2, 1999); Human Rights Committee, 
Rafael Marques de Morais v. Angola, Communication No. 1128/2002, ¶ 6.8, 83rd Sess., U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/83/D/1128/2002, (Mar. 14–Apr. 2005) [hereinafter HRC 83rd Sess.].
53. See General Comment No. 34, supra note 34, ¶ 47.
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figures, because they are naturally subject to criticisms and opposition.54
The fourth prong requires the existence of actual malice in the defendant’s 
actions in cases concerning public officials/figures. 55 The fifth prong 
indicates that the burden of proof lies with the plaintiff.56 The sixth and last 
prong sets forth the defenses available to the defendant—truth and public
interest of the subject matter.57
Throughout the years, the Human Rights Committee has developed a 
stringent standard rejecting the criminalization of speech directed at public 
officials and highlighting that citizens of any society must be able to freely 
criticize their government “without fear of interference or punishment.”58
In the 2009 UNHRC Report, The U.N. Special Rapporteur on Freedom of 
Opinion and Expression (Special Rapporteur) stated, “[m]echanisms for 
criticism, particularly of political leaders, were deemed important so that 
leaders were held to account [and that] [f]reedom of expression was not 
limited to statements considered appropriate or beneficial.”59
Non-democratic countries around the world commonly abuse criminal 
defamation laws to stifle freedom of expression, and silence the opposition 
in circumstances of public debate. In this context, the Human Rights 
Committee held that “the mere fact that forms of expression are considered 
to be insulting to a public figure is not sufficient to justify the imposition of 
penalties.”60 Laws such as lèse majesté, desacato,61 or offenses such as 
disrespect for authority,62 disrespect for flags and symbols, defamation of 
                                                     
54. See Human Rights Committee, Adimayo, M. Aduayom, Sofianou T. Diasso and Yawo S. 
Dobou v. Togo, Communications Nos. 422/1990, 423/1990 & 424/1990, ¶ 7.4, 57th Sess., U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/51/D/422/1990, 423/1990 & 424/1990, (July 12, 1996) [hereinafter HRC 57th Sess.].
55. See General Comment No. 34, supra note 34, ¶ 47.
56. Human Rights Committee, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under 
Article 40 of the Covenant:  United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, ¶ 25, 93rd Sess., 
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GBR/CO/6, (July 30, 2008) [hereinafter HRC 93rd Sess.].
57. See General Comment No. 34, supra note 34, ¶ 47; Human Rights Committee, Pavel 
Kozlov v. Belarus, Communication No. 1986/2010, ¶ 7.5, 111th Sess., U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/111/D/1986/2010, (July 7–25, 2014).
58. HRC 57th Sess., supra note 54, ¶ 7.4.
59. Human Rights Council, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human 
Rights and Follow-Up to the World Conference on Human Rights, ¶ 10, 10th Sess., U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/10/31/Add.3, (Jan. 16, 2009) [hereinafter HRC 10th Sess.].
60. HRC 83rd Sess., supra note 52, ¶ 6.8.
61. Human Rights Committee, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under 
Article 40 of the Covenant:  Dominican Republic, ¶ 22, 71st Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/71/DOM, (Apr. 
26, 2001).
62. Human Rights Committee, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under 
Article 40 of the Covenant:  Honduras, ¶ 17, 88th Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/HND/CO/1, (Dec. 13, 
2006).
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the head of state63 and the protection of the honor of public officials,64 and
any defamation laws should be carefully drafted and implemented to ensure 
that they comply with the ICCPR. Furthermore, the Human Rights 
Committee recommends that all such laws include the defense of truth and 
“with regard to comments about public figures, consideration should be 
given to avoiding penalizing or otherwise rendering unlawful untrue 
statements that have been published in error but without malice.”65
In any case of defamation, imprisonment should never be an 
appropriate penalty. The Special Rapporteur stated that “[s]anctions for 
defamation should not be so large as to exert a chilling effect on freedom of 
opinion and expression and the right to seek, receive and impart 
information; penal sanctions, in particular imprisonment, should never be 
applied.”66
Consequently, domestic defamation laws must be constructed 
carefully to meet the international standards articulated by the six-prong test, 
and so as to not infringe on free speech aimed at both holding public 
officials accountable and promoting good governance. Criminal sanctions 
for such speech will almost certainly render a state as non-compliant with 
their international obligations.
B. Incitement Under the International Standard of Freedom of 
Expression
1. General Prohibitions Against Incitement and Hate Speech
Preventing incitement of violence and hate speech are important 
tenants of international law as articulated by Article 20, Paragraph 2 of the 
ICCPR. Article 20, Paragraph 2 states that “any advocacy of national, 
racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, 
hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law” (the Incitement 
Prohibition).67 The Incitement Prohibition is “fully compatible with the 
right of freedom of expression as contained in [A]rticle 19 [of the ICCPR], 
                                                     
63. Human Rights Committee, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under 
Article 40 of the Covenant:  Zambia, ¶ 25, 90th Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/ZMB/CO/3, (Aug. 9, 2007).
64. Human Rights Committee, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under 
Article 40 of the Covenant:  Costa Rica, ¶ 11, 91st Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/CRI/CO/5, (Nov. 16, 
2007).
65. HRC 93rd Sess., supra note 56, ¶ 25.
66. Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Protection and 
Promotion of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, Mr. Abid Hussain, ¶ 28(h), 55th Sess., 
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1999/64 (Jan. 29, 1999).
67. Human Rights Instruments, General Comment No. 11:  Article 20, ¶ 2, 19th Sess., U.N. 
Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (Vol. I) (May 27, 2008) [hereinafter HRI 19th Sess.].
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the exercise of which carries with it special duties and responsibilities.”68
For it to become effective, “there ought to be a law making it clear that . . . 
advocacy as described [is] contrary to public policy and providing for an 
appropriate sanction in case of violation.”69
According to the Human Rights Committee, “restrictions on 
expression which may fall within the scope of Article 20 must also be 
permissible under Article 19, paragraph 3, which lays down requirements 
for determining whether restrictions on expression are permissible.” 70
Under this provision, “[a]ny restriction on the right to freedom of 
expression must cumulatively meet the following conditions: it must be 
provided by law, it must address one of the aims set out in paragraph 3 (a) 
and (b) of Article 19, and it must be necessary to achieve a legitimate 
purpose.”71
                                                     
68. Id.; Human Rights Committee, Malcolm Ross v. Canada, Commc’n No. 736/1997, ¶ 11.6, 
70th Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/70/D/736/1997, (Oct. 20, 2000) [hereinafter HRC 70th Sess.].  The HRC 
recognized the overlapping nature of Articles 19 and 20, stating that it considered that restrictions on 
expression which may fall within the scope of Article 20 must also be permissible under Article 19, 
paragraph 3, which lays down requirements for determining whether restrictions on expression are 
permissible. HRC 70th Sess., supra note 68, ¶ 11.6.
69. HRI 19th Sess., supra note 67, ¶ 2.
70. HRC 70th Sess., supra note 68, ¶ 10.6.
71. Human Rights Committee, Robert Faurisson v. France, Communication No. 550/1993, ¶ 
9.4, 58th Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/58/D/550/1993, (Nov. 8, 1996); General Comment No. 34, supra
note 34, ¶ 12 (elaborating on the links between Articles 19 and 20 of the ICCPR:
50. Articles 19 and 20 are compatible with and complement each other. The acts 
that are addressed in article 20 are all subject to restriction pursuant to article 19, 
paragraph 3. As such, a limitation that is justified on the basis of article 20 must 
also comply with article 19, paragraph 3. 
51. What distinguishes the acts addressed in article 20 from other acts that may be 
subject to restriction under article 19, paragraph 3, is that for the acts addressed in 
article 20, the Covenant indicates the specific response required from the State:
their prohibition by law. It is only to this extent that article 20 may be considered 
as lex specialis with regard to article 19. 
52. It is only with regard to the specific forms of expression indicated in article 20 
that States parties are obliged to have legal prohibitions. In every case in which 
the State restricts freedom of expression it is necessary to justify the prohibitions 
and their provisions in strict conformity with article 19.
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2. Three-Prong Test to Determine the Validity of Measures
Implementing the Incitement Prohibition
Any restriction of freedom of expression implementing Article 20 of 
the incitement prohibition requires compliance with the three-prong test set 
forth in Article 19, paragraph 3.
The Human Rights Committee’s General Comment 34 breaks down 
the elements of the three-prong test that must be met in order to impose 
exceptional restrictions on freedom of expression. 72 The first prong 
requires that laws are formally provided for in a way that they are 
understandable to the public, allowing the public to conform their behavior 
accordingly, and which are also capable of being applied in a consistent 
way by those charged with their execution.73 The second prong requires 
that laws be necessary for a legitimate purpose.74 If an alternate restriction 
is capable of achieving the legitimate aim, then the law is an inappropriate 
use of the restrictions permitted under Article 19. 75 The third prong 
requires proportionality, and that the restrictive measure is the least 
intrusive means of achieving the protective function.76 Both formalized 
laws, in addition to the judicial authorities charged with their administration, 
must reflect this least restrictive principle. 77 Furthermore, the 
proportionality of restrictions must take into account the form of expression 
being restricted, and when issues of public importance are the subject of 
these expressions, the ICCPR calls for uninhibited expression.78 Finally, in 
instances where there is a necessary and proportionate restriction aimed at 
legitimate concerns posed by the exercise of freedom of expression, the 
state must, in each case where it imposes criminal sanctions or penalties 
against specific individuals, demonstrate a causal nexus between that 
individual’s expression, the immediate threat posed by that expression, and 
the particular and urgent cause of sanctions against that specific 
individual.79
The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human 
Rights (OHCHR) has detailed the three-prong test for the incitement 
                                                     
72. General Comment No. 34, supra note 34, ¶ E.5.
73. Id.
74. HRC 47th Sess., supra note 49.
75. General Comment No. 34, supra note 34, ¶ 34.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Human Rights Committee, Hak—Chul Shin v. Republic of Korea, Communication No. 
926/2000, ¶ 7.3, 80th Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/80/D/926/2000, (March 15–April 2, 2004) [hereinafter 
HRC 80th Sess.].
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prohibition more succinctly. According to the OHCHR, “Article 20 of the 
ICCPR requires there be a high threshold” when restricting free speech with 
incitement laws, so as to conform to Article 19 requirements of legality, 
proportionality, and necessity.80 The restrictions should be clear and not 
limit free speech in an overly broad or untargeted way. When sanctions 
limiting speech are applied, the benefit to the protected interest must
outweigh the harm to freedom of expression caused by the sanctions.81
In addition, there have been several cases in which the Human Rights 
Committee has looked at the intent behind the incitement to discrimination,
hostility, or violence. In 1997, the Human Rights Committee distinguished 
between “critical discussion” and “advocating contempt against a group” in 
order to determine if the speech restriction was permissible.82 A 2001 Joint 
Statement on Racism and Media by the U.N. Special Rapporteur on 
Freedom of Opinion and Expression, the Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe (OSCE) Representative on Freedom of the Media, and 
the Organization of American States (OAS) Special Rapporteur on 
Freedom of Expression states that “no one should be penalized for the
dissemination of ‘hate speech’ unless it has been shown that they did so 
with the intention of inciting discrimination, hostility or violence.”83
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE CONDUCT OF THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA IN 
RELATION TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
Waleed Abu al-Khair is a Saudi Arabian human rights lawyer and 
activist. He is an outspoken advocate for political reform, particularly for 
establishing a democratic state in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. He
focuses on advancing individual liberties and defending victims of human 
rights violations. In 2009, he founded the Monitor of Human Rights in 
Saudi Arabia (MHRSA), an independent human rights organization.84 On 
October 29, 2013, in retaliation for his work as a human rights lawyer and 
activist, Abu al-Khair was sentenced by the criminal court in Jeddah to 
three months in prison for “contempt of the judiciary” by publically 
criticizing a court decision against his client. On February 6, 2014, the 
Court of Appeal in Mecca upheld the sentence.
                                                     
80. ICCPR, supra note 19, art. 19.
81. Human Rights Council, Annual Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Human Rights, ¶ 18, 22nd Sess., U.N. Doc. A/HRC/22/17/Add.4, (Jan. 11, 2013).
82. HRC 70th Sess., supra note 68, ¶ 11.5.
83. Racism and the Media, ORG. FOR SECURITY & CO-OPERATION EUR. (Feb. 27, 2001),
http://www.osce.org/fom/40120?download=true.
84. E-mail from Ekua Quansah, Human Rights Award Selection Committee, to LSUC Human 
Rights Award Selection Committee (June 15, 2016), http://www.lrwc.org/ws/wp-content/uploads/2016
/11/Waleed-Abu-al-Khair.Nomination.Ltr_.-LRWC.UIA_.LSEW_.15-.June_.2016.pdf.
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A few weeks earlier on October 6, 2013, a second case was filed 
against Abu al-Khair before the Specialized Criminal Court on various 
charges, including “harming the reputation of the Kingdom,” “inciting the 
public opinion against the Kingdom,” “breaking allegiance to the ruler,” 
and “subverting public order in the Kingdom,” for similar reasons. In July 
2014, he was sentenced to fifteen years in prison with a five-year suspended 
sentence. On January 12, 2015, the Court of Appeal upheld the conviction 
of the Specialized Criminal Court and extended the sentence from ten to 
fifteen years after Abu al-Khair refused the judge’s offer to apologize for 
his acts.
This Part analyzes the second case against Waleed Abu al-Khair under 
international human rights law.
A. Violation of the Right to Freedom of Expression and Opinion
According to international human rights law, everyone shall have the 
right to freedom of expression and the right to hold opinions without 
interference through any media or form of expression.85 This right includes 
criticism towards the government, its officials and public affairs.86 The 
obligation to respect the right to freedom of expression and opinion is 
binding on all branches of the state (executive, legislative, and judicial) and 
extends to “expression of views and opinions that offend, shock or 
disturb.” 87 International human rights law also recognizes that 
“mechanisms for criticism, particularly of political leaders, were deemed 
important so that leaders were held to account and that freedom of 
expression was not limited to statements considered appropriate or 
beneficial.”88
Saudi Arabia is a nondemocratic country where the fundamental rights of 
citizens are denied.89 The Kingdom is ruled by a fully authoritarian regime 
where freedom of expression is neither guaranteed nor respected.90 Under this 
regime, any kind of public dissent is prohibited and dissenters are severely 
                                                     
85. Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection 
of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, Frank La Rue, ¶ 20(a), 77th Sess., U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/17/27, ¶ 20, (May 16, 2011).
86. Id.
87. Id. ¶ 37.
88. HRC 10th Sess., supra note 59, ¶ 10.
89. Mayan Derhy, Top Five Non-Democratic Countries, BORGEN PROJECT (Jan. 10, 2017), 
https://borgenproject.org/top-five-non-democratic-countries/.
90. Erwin van Veen, Return of Authoritarianism Primes Middle East for More Conflict,
CLINGENDAEL (Dec. 19, 2017, 13:33), https://www.clingendael.org/publication/return-authoritarianism-
primes-middle-east-more-conflict.
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punished, especially those who openly express their disagreement with the 
government or discuss reforming the Kingdom’s political system.
The prosecution and sentencing of Waleed Abu al-Khair for 
expressing his criticism of the judiciary were carried out within the context 
of full authoritarianism. In 2011, the public prosecutor charged Abu al-
Khair with “contempt of the judiciary” and “harming the reputation of the 
Kingdom” pursuant to general principles of Shari’a law. The charges were 
based on the fact that Abu al-Khair publically criticized a court decision 
sentencing Samar Badawi, his client at the time, to six months in prison in a 
male guardianship case against her abusive father. In addition, Abu al-
Khair was accused of sharing information about Badawi’s case with 
international organizations and for signing a petition,91 which criticized the 
severity of the sentence against peaceful political activists and condemned 
the use of violence by security forces against protesters. Based on the 
indictment of the public prosecutor, the criminal court in Jeddah, and 
subsequently the court of appeal in Mekkah, sentenced Abu al-Khair to 
three months in prison for “contempt of the judiciary” for signing a petition, 
which the court qualified as damaging to the judiciary and to Islam.92
In the second case filed against Abu al-Khair before the Specialized 
Criminal Court, the charging document filed by the public prosecutor 
included charges of “criticizing and insulting the judiciary” and 
“communicating with international organizations in order to undermine the 
reputation of the Kingdom.” These charges were based on the same facts 
mentioned in the indictment document filed a year earlier, namely: 
“criticizing the Kingdom by communicating on the internet and satellite 
channels materials related to the sentences against [political] reformers,” 
“signing a petition,” and “publishing comments on twitter criticizing the 
government and the human rights status in the Kingdom.”93 In 2014, the 
Specialized Criminal Court in Jeddah, and subsequently the appellate court,
sentenced Abu al-Khair to fifteen years in prison based on the charging 
document of the public prosecutor, which included the public defamation 
offenses of “criticizing and insulting the judicial authority” and “harming 
the reputation of the Kingdom.”
                                                     
91. See EL-HAGE & BOUSTANI, supra note 39, at 33.
92. Id. The Petition included statements such as:  “unjustified security escalation,” “unfair 
judgments,” and “painful repressive measures.”  The Petition condemns “the use of weapons” and 
demands the constitution of a “judicial fact-finding committee, the identification of persons and entities 
involved in the killings, and bringing them to justice.”  It is worth noting that Abu al-Khair was not 
involved in the drafting of the Petition but was one of the sixty-two petitioners who signed it.
93. Id. Twitter comments include the following: “Human Rights in Saudi Arabia . . . going 
backwards!”; “Saudi Arabia through its oil, buys the silence of the western world due to what is 
happening in Bahrain.”; “The politicians remain careful to gain legitimacy from Wahhabism in a regime 
that has not much on the human level.”
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Charging and sentencing on the basis of the expression of one’s 
opinion, in any form whatsoever, even if such opinion is deemed critical or 
offensive toward any third party, including public officials, violates the 
principle consecrated in Article 19 of the ICCPR.94 The criminalization of 
Abu al-Khair’s expression by the Saudi Arabian court violated this standard.
Therefore, by violating Abu al-Khair’s right to express opinions and 
ideas freely, even if such opinion offended public officials, or were found 
shocking or disturbing by the judicial and executive authorities of the 
country, Saudi Arabia has violated international human rights law.
B. Violation of the General Prohibition Against the Criminalization of 
Speech Directed at Public Officials
1. Saudi Arabia’s Restrictions on Speech Directed at Public 
Officials
According to international human rights law, criminalizing the holding 
of an opinion is prohibited. 95 The “harassment, intimidation, arrest, 
detention, trial or imprisonment” of any individual based on the expression 
of an opinion, constitutes a violation of the ICCPR.96 As discussed above, 
international law recognizes a special prohibition against the 
criminalization of speech directed at public officials due to public figures 
being “required to tolerate a greater degree of criticism than private 
citizens,” and because “mechanisms for criticism, particularly of political 
leaders, were deemed important so that leaders were held to account.”97
The Saudi laws expressly criminalize any critical speech directed at 
the government or its officials and Saudi judges broadly interpret these laws 
to stifle any form of speech that criticizes the Kingdom and its public 
affairs.98 The Law of Terrorism Crimes and its Financing defines a terrorist 
crime as any act carried out by the perpetrator to commit a criminal 
activity . . . towards the purpose of disabling the Basic Law or any of its 
articles; harming the reputation or status of the country. 99 The Saudi 
government relies on this law to crush peaceful opposition and justify 
severe sentences against those who express critical opinions.
                                                     
94. ICCPR, supra note 19, art. 19.
95. Id.
96. EL-HAGE & BOUSTANI, supra note 39, at 34; see also HRC Zaire, supra note 41.
97. HRC 10th Sess., supra note 59, ¶ 10.
98. Saudi Arabia:  New Terrorism Regulations Assault Rights, HUM. RTS.WATCH (Mar. 20, 
2014, 12:00 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/03/20/saudi-arabia-new-terrorism-regulationsassault
-rights.
99. PRETENSE OF PROGRESS, supra note 4.
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Similarly, the Anti-Cyber Crime Law of 2009 lists “defamation” as 
one of the cyber-crimes subject to imprisonment, but fails to define this 
offense.100 With such a broad term, any critical expression can amount to a 
punishable crime under this law. Article 6 of the same law provides that 
the “[p]roduction, preparation, transmission, or storage of materials 
impinging on public order, religious values, public morals, and privacy” is a 
cyber-crime, which similarly encompasses any communication of material 
deemed critical towards public affairs or religion.101
The opinions expressed by Abu al-Khair, whether in the petition, on 
television, or via Twitter, were directed at the judicial authority and are 
protected by international law. Despite that, and according to the facts of this 
case, the Saudi Arabian legal system criminalized this expression by pressing 
charges against Abu al-Khair for the alleged crime of insulting the judiciary, 
and the criminal court sentenced him to three months in prison on that charge. 
Two years later, the Specialized Criminal Court sentenced Abu al-Khair to 
fifteen years in prison for charges related to “harming the reputation of the 
Kingdom” and “inciting the public opinion against the Kingdom,” based on the 
provisions of the Law of Terrorism Crimes and its Financing and Anti-Cyber 
Crime Law. Under a broad definition of “terrorist crime” and “defamation,” 
these laws harshly criminalize holding any opinion suspected of harming the 
reputation of the Kingdom or any of its officials.
The sentencing of Abu al-Khair based on defamation charges violates 
the universal standard on defamation set out in international law. The 
analysis of the case, in light of the six-prong test discussed in the above 
section, demonstrates that Saudi Arabia fails to comply with international 
law requirements.
2. Analysis of the Multi-Prong Test Related to Defamation
The first prong of this test requires that the laws on defamation must be 
provided by law and must not be overbroad; must address one of the legitimate 
aims set out in paragraph 3(a) and (b) of Article 19 (respect of the rights and 
reputation of others; protection of national security or of public order, or of 
public health or morals); must be necessary to achieve a legitimate purpose;
must be the least intrusive instrument necessary to achieve the protective 
function; and must be proportionate to the interest being protected.102
                                                     
100. Anti-Cyber Crime Law, M/17, art. 3(5) (Sa.) (March 26, 2007) [hereinafter M/17].  Article 
3, Section 5 of the Anti-Cyber Crime Law states, “Any person who commits one of the following cyber 
crimes shall be subject to imprisonment for a period not exceeding one year and a fine not exceeding 
hundred thousand riyals or to either punishment: Defamation and infliction of damages upon others 
through the use of various information technology devices.”  Id.
101. Id.
102. General Comment No. 34, supra note 34, ¶¶ 26–30.
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Saudi Arabian laws expressly criminalize defamatory statements that 
harm the reputation of public officials or the Kingdom. The Law of 
Terrorism Crimes and its Financing harshly punishes any speech that “harm 
the reputation or status of the country,”103 and the Anti-Cyber Crime Law 
criminalizes defamation including any expression deemed critical to public 
affairs and religion.104 The Law of Printed Materials and Publications 
proscribes expression of opinion that is “insulting to Islam and to the 
system of government”105 and bans and criminalizes any speech that is 
“damaging to the reputation of the Grand Mufti, members of the Council of 
Senior Religious Scholars, or senior government officials.”106 While the 
laws on defamation are codified, these laws include overbroad expressions 
such as “reputation or status of the country,” “public affairs and religion,” 
“Islam [or] the system of government,” which render these laws not precise 
enough to enable an individual to regulate his or her conduct accordingly.107
In addition, the predominance of the Shari’a law in the Kingdom adds to the 
broadness of such laws, especially that Saudi judges have broad discretion 
in the interpretation of the law.
Moreover, the ground for restrictions provided in the Saudi Arabian 
laws and on which the court decisions in Abu al-Khair’s case are based, is 
the protection of the reputation of the country and its judicial system.
Legitimate interests for restriction of free speech include: the rights of 
others, 108 such as the human rights articulated by the ICCPR; national 
security,109 such as the violent overthrow of the constitutional order; and 
public order,110 such as speaking in a public place that may be disruptive to 
the public order. This interest of Saudi Arabian law is not protected by the 
universal standard of the ICCPR and restricting Abu al-Khair’s speech on 
this basis is therefore not necessary for a legitimate purpose. Therefore, 
                                                     
103. PRETENSE OF PROGRESS, supra note 4.
104. M/17, supra note 100, art. 6.
105. Law of Printed Materials and Publications, M/32, art. 18 (Sa.) (Nov. 2000) [hereinafter 
M/32].
106. EL-HAGE & BOUSTANI, supra note 39, at 10.
107. General Comment No. 34, supra note 34, ¶¶ 25, 34.  Paragraph 34 requires restricting
laws not to be overbroad and Paragraph 25 states that laws “must be formulated with sufficient precision 
to enable an individual to regulate his or her conduct accordingly.” Id.
108. See Human Rights Committee, Jong-Cheol v. Republic of Korea, Commc’n No. 968/2001, 
¶ 8.3, 85th Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/84/D/968/2001, (July. 25, 2005).
109. See Human Rights Committee, AK & AR v. Uzbekistan, Commc’n No. 1233/2003, 95th 
Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/95/D/1233/2003, (Mar. 31, 2009).
110. See Human Rights Committee, Patrick Coleman v. Australia, Commc’n No. 1157/2003, ¶ 
7.3, 87th Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/87/D/1157/2003, (July 10–28, 2006).
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sentencing Abu al-Khair to fifteen years in prison on the basis of 
defamation charges is neither proportional nor justified.
Because the legality, legitimate grounds, necessity and proportionality 
elements are not satisfied, Saudi Arabia fails this prong of the test.
The second prong of the test requires that the defamatory statement in 
question be a fact instead of an opinion.111 The third prong imposes a 
heightened standard for public officials and figures, because they are 
naturally subject to criticisms and opposition.112 The Saudi Arabian laws 
on defamation and the judges in the case of Abu al-Khair do not distinguish 
between statements of fact and opinion. Additionally, they do not suggest 
that public officials and public figures are subject to a heightened level of 
criticism. In fact, harming the reputation of the country, including its 
officials, carries a sentence of up to twenty years in prison.113 The second 
and third prongs of the test are therefore not satisfied.
The fourth prong of the test requires the existence of actual malice in 
the defendant’s actions in cases concerning defamation of public 
officials.114 The Saudi Arabian laws do not mandate the existence of actual 
malice as a prerequisite for persecution.115 The court in Abu al-Khair’s 
case does not state actual malice as a requirement for criminal defamation 
and charged him solely based on the fact that he expressed a critical opinion. 
This prong is therefore not satisfied.
The fifth prong indicates that the burden of proof lies with the 
plaintiff.116 In other words, when an individual is criminally prosecuted for 
violating statutes legitimately and necessarily restricting free speech, the 
prosecution must plead with particularity how the individual on trial 
violated the law, and has the burden of proving these facts before a court of 
law. The Saudi statutes do not set forth the burden of proof and Abu al-
Khair’s case lacked the due process required for demonstrating proof in an 
impartial judicial proceeding. Saudi Arabia’s prosecution and sentencing of 
Abu al-Khair violated his right to a fair trial and the right to due process.
After he was arrested during a hearing on April 15, 2014, he was denied 
access to his lawyer. On April 22, 2014, the judge refused to provide Abu 
al-Khair’s lawyer with any explanation for his arrest and detention, and he 
was thus unable to present his defense.  Consequently, the plaintiff-
prosecutors did not present any proof for the charges against Abu al-Khair 
                                                     
111. HRC 17th Sess., supra note 37.
112. General Comment No. 34, supra note 34, ¶ 38.
113. HRC 17th Sess., supra note 37.
114. General Comment No. 34, supra note 34, ¶ 47.
115. The fourth prong of international standards relating to defamation under the ICCPR 
requires the existence of actual malice on the part of the defendant in cases concerning public officials.
116. See ICCPR, supra note 19, art. 14(2).
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who was charged based on the evidence gathered by the Bureau of 
Investigation and Public Prosecution during an interrogation. The plaintiff-
prosecutors in this case could not have met their burden of proving their 
case if Mr. Abu al-Khair was denied a defense, as there was no impartial 
judicial proceeding within which to prove their case. This prong is 
therefore not satisfied.
The sixth prong sets forth the defenses available to the defendant: truth 
and public interest of the subject matter.117 Saudi laws do not state that truth 
and public interest are justifications for the defamatory statement.118 Likewise, 
in Abu al-Khair’s case, he was unable to present his defense as he was denied 
access to his lawyer. This prong is therefore not satisfied.
The fact that the Saudi Arabian laws and its application by the courts 
do not comply with the multi-prong test renders Saudi Arabia as a non-
compliant state with the universal standard on defamation. By enacting and 
implementing laws that unambiguously proscribe the expression of one’s 
opinion, and even more harshly when directed at public figures, Saudi 
Arabia, acting through its executive branch, is internationally responsible 
for violating the prohibition against criminalization of speech and the 
special prohibition against the criminalization of forms of expression 
directed at public officials.119 Additionally, by detaining and imprisoning 
Abu al-Khair based on such laws, Saudi Arabia, acting through its judicial 
branch, has violated the prohibition against criminalization of speech and 
the special prohibition against the criminalization of forms of expression 
directed at public officials.120
C. Violation of the Incitement Prohibition
1. The Incitement Prohibition
The incitement prohibition limits the right to freedom of expression 
when hatred, hostility or violence are encouraged through the speech.121
According to international human rights law, a particular government’s 
measures in implementing the incitement prohibition requires a high 
threshold because, as a matter of fundamental principle, limitations on 
speech must always remain an exception.122 Such a threshold must be read 
                                                     
117. Id. art. 14(3)(d).
118. HRC 17th Sess., supra note 37.
119. ICCPR, supra note 19, art. 19.
120. Id.
121. Id. art. 20(2).
122. Id. arts. 19–20.
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in consonance with the three-prong test for restrictions123—namely, such 
restrictions must be provided by law (legality test); be narrowly defined to 
serve a legitimate interest (proportionality test); and be necessary to protect 
that interest (necessity test). In particular, the legal provision must not be 
overly broad or restrict speech in a wide or untargeted way.124 Similarly, 
the principle of proportionality must be respected not only in the law that 
frames the restrictions, but also by the administrative and judicial 
authorities in applying the law.125 As a result, when a state party invokes a 
legitimate ground for restriction of freedom of expression, it must 
demonstrate in a specific and individualized fashion the precise nature of 
the threat, and the necessity and proportionality of the specific action 
taken—in particular by establishing a direct and immediate connection 
between the expression and the threat.126
2. Analysis of the Three-Prong Test Related to the Incitement 
Prohibition
The legality test requires that the incitement prohibition restricting 
freedom of expression must be provided by law in a clear and targeted way, 
and must address one of the aims set out in paragraph 3(a) and (b) of 
Article 19 in respect of the rights and reputation of others, protection of 
national security or public order, or public health or morals.127
Saudi laws and Shari’a law that govern most areas in the Kingdom are 
unclear, overly broad, and restrict speech in a wide or untargeted way, 
especially when the speech is found to be offensive, shocking, disturbing, 
or merely critical of the government or of Islam. In fact, the Law of 
Terrorism Crimes and its Financing,128 the Anti-Cyber Crime Law,129 the 
Law of Printed Materials and Publications,130 and the Law on Electronic 
Publications,131 all include provisions that restrict the right to freedom of 
expression, and are not formulated with sufficient precision to enable an 
individual to regulate his or her conduct accordingly. Instead, the legal 
system confers arbitrary discretion on prosecutors and judges to restrict 
                                                     
123. ICCPR, supra note 19, art. 19(3).
124. General Comment No. 34, supra note 34, ¶ 34.
125. Id.
126. HRC 80th Sess., supra note 79.
127. General Comment No. 34, supra note 34, ¶ 25.
128. PRETENSE OF PROGRESS, supra note 4.
129. M/17, supra note 100, art. 6 (Sa.).
130. M/32, supra note 105, art. 18 (Sa.).
131. Saudi Arabia: Rescind New Online Restrictions, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Jan. 7, 2011, 6:04 
P.M.), https://www.hrw.org/news/2011/01/07/saudi-arabia-rescind-new-online-restrictions.
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freedom of expression and apply the incitement prohibition arbitrarily.
Even if the laws were properly narrowly constructed, the unlimited 
interpretation power possessed by the Saudi judiciary corrupts the equal 
application of the law necessary to safeguard the limitations of the 
incitement prohibition enshrined in international human rights law.
In addition, the restrictions to freedom of expression as provided in the 
Saudi Arabian laws are not based on legitimate grounds set out in the 
ICCPR. The Law of Terrorism Crimes and its Financing and the Anti-
Cyber Crime Law state that the grounds for restriction are to protect “public 
order,” “the stability of the state,” “national unity,” “the reputation or status 
of the country,” and impinging on public order and “religious values.”132
Most of these grounds are not legitimate grounds according to the universal 
standard, which recognize as such the “the rights or reputations of others” 
and “the protection of national security or of public order or of public 
health or morals.”133 Therefore, Saudi Arabia fails the legality test for the 
implementation of the incitement prohibition as established under 
international human rights law because the law on incitement is neither 
adequately clear nor targeted.
The proportionality test requires that the incitement prohibition 
restricting freedom of expression must not be overbroad, must be the least 
intrusive instrument necessary to achieve the protective function, and must 
be proportionate to the interest being protected.134
In both legal cases against Abu al-Khair, the courts failed to demonstrate 
that the legal provisions of the Law of Terrorism Crimes and its Financing, the 
Anti-Cyber Crime Law, and the Shari’a law used by the courts were clearly 
and narrowly defined to protect a legitimate government interest and that they 
were aimed at the “respect of the rights and reputation of others, protection of
national security or of public order, or of public health or morals.”135 As 
evidenced by the charges in both indictment documents and court decisions, 
the government’s alleged interest in this case is the protection of the reputation 
                                                     
132. General Comment No. 34, supra note 34, ¶¶ 21, 29, 30. Paragraph 29 provides that although 
the exercise of the right to freedom of expression carries with it special duties and responsibilities leading to 
restriction of freedom of expression in order to protect the rights or reputations of others or the protection of 
national security or of public order, such restricting laws should not jeopardize the freedom of expression as 
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strict requirements of Paragraph 3 of Article 19 of ICCPR.  Id. It is not compatible with Paragraph 3 to 
invoke such laws to suppress the public information of legitimate public interest that does not harm national 
security or to prosecute journalists and other human rights defenders. Id. PRETENSE OF PROGRESS, supra
note 4; M/17, supra note 100, art. 6 (Sa.).
133. General Comment No. 34, supra note 34.
134. Id. ¶ 34.
135. ICCPR, supra note 19, art. 19(3).
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of the Kingdom both inside and outside the country. Abu al-Khair is charged 
and sentenced with “subverting public order in the Kingdom,” “discrediting the 
Kingdom,” and “inciting public opinion against the Kingdom,” and 
“transmitting information prejudicial to public order”. These charges are based 
on the fact that Abu al-Khair expressed criticism toward the Kingdom, signed a 
petition calling for democratic reforms, and communicated with international 
organizations and provided information about the status of human rights in 
Saudi Arabia.
The charge of “subverting public order,” and “inciting public opinion 
against the Kingdom” is not justified given that Abu al-Khair’s peaceful 
activities legitimately exercised his right to freedom of expression under the 
ICCPR. In addition, prohibiting criticism towards the Kingdom and its 
officials in order to preserve its reputation is not a legitimate interest under 
international legal standards and especially in the circumstances of public 
debate since expressing critical views is a right guaranteed by the ICCPR.
In addition, the ICCPR places a higher value on expression critical to public 
figures, even when the expression is offensive, shocking or disturbing.136
The punishment of imprisonment for fifteen years with a fifteen-year 
travel ban after release is clearly disproportional to any interest being 
protected. In fact, as the interests being protected are not legitimate, any 
penalty imposed could never be proportionate. Therefore, Saudi Arabia 
fails the proportionality test required for the implementation of the 
incitement prohibition.
The necessity test requires that the incitement prohibition restricting 
freedom of expression must be necessary to protect a legitimate interest, 
and must be the only way to achieve protection.137
The Specialized Criminal Court sentenced Abu al-Khair for “subverting 
public order in the Kingdom” and “transmitting information prejudicial to 
public order,” because he publically criticized the judiciary by signing a 
petition and shared information about the human rights’ situation of the country 
with international organizations. The Court interpreted these simple acts of 
expression, protected by international human rights law, as threatening to the 
public order. Although the protection of public order is considered a legitimate 
government interest by international human rights law, in this case the actual 
interest at issue is the protection of the reputation of the Kingdom. Legitimate 
grounds must conform to the strict requirements of Article 19, Paragraph 3.138
As the Human Rights Committee has noted: “a) It is not compatible with 
paragraph 3, for instance, to invoke such laws to suppress or withhold from the 
                                                     
136. See Human Rights Committee, Bodrožiü v. Serbia and Montenegro, Communication 
No.1180/2003, ¶ 7.2, 85th Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/85/D/1180/2003, (Oct. 17–Nov. 3, 2005).
137. General Comment No. 34, supra note 34, ¶ 33.
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public information of legitimate public interest that does not harm national 
security or to prosecute journalists, researchers, environmental activists, human 
rights defenders, or others, for having disseminated such information.”139
Legitimate grounds related to national security involve restricting 
expressions that promote the violent overthrow of the government 140 or 
expressions related to official secrets and sedition, 141 a far cry from the 
expressions made by Abu al-Khair which were simply critical to the government. 
Examples of legitimate grounds connected to public order involve contempt of 
court142 and parliamentary privilege.143 However, even here the scope of the 
legitimacy for these grounds is strictly limited, and manifestly distinct from the 
statements made by Abu al-Khair.144 His statements criticizing the Kingdom’s 
judiciary for sentencing peaceful activists fall well outside the scope of 
expressions legitimately restricted under international law.
In any case, the court failed to demonstrate that sentencing Abu al-
Khair to fifteen years in prison was justified and necessary to protect any 
legitimate interest, especially when the forms of expression used by Abu al-
Khair (i.e. signing a petition, publishing comments on Twitter, 
communicating with international organizations) did not involve any kind 
of violence or incitement of violence whatsoever. Even where a legitimate 
interest exists, such as with contempt of court, the punishment must fit the 
crime.145 International jurisprudence demonstrates that the lengthy prison 
sentence handed to Abu al-Khair was unnecessary and disproportionate to 
his actions.146 Necessity and proportionality are both strict requirements a 
state must adhere to in order to abide by their Article 19 responsibilities.147
                                                     
139. Id.
140. A.K. and A.R., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/95/D/1233/2003 (2009); 16 IHRR 719 (2009), ¶ 7.2.
141. General Comment No. 34, supra note 34, ¶ 30.
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In addition, the universal standard as established by the ICCPR requires 
the existence of an intent, specifically an intent to incite discrimination, 
hostility, or violence.148 It requires causation between the expression and 
threat.149 However, the court failed to demonstrate that Abu al-Khair had the 
intent to “incite violence” as it is suggested by the charges against him. He was 
charged for signing a petition that is critical of the government and for 
defending victims of human rights violations. His acts did not involve any kind 
of violence. Abu al-Khair was charged in relation to his opinions and 
expressions about social and political issues in the country. There was no 
threat associated with his expression and the court failed to demonstrate any 
causation between his speech and any threat to the public order.
In conclusion, the speech restrictive measures adopted by the 
Kingdom and implemented by its judicial authorities fail to meet the three-
prong test under the ICCPR, which renders the Saudi Arabian state as non-
compliant with the universal standard on incitement. As a result, through 
these measures, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia violated the right of Abu al-
Khair to freely hold and express his opinion and to disseminate information 
to others whether inside or outside of the Kingdom.
As a result, Saudi Arabia is responsible for the violation of Article 19 of 
the UDHR, Article 19 of the ICCPR and Article 32 of the Arab Charter for 
Human Rights, depriving Abu al-Khair from fundamental rights recognized by 
all international legal instruments.150 Saudi Arabia’s domestic law does not 
meet the minimum thresholds of legality, proportionality, and necessity under 
international law with regards to freedom of expression.
                                                     
148. EL-HAGE & BOUSTANI, supra note 39, at 34; HRC 70th Sess., supra note 68.
149. General Comment No. 34, supra note 34, ¶ 38 (stating that “the mere fact that forms of expression 
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V. CONCLUSION
Saudi Arabia is ruled by an absolute monarchy, with no independent 
judiciary, separation of powers, independent media, or political parties. 151
Citizens have no freedom of thought, expression, religion or association.
Under this regime, there is no guarantee of independence in the administration 
of justice or respect for the fundamental rights of citizens, especially for those 
who openly express their disagreement with the government.
The prosecution and trials in the case of Waleed Abu al-Khair were 
carried out in the context of arbitrariness, abuse of power and full 
authoritarianism in Saudi Arabia. This article concludes that Saudi Arabia 
has violated Abu al-Khair’s right to freedom of expression. He was 
convicted under defamation and incitement laws simply for expressing his 
opinions, calling for democratic reform, and advocating for human rights in 
the Kingdom. Specifically, he was charged and later convicted under the 
internationally wrongful grounds of harming the Kingdom’s reputation and 
inciting public opinion against the Kingdom.
Moreover, Waleed Abu al-Khair was not provided a fair trial or the 
opportunity to present a defense, as is required by international law. He 
was given a fifteen-year prison sentence, an unnecessary and 
disproportionate response to comments made without malice and without 
the intent to incite violence. His expressions were simply aimed at 
promoting the human rights articulated by the ICCPR and other 
international instruments.
Abu al-Khair has been imprisoned since April 2014 and his case is one 
among many. Despite its seat at the UNHRC and its recent appointment to 
lead an influential U.N. Human Rights panel,152 the Kingdom still regularly 
engages in the systematic repression of activists and human rights defenders, 
often leading to numerous years of imprisonment, without trial, and the use 
of repressive measures against them.153
                                                     
151. Basic Law of Governance, supra note 1, art. 5 (stating that “(a) [T]he system of governance in 
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia shall be monarchical.  (b) Governance shall be limited to the sons of the Founder 
King ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn ‘Abd ar-Rahman al-Faysal Al Sa‘ud, and the sons of his son . . . .”).
152. Christopher Ingraham, Why One of the World’s Worst Human Rights Offenders Is Leading 
A U.N. Human Rights Panel, WASH. POST (Sept. 28, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news
/wonk/wp/2015/09/28/why-one-of-the-worlds-worst-human-rights-offenders-is-leading-a-un-human-
rights-panel/?utm_term=.d2ea7e456357.
153. AMNESTY INT’L, SAUDI ARABIA: REPRESSION IN THE NAME OF SECURITY 18, 29 (2011),
https://www.amnestyusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/saudisecurity.pdf (“In July 2007 the Ministry 
of Interior announced that 9,000 people had been arrested during counter-terrorism operations between 
2003 and 2007 and that 3,106 of them remained held.”).
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Abstract
For centuries, non-state actors have acted as claimants before 
international judicial bodies. Only recently, however, have they begun 
acting as respondents. This Article considers how five areas of 
international law—international investment law, international human rights 
law, international humanitarian law, international criminal law, and the law 
of the sea—deal with non-state actors in order to identify a lex generalis
governing non-state actors as respondents. In particular, this Article 
examines two elements that must be established to make a successful claim 
against a non-state actor: (1) how non-state actors acquire obligations 
under international law; and (2) how international judicial bodies acquire 
jurisdiction ratione personae over non-state actors.
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I. INTRODUCTION
For centuries, non-state actors have acted as claimants before 
international judicial bodies. The Jay Treaty of 1794—widely considered 
to be the foundation of modern arbitration1—permitted non-state actors to 
file claims against states. 2 Since then, many international claims 
commissions, 3 international investment agreements, 4 and international 
human rights treaties 5 have similarly permitted non-state actors to file 
claims against states. In fact, the majority of claims heard by the first 
international court with jurisdiction over states, the first Central American 
Court of Justice, were filed by individuals.6 The phenomenon of non-state 
actors acting as claimants before international judicial bodies is thus well 
established in international law.
The phenomenon of non-state actors acting as respondents, however, 
is relatively new. In 1945, the International Military Tribunal in 
Nuremberg was established to adjudicate claims under international law 
against individuals.7 Beginning in the 1990s, various international criminal 
courts and tribunals were similarly established to prosecute individuals for 
international crimes.8 It thus appeared that the phenomenon of non-state 
actors acting as respondents was confined to the sphere of international 
criminal law. This conception, however, is inaccurate. Some international 
                                                
1. See Charles H. Brower II, Arbitration, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL LAW ¶ 13 (2007).
2. Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation, Gr. Brit.-U.S., arts. 6, 7, Nov. 19, 1794, 8 
Stat. 116 [hereinafter Jay Treaty].  Article VI of the Jay Treaty also permitted non-state actors to file 
claims against other non-state actors, but the basis for these claims was contracts, not international law.  
See id. art. 6.  1 JOHN BASSETT MOORE, HISTORY AND DIGEST OF THE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS 
TO WHICH THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN A PARTY 271–76 (1898).
3. See, e.g., Convention on the Settlement of Matters Arising Out of the War and the 
Occupation ch. 5, art. 7, May 26, 1952, 6 U.S.T. 4411, 332 U.N.T.S. 219.
4. See, e.g., Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, 
U.S.-Arg., art. 7, Nov. 14, 1991, 31 I.L.M. 124.
5. See, e.g., Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 
34, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221; Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights art. 1, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).
6. Rosa Riquelme Cortado, Central American Court of Justice (1907–18), in MAX PLANCK 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW ¶ 16 (2013).
7. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the 
European Axis, and Charter of the International Military Tribunal arts. 1, 5, Aug. 8, 1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 
280.
8. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 827, ¶ 2 (May 25, 1993) (establishing the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia); S.C. Res. 955, ¶ 1 (Nov. 8, 1994) (establishing the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda).
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investment agreements (IIAs) grant arbitral tribunals broad jurisdiction over 
disputes between investors and states, 9 such that states have filed 
counterclaims against investors, leading the investors to act as respondents. 
Also, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)
grants the Seabed Disputes Chamber of the International Tribunal for the 
Law of the Sea (ITLOS) jurisdiction over “disputes between parties to a 
contract, being States Parties, the Authority or the Enterprise, state 
enterprises and natural or juridical persons,”10 suggesting that a non-state 
contractor could act as a respondent in such a dispute settlement proceeding.
Admittedly, it is not common for non-state actors to act as respondents 
before international judicial bodies. Nevertheless, as non-state actors are 
playing an increasingly important role in international law, this 
phenomenon is likely to become more common. This Article thus 
examines the particular issues that arise when non-state actors act as 
respondents before international judicial bodies.
As a preliminary matter, a few terms must be defined. First, as used in 
this Article, a “non-state actor” is any actor that is not only not a state, but also 
not an international organization. Non-state actors may thus be, inter alia,
individuals, corporations, terrorist groups, and sub-state entities. Second, the 
term “claim” in this Article refers to claims or counterclaims only under public 
international law, not under domestic law or private international law. As a 
result, contractual claims in international commercial arbitration are excluded 
from the scope of this Article. Third, a “claimant” is any actor that makes a 
claim or counterclaim against another actor before an international judicial 
body. In some forums, the “claimant” is more commonly called an “applicant” 
or a “petitioner,” but for uniformity, this Article exclusively uses the term 
“claimant.” Fourth, a “respondent” is the actor against whom the claim or 
counterclaim is made. In the context of international criminal law, the 
respondent is often called an “accused” or a “defendant,” but again for 
uniformity, this Article exclusively uses the term “respondent.” Fifth, an 
“international judicial body” is any public international body that renders 
decisions on the responsibility of the respondent on the basis of public 
international law. The term thus includes, inter alia, the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ), investor-state arbitral tribunals, panels of the World Trade 
Organization, international criminal tribunals, claims commissions, and human 
rights treaty bodies.
                                                
9. See, e.g., Agreement Between the Argentine Republic and the Kingdom of Spain on the 
Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, Arg.-Spain, art. X(1), Oct. 3, 1991, 1699 U.N.T.S. 
202 [hereinafter Argentina-Spain BIT].
10. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 187(c), Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3 
[hereinafter UNCLOS] (emphasis added).
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Over the past decade, the literature on non-state actors has exploded. 
Leading commentators have written hundreds of books and articles on the 
implications of non-state actors acting as subjects of international law.11
Nevertheless, the existing literature does not provide a sufficient 
understanding of non-state actors acting as respondents before international 
judicial bodies. This is for two principal reasons. The first reason is that 
most commentary on non-state actors focuses on their rights rather than 
their obligations. This can perhaps be explained by the fact that non-state 
actors seem to have more rights than obligations under international law.
Further, as noted above, there is a long history of non-state actors acting as 
claimants before international judicial bodies, whereas the phenomenon of 
non-state actors acting as respondents is rather new. All this said, today 
there is undoubtedly a growing literature on the obligations of non-state 
actors under international law. This is where the second reason comes into 
play: commentary on the obligations of non-state actors tend to focus on 
one particular area of law, one particular type of obligation, and/or one 
particular type of non-state actor. For example, many commentators have 
focused on the obligations of non-state armed groups under international 
humanitarian law. 12 Another popular topic is the obligations of 
corporations under international human rights law.13 Rather than focus on 
any particular area of law, obligation, or type of non-state actor, this Article 
aims to identify a lex generalis concerning non-state actors acting as 
respondents before international judicial bodies.
As a general matter, a claimant must establish five elements to make a 
successful claim under international law against a respondent before an 
international judicial body. First, the respondent must hold an obligation under 
international law (“an international obligation”). Second, the respondent must 
have breached that obligation. Third, the respondent must have responsibility
under international law (“international responsibility”) for that breach. Fourth, 
                                                
11. See, e.g., Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors in Conflict 
Situations, 88 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 491, 498 (2006) [hereinafter Clapham, Human Rights 
Obligations]; ANNE PETERS, BEYOND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Jonathan Huston trans., 2016); KATE PARLETT, THE INDIVIDUAL IN THE 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (2011); Jean 
d’Aspremont et al., Sharing Responsibility Between Non-State Actors and States in International Law: 
Introduction, 62 NETH. INT’L L. REV. 49, 49–67 (2015).
12. See, e.g., Antonio Cassese, The Status of Rebels Under the 1977 Geneva Protocol on Non-
International Armed Conflicts, 30 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 416, 416–39 (1981).
13. See, e.g., Sufyan Droubi, Transactional Corporations and International Human Rights 
Law, 6 NOTRE DAME J. INT’L & COMP. L. 119 (2016); Emeka Duruigbo, Corporate Accountability and 
Liability for International and Human Right Abuses:  Recent Changes and Recurring Challenges, 6 NW.
J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 222 (2008).
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the claimant must have the right to invoke that responsibility. And fifth, the 
judicial body must have jurisdiction over the matter.
This Article aims to address only the particular issues that arise when 
the respondent is a non-state actor. Notably, the second and fourth 
elements are inquiries for which, more often than not, particular issues do 
not arise when the respondent is a non-state actor as opposed to a state.
Particular issues could arise with respect to the third element, but this 
Article also does not address this element because of spatial constraints.  As 
a result, this Article examines only the first and fifth elements.
The Article is organized as follows: Section II will discuss the non-state 
actor’s obligation, focusing on how non-state actors acquire obligations under 
international law; Section III will discuss the judicial body’s jurisdiction,
focusing on how the judicial body acquires jurisdiction ratione personae over 
non-state actors; Section IV will then conclude the Article.
II. THE NON-STATE ACTOR’S OBLIGATION
A successful claimant must first establish that the non-state actor holds 
an obligation under international law. Commentators today generally agree 
that non-state actors can hold obligations under international law. The 
more difficult question, however, is how non-state actors acquire such 
obligations.
A. Theory
States acquire international obligations by operation of any of the 
sources of international law: treaties, custom, and general principles of law.
To this list may be added unilateral acts. An underlying theme that 
pervades most if not all these sources is consent: a state holds only 
obligations to which it has expressly or impliedly consented. For treaties, 
the pacta tertiis rule provides that a state cannot be bound by a treaty to 
which it did not consent.14 And for custom, the persistent objector rules 
similarly provides that a state cannot be bound by a custom to which it 
objected during its formation.15 Although some scholars assert that non-
state actors are not subject to this “voluntarist paradigm,”16 this Article 
proceeds on the assumption that they are subject to the paradigm. The 
                                                
14. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 34, Jan. 27, 1980, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 
[hereinafter VCLT].
15. Fisheries (U.K. v. Nor.), Judgment, 1951 I.C.J. Rep. 116, at 126 (Dec. 18); Asylum 
(Colom. v. Peru), Judgment, 1950 I.C.J. Rep. 266, at 277–78 (Nov. 20).
16. See, e.g., Marko Milanoviü, Is the Rome Statute Binding on Individuals? (and Why We 
Should Care), 9 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 25, 39 (2011).
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reason is that, if international law has now developed to the point where 
non-state actors may act as respondents before international judicial bodies 
and may be held responsible for breaches of international law, then they 
should be treated the same way that states are treated in the context of 
dispute settlement proceedings. In light of this understanding, in order to 
determine how non-state actors may acquire obligations under international 
law, one must examine the three traditional sources of international law 
(treaties, custom, and general principles of law), as well as unilateral acts.
First, can non-state actors acquire obligations by treaty? At first, the 
answer appears to be in the negative because non-state actors generally may 
not be parties to treaties. Nevertheless, Section 4 of Part III (Articles 34 to 
38) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) expressly 
recognizes the possibility that a treaty may create rights and obligations for 
non-parties.17 Although Section 4 refers only to non-party states, as one 
esteemed commentator has observed,18 there is no reason why the section 
should not also apply to non-party non-state actors. Article 34 of the VCLT 
provides the general rule that “[a] treaty does not create either obligations 
or rights for a third State without its consent.”19 Article 35 then provides:
“An obligation arises for a third State from a provision of a treaty if the 
parties to the treaty intend the provision to be the means of establishing the 
obligation and the third State expressly accepts that obligation in writing.”20
Assuming that this latter provision is equally applied to non-state actors, 
there are two requirements for a non-state actor to acquire an obligation by 
treaty.  First, “the parties to the treaty intend the provision to be the means 
of establishing the obligation”; and second, “the [non-state actor] expressly 
accepts that obligation in writing.”21
As for the first requirement, it is not difficult to imagine how the 
parties to a treaty can express their intent for the provision in question to 
establish the obligation. The clearest example is where the text of the treaty 
expressly states that the non-state actor “shall” do something. Although 
this sort of provision is not common, it does indeed exist in many 
international treaties. For example, Article 6(5) of Additional Protocol II
provides: “At the end of hostilities, the authorities in power shall 
endeavour to grant the broadest possible amnesty to persons who have 
                                                
17. See VCLT, supra note 14, arts. 34–38.
18. See Cassese, supra note 12, at 423.
19. VCLT, supra note 14, art. 34.
20. Id. art. 35.
21. Id.
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participated in the armed conflict . . . .”22 Although the “authorities in 
power” at the end of hostilities may be a state, it may also be a non-state 
armed group. As another example, Article 21(4) of UNCLOS provides: 
“Ships shall sail under the flag of one State only . . . .”23 One can also find 
examples in provisions governing the constitution of an arbitral tribunal. 
For example, the second paragraph of the Annex to the Convention on the 
Protection of the Rhine provides: “If the chair of the arbitral tribunal has 
not been appointed . . . , the President of the International Court of Justice 
shall appoint an arbitrator . . . .”24
There are three ways to interpret these provisions. First, one can interpret 
them as only imposing an obligation on the state that has jurisdiction over the 
non-state actor to ensure that the non-state actor complies with the prescription. 
This interpretation, however, is unpersuasive given that the drafters could 
easily have rephrased the provision to make clear that the obligation was on the 
state, not the non-state actor. Second, one can interpret them as automatically 
placing an obligation on the non-state actor. Under the voluntarist paradigm 
outlined above, this interpretation is unpersuasive because, if non-state actors 
are to be considered as independent subjects under international law, states 
should not have the power to directly impose obligations under international 
law on them, even though states may impose obligations under domestic law 
on them. Third, one can interpret these provisions as merely expressing an 
intention by the states to bind a non-state actor, fulfilling the first requirement 
under Article 35 of the VCLT. This third approach is the most sensible.
As for the second requirement, if non-state actors are to be considered 
as independent subjects under international law, it makes sense to require 
them to expressly consent to any treaty obligation that binds them. If 
Article 35 requires that non-party states expressly accept treaty obligations 
in writing for the obligations to bind them,25 then it makes sense for non-
party, non-state actors to do the same. In conclusion, then, although non-
state actors generally may not be parties to treaties, they may still acquire 
obligations by treaty.
                                                
22. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts art. 6, ¶ 5, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 
(entered into force Dec. 7, 1978) (emphasis added).
23. UNCLOS, supra note 10, art. 92(1) (emphasis added); see also id. art. 21(4).
24. Convention on the Protection of the Rhine annex, ¶ 2, Apr. 12, 1999 (emphasis added); 
see also Arbitration Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Slovenia and the 
Government of the Republic of Croatia, Slovn.-Croat., art. 2, ¶ 1, Nov. 4, 2009 (“In case that [the 
Parties] cannot agree . . . the President and the two members of the Arbitral Tribunal shall be appointed 
by the President of the International Court of Justice from the list.”).
25. VCLT, supra note 14, art. 35.
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Second, can non-state actors acquire obligations by custom? Once 
again, at first, the answer appears to be in the negative because custom, 
according to the ICJ, is “to be looked for primarily in the actual practice 
and opinio juris of States”26—hence the notions of “state practice” and 
“opinio juris.” Nevertheless, one must recall that Article 38(1)(b) of the 
ICJ Statute does not mention “states” at all; rather, it defines “custom” as
“evidence of a general practice accepted as law.”27 By the terms of the 
Article 38(1)(b) alone, there is thus no reason why a non-state actor’s 
practice and opinio juris cannot create custom binding on non-state actors.
Third, can non-state actors acquire obligations by general principle of 
law? This question is difficult to answer given the lack of consensus over 
what constitutes a general principle of law. Nevertheless, as Alain Pellet 
notes, there is “little doubt” that general principles of law are “unwritten 
legal norms of a wide-ranging character,” “recognized in the municipal 
laws of States,” and “transposable at the international level.”28 If general 
principles of law may impose obligations on states, there is thus no reason 
why they may not impose obligations on non-state actors.
Fourth, can non-state actors acquire obligations by unilateral act? As 
the ICJ held in the Nuclear Tests cases, “[i]t is well recognized that 
declarations made by way of unilateral acts . . . may have the effect of 
creating legal obligations.”29 To the extent that a non-state actor makes a 
similar declaration that meets the requirements set forth in the Nuclear 
Tests cases, there is no reason why it should not be bound by such a 
declaration.
In conclusion, then, non-state actors may acquire obligations by treaty, 
custom, general principle of law, and unilateral act.
B. Lex Specialis
As mentioned above, courts, tribunals, and commentators generally 
agree that non-state actors can hold obligations under international law. 
The large majority of such courts, tribunals, and commentators do not 
                                                
26. Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), Judgment, 1985 I.C.J. Rep. 13, ¶ 27 
(June 3) (emphasis added); see also Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua 
(Nicar. v U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 183 (June 27).
27. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(b), June 26, 1945, 3 Bevans 1153, 
UKTS 67 (1946).
28. Alain Pellet, Article 38, in THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: A
COMMENTARY 677, 766 (Andreas Zimmerman, et al. eds., 2012).
29. Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), Judgment, 1974 I.C.J. Rep. 253, ¶ 43 (Dec. 20); Nuclear 
Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), Judgment, 1974 I.C.J. Rep. 457, ¶ 46 (Dec. 20).
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propound a theory for how non-state actors acquire such obligations. Those 
that do tend to only propose such a theory in their particular area of 
international law. This Section examines these theories.
1. International Humanitarian Law
International humanitarian law (IHL) is perhaps the area of 
international law where scholars have discussed the question of how non-
state actors acquire obligations the most. The question arises most 
frequently in the context of non-international armed conflicts (NIACs).
Common Article 3 (CA3) and Additional Protocol II (APII) both apply in 
NIACs. 30 The issue, however, is that NIACs are generally conflicts 
between a state and a non-state actor. It would be unfair for IHL 
obligations to apply only to one side of an armed conflict. As a result, 
commentators generally agree that CA3 and APII apply not only to states
engaged in NIACs, but also to non-state actors engaged in NIACs. States 
acquire obligations under CA3 and APII by ratifying or acceding to the 
respective treaties. The question, however, is how non-state actors acquire
obligations under CA3 and APII.
Three major groups of theories have developed in this regard.31 The 
first and most popular group of theories holds that CA3 and APII apply to 
non-state actors through the state’s ratification of or accession to the treaty
because of the treaty’s incorporation into domestic law, and/or the fact that 
the non-state actors are nationals of, on the territory of, and/or within the 
jurisdiction of the state. As Antonio Cassese notes, however, this group of 
theories arguably confuses international law and domestic law.32 It may 
explain how obligations become binding on the non-state actor under 
domestic law, but it does not explain how obligations under international 
law are imposed on the non-state actors.33
The second group of theories holds that CA3 and APII apply to non-
state actors through the non-state actors’ consent to their application by 
virtue of unilateral acts or Article 35 of the VCLT (as applied to non-state 
                                                
30. Article 19 of The Hague Convention on Cultural Property of 1954 also applies in NIACs, 
but commentary tends to focus on CA3 and APII.  See Convention for the Protection of Cultural 
Property in the Event of Armed Conflict art. 19, May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 215.
31. For commentary attempting to enumerate the theories, see Andrew Clapham, Non-State 
Actors, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 557, 557–79 (Daniel Moeckli, et al. eds., 3d ed. 2017); 
Clapham, Human Rights Obligations, supra note 11, at 498; Cassese, supra note 1212, at 420–30; 
Milanoviü, supra note 16, at 39.
32. See Cassese, supra note 12, at 429.
33. See id.
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actors rather than states). Cassese has been an advocate of the latter.34 The 
first requirement of Article 35—that “the parties to the treaty intend the 
provision to be the means of establishing the obligation”35—is met by the 
fact that the parties to the Geneva Conventions and APII undoubtedly
intended the treaties to apply to all sides of a NIAC, including non-state 
actors. The trickier part is the second requirement—the requirement that 
“the [non-state actor] expressly accepts that obligation in writing.” 36
Cassese recognizes that:
As for the second test, i.e. the assent by the third party to the 
rights or duties deriving from the treaty, it will of course be 
necessary to determine in each civil war whether rebels are ready 
and willing to accept the Protocol. This willingness may be 
shown in various ways; by a unilateral declaration addressed to 
the Government, by tacit compliance with the Protocol, by a 
request to the ICRC to intervene and guarantee respect for the 
Protocol, or by any other similar means.37
Interestingly, he appears to take the view that the acceptance need not 
be express nor in writing, as he considers “tacit compliance with the 
Protocol” as a means of expressing acceptance of obligations thereunder.38
The third group of theories is that CA3 and APII apply as customary 
or treaty law to non-state actors either because the customary or treaty rules 
apply to non-state actors generally, apply to non-state actors that reach a 
certain level of organization, apply to non-state actors that exercise state-
like functions, and/or apply to non-state actors that claim to represent the 
state.
2. International Human Rights Law
International human rights law (IHRL) is another area where there is 
significant literature on how non-state actors acquire obligations under 
international law. It is now widely accepted that many human rights 
treaties confer rights on individuals. But there is a question as to whether 
non-state actors have the obligation under international law to respect such 
rights. In particular, a question that has often arisen in this context is 
                                                
34. See id. at 420–30.
35. VCLT, supra note 14, art. 35.
36. Id.
37. Cassese, supra note 12, at 428.
38. Id.
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whether corporations have international obligations to respect economic, 
social, and cultural rights (ESCRs).
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), 
which monitors the implementation of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), appears to answer this
question in the negative. The ICESCR confers rights on individuals, and 
the CESCR has recognized the importance of corporations in respecting 
these rights. Nevertheless, the CESCR has focused its attention on state 
obligations under the ICESCR, not corporate obligations.39 Similarly, the 
International Labour Organization (ILO) has adopted many conventions 
that confer rights on individuals and aim to ensure that corporations respect 
labour rights. Nevertheless, as far as the present author is aware, the ILO 
conventions do not impose any direct obligations on corporations. Rather, 
they impose obligations on state parties to enact legislation and take other 
measures in order to influence the conduct of corporations and ultimately 
achieve the conventions’ objectives.40
If one is to argue that corporations have obligations to respect ESCRs, 
one would have to identify a particular theory under which they acquire 
such obligations. One could adopt—and scholars have adopted—any of the 
three groups of theories discussed above in the context of IHL for this 
question as it relates to IHRL. One could argue that corporations acquire
such an obligation by virtue of the state’s ratification of or accession to the 
ICESCR because of the treaty’s incorporation into domestic law and/or the 
fact that the corporations are nationals of, on the territory of, and/or within 
the jurisdiction of the state. Or perhaps, corporations may expressly or 
impliedly consent to the obligation of respecting ESCRs or the obligation 
could also arise from customary law, whether it be a customary rule that 
applies to corporations generally, applies to corporations that reach a 
certain level of organization, and/or applies to corporations that exercise 
state-like functions. All of these theories could rationally be invoked.
An additional theory has also been proposed in this context. Steven 
Ratner has argued that, contrary to the text of the ILO conventions, “both 
the purpose of the conventions and their wording make clear that they do 
                                                
39. See, e.g., Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 24 
(2017) on State Obligations Under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
in the Context of Business Activities, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/24 (Aug. 10, 2017) [hereinafter General
Comment No. 24]; Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Statement on the Obligations 
of State Parties Regarding the Corporate Sector and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/2011/1 (July 12, 2011).
40. See, e.g., Convention (No. 111) Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment 
and Occupation arts. 2–3, June 25, 1958, 362 U.N.T.S. 31 (entered into force June 15, 1960).
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recognize duties on enterprises regarding their employees.”41 In particular, 
he argues that the affirmation of rights in the conventions imply 
corresponding obligations. As an example, he notes:
[O]ne of the ILO’s so-called core conventions, the 1949 
Convention Concerning the Application of the Principles of the 
Right To Organise and To Bargain Collectively, states simply, 
“Workers shall enjoy adequate protection against acts of anti-
union discrimination in respect of their employment.” While 
clearly an injunction to governments to enact legislation against 
certain behavior by industry, the obligation also entails, indeed 
presupposes, a duty on the corporation not to interfere with the 
ability of employees to form unions.42
The investor-state tribunal in the recent case of Urbaser v. Argentina
took a similar approach. It effectively held that corporations acquire the 
obligation to respect ESCRs under the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR) because it is an implied “corresponding obligation”
derivative from the mere existence of rights.43 The tribunal stated:
It may be said that these and other provisions do not state more 
than rights pertaining to each individual. Nevertheless, in order 
to ensure that such rights be enjoyed by each person, it must
necessarily also be ensured that no other individual or entity,
public or private, may act in disregard of such rights, which then 
implies a corresponding obligation.44
Nevertheless, neither Ratner nor the Urbaser v. Argentina tribunal 
explain how a corporation acquires such obligations in the framework of 
the sources of international law.
                                                
41. Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights:  A Theory of Legal Responsibility,
111 YALE L.J. 443, 478 (2001).
42. Id. at 478–79.  Ratner also argues that certain conventions impose direct obligations by 
virtue of their text.  He cites to Article 16(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Convention, which 
provides that “[e]mployers shall be required to ensure that, so far as is reasonably practicable, the 
workplaces, machinery, equipment and processes under their control are safe and without risk to 
health.”  Id. at 479 n.139.  Nevertheless, he fails to note that the language “shall be required” does not 
impose a direct obligation on the employer, but rather on another entity (probably the State) that has the 
power to impose requirements on the employer.  See id. at 478–79, 479 n.139.
43. Urbaser S.A. and Consorcio de Aguas Bilbao Bizkaia, Bilbao Biskaia Ur Partzuergoa v. 
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/26, Award, ¶ 1196 (Dec. 8, 2016).
44. Id.
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3. International Investment Law
Although IIAs generally impose obligations on states, some IIAs—
particularly newer ones—also impose obligations on investors. A recent
example is the Morocco-Nigeria Bilateral Investment Treaty, Article 14 of 
which provides in relevant part:
(1) Investors . . . shall comply with environmental assessment 
screening . . . .
(2) Investors . . . shall conduct a social impact assessment of the 
potential investment . . . .
(3) Investors . . . shall apply the precautionary principle to their 
environmental impact assessment.45
An older example is the Investment Agreement of the Organization of
the Islamic Conference (OIC Agreement), Article 9 of which provides:
The investor shall be bound by the laws and regulations in force 
in the host state and shall refrain from all acts that may disturb 
public order or morals or that may be prejudicial to the public 
interest.  He is also to refrain from exercising restrictive practices 
and from trying to achieve gains through unlawful means.46
The question is, then, how the investor acquires obligations under such 
IIAs. On the one hand, one can argue that the obligations are automatically 
imposed on the investor because the investor is operating within the 
jurisdiction and/or on the territory of the states in question. On the other 
hand, one may ask how the investor can express its acceptance of the 
obligations imposed by the IIA. There are many options here. One can 
argue that the investor accepts the obligations, inter alia, by merely owning 
an investment in one of the contracting states (such that the obligations 
would apply in respect of all investments); by the act of investing in one of 
the contracting states (such that the obligations would only apply in respect 
of investments made after the entry into force of the IIA); or by the act of 
filing an investment claim against the host state (such that the obligations 
would only apply in respect of investments whose investors filed a claim 
with respect to the investments in question). The investor-state tribunal in 
                                                
45. Reciprocal Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement between the Government of 
the Kingdom of Morocco and the Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, Morocco-Nigeria, art 
14., Dec. 3, 2016.  See also id. art. 18(2)–(3) (stating that “[i]nvestors . . . shall uphold human rights in 
the host state [and] [i]nvestors . . . shall act in accordance with core labour standards as required”).
46. Agreement on Promotion, Protection and Guarantee of Investments Among Member 
States of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, art. 9, June 5, 1981.
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Al-Warraq v. Indonesia, in the context of examining the applicability of 
Article 9 of the OIC Agreement, adopted this last approach.47
C. Lex Generalis
In light of this examination of international humanitarian law, 
international human rights law, and international investment law, there are 
four general theories for how non-state actors may acquire obligations 
under international law: (1) the non-state actor acquires an obligation 
because the non-state actor is a national of, on the territory of, or within the 
jurisdiction of a state that is bound by the obligation; (2) the non-state actor 
acquires an obligation because the non-state actor consented to the 
obligation; (3) the non-state actor acquires an obligation because customary 
law directly binds that non-state actor; and (4) the non-state actor acquires 
an obligation because the obligation corresponds to a right established in 
international law. The first three theories have been invoked in the context 
of international humanitarian law, all four in the context of international 
human rights law, and only the first two in international investment law.
International 
Humanitarian 
Law
International 
Human Rights 
Law
International 
Investment Law
Theory 1
(Relationship with 
State)
X X X
Theory 2
(Consent)
X X X
Theory 3
(Custom)
X X
Theory 4
(Corresponding 
Obligation)
X
If one adopts the voluntarist paradigm for non-state actors, then the 
first, third, and fourth theories could not hold water. The first theory is 
                                                
47. Hesham Talaat M al-Warraq v. Republic of Indon., Final Award, ¶¶ 662–63 (Dec. 15, 
2014).
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weak because the mere fact that states can impose obligations on non-state 
actors in domestic law, does not mean they can also do so in international 
law. The third theory is weak because there has been very little study on 
the practice and opinio juris of non-state actors. And the fourth theory is 
weak because it relies on a purely abstract logic rather than one grounded in 
any of the sources of international law.
III. JURISDICTION OVER THE NON-STATE ACTOR
Another element that a successful claimant must establish is that the 
judicial body has jurisdiction over the matter. In general, there are four 
dimensions of jurisdiction: jurisdiction ratione personae, ratione materiae,
ratione temporis, and ratione loci. The questions of jurisdiction ratione 
materiae, ratione temporis, and ratione loci are for the most part the same 
regardless of whether the respondent is a state or a non-state actor. The 
question with respect to jurisdiction ratione personae, however, raises some 
novel questions in cases where the respondent is a non-state actor.
A. Theory
The fundamental principle governing jurisdiction ratione personae is 
the principle of consent: in order for a judicial body to have jurisdiction 
over a subject, the subject must consent to the judicial body’s jurisdiction.48
States give such consent most often by treaty (e.g., dispute settlement 
clauses, special agreements, arbitration treaties). Nevertheless, states have 
also given such consent by unilateral act (e.g., Article 36(2) declarations, 
forum prorogatum49). In addition, according to some, states may also give 
such consent by operation of a general principle of law: estoppel.50
                                                
48. Status of Eastern Carelia, Advisory Opinion, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 5, ¶ 33 (July 23, 
1923); Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943 (It. v. Fr., U.K. & U.S.), Judgment, 1954 I.C.J. 
Rep. 19, 32 (June 15).
49. See Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Albania), Judgment, 1948 I.C.J. Rep. 15 (Mar. 25); Certain 
Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (Djib. v. Fr.), Judgment, 2008 I.C.J. Rep. 177, ¶¶ 
60–64 (June 4); Certain Criminal Proceedings in France (Congo v. Fr.), Provisional Measure Order, 
2003 I.C.J. Rep. 102, ¶ 21 (June 17); Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary Between Ghana and Côte 
d’Ivoire in the Atlantic Ocean (Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire), ITLOS Case No. 23, Judgment of Sept. 23, 2017, 
https://www.itlos.org/en/cases/list-of-cases/case-no-23/#c3685.
50. See “ARA Libertad” (Argentina v. Ghana), ITLOS Case No. 20, Order, ITLOS Rep. ¶ 52–
73 (Dec. 15, 2012), https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no.20/publish
ed/C20_Order_151212.pdf.  But see Achmea B.V. v. Slovak Republic, PCA Case No. 2008-13, Award 
on Jurisdiction, Arbitrability and Suspension, ¶ 219 (Oct. 26, 2010), 
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0309.pdf; Megan L. Wagner, Jurisdiction 
by Estoppel in the International Court of Justice, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 1777, 1777 (1986).
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Although non-state actors cannot conclude treaties, they can still 
consent to a judicial body’s jurisdiction by internationalized agreements,
Article 35 of the VCLT, as well as by unilateral act and, in theory, estoppel.
Indeed, non-state actors have given such consent, most often by unilateral 
act, when acting as claimants. In such contexts, the question of jurisdiction 
ratione personae is a non-issue because it is assumed that the non-state 
actor consents to jurisdiction by the mere act of filing the claim. In cases 
where the non-state actor is a respondent, however, the issue is not as
straightforward.
B. Lex Specialis
Currently, international judicial bodies have jurisdiction ratione 
personae over non-state actors acting as respondents in at least three areas 
of international law: international investment law,51 the law of the sea,52
and international criminal law.53 This section examines how non-state 
actors consent to the jurisdiction of the judicial body in these three areas of 
law.
1. International Investment Law
In all known investor-state arbitrations to date, the investor has always 
been the party initiating the arbitration. As a result, the issue of jurisdiction 
over non-state actors as respondents arises only where the state files 
counterclaims. Both the International Centre for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (ICSID) Convention and the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Arbitration Rules allow for 
counterclaims, but the counterclaims must be within the jurisdiction ratione 
materiae and jurisdiction ratione personae of the arbitral tribunal.54
Many IIAs do not allow for counterclaims because they grant investor-
state tribunals jurisdiction ratione materiae only over disputes concerning 
                                                
51. See, e.g., Burlington Resources, Inc. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5, 
Decision on Ecuador’s Counterclaims (Feb. 7, 2017); Urbaser S.A. and Consorcio de Aguas Bilbao 
Bizkaia, Bilbao Biskaia Ur Partzuergoa v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/26, Award 
(Dec. 8, 2016).
52. See UNCLOS, supra note 10, art. 187(c)–(e).
53. See, e.g., Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 1, July 17, 1998, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force July 1, 2002).
54. See Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of 
Other States art. 46, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter ICSID Convention]; 
G.A. Res. 31/98, Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (Dec. 
15, 1976).  
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the host state’s allegedly wrongful conduct. For example, Article 9 of the 
Greece-Romania bilateral investment treaty (BIT) grants jurisdiction
ratione materiae only over “[d]isputes between an investor of a Contracting 
Party and the other Contracting Party concerning an obligation of the latter
under this Agreement”.55 On the other hand, the language of other IIAs is
broader. In Urbaser v. Argentina, the provision at stake was Article X(1) of 
the Argentina-Spain BIT, which grants jurisdiction ratione materiae over 
“disputes . . . in connection with the investments.”56 In such cases where a 
tribunal has jurisdiction ratione materiae over the counterclaim, it must 
then proceed to examine whether it has jurisdiction ratione personae over 
the investor as a respondent. Investor-state tribunals have declared that 
they have jurisdiction ratione personae over investors as respondents on the 
basis of two grounds.
First, in some cases, the investor and the state expressly conclude an 
agreement granting the tribunal jurisdiction over the counterclaim. For
example, in MINE v. Guinea57 and Atlantic Triton v. Guinea,58 such consent 
was given in the concession agreements in question, and in Burlington v.
Ecuador, it was given in a separate agreement.59
Second, in other cases, the investor does not expressly grant the tribunal 
jurisdiction over counterclaims. Here, a question arises as to whether the 
claimant’s submission of the principal claim to arbitration qualifies as consent to 
counterclaims that may be filed against it. In the recent cases of Goetz v. Burundi 
(II), 60 Al-Warraq v. Indonesia, 61 and Urbaser v. Argentina, 62 the tribunal
answered this question in the affirmative.
                                                
55. The treaty is not publicly available, but this provision was quoted in Spyridon Roussalis v. 
Romania, ICSID Case No ARB/06/1, Award, ¶ 868 (Dec. 7, 2011).  In that case, Romania filed a 
counterclaim, but the tribunal held that it did not have jurisdiction over it.  Id. ¶ 869.
56. Argentina-Spain BIT, supra note 9, art. 10(1).
57. Maritime Int’l Nominees Establishment (MINE) v. Republic of Guinea, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/84/4, Award, (Jan. 6, 1988), 4 ICSID Rep. 61 (1997).
58. Atlantic Triton Co. Ltd. v. People’s Revolutionary Republic of Guinea, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/84/1, Award, (Apr. 21, 1986), 3 ICSID Rep. 13 (1995).
59. See, e.g., Burlington Resources, Inc. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5, 
Decision on Ecuador’s Counterclaims, ¶ 60 (Feb. 7, 2017).
60. Antoine Goetz & Consorts & Others and S.A. Affinage des Metaux v. Republic of 
Burundi, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/2, Award, ¶ 278 (June 21, 2012).
61. See Hesham Talaat M al-Warraq v. Republic of Indon., Final Award, ¶¶ 662–64 (Dec. 15, 
2014).
62. Urbaser S.A. and Consorcio de Aguas Bilbao Bizkaia, Bilbao Biskaia Ur Partzuergoa v. 
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/26, Award, ¶ 1147 (Dec. 8, 2016).
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2. Law of the Sea
Article 187(c) of UNCLOS grants the ITLOS Seabed Disputes 
Chamber jurisdiction ratione materiae over disputes with contractors 
operating in the deep seabed. 63 Since contractors cannot be party to 
UNCLOS, the question is how the Chamber may acquire jurisdiction 
ratione personae over contractors.
The answer is contracts. Any contractor engaging in exploration or 
exploitation of the deep seabed must have a contract in force with the 
International Seabed Authority (ISA), the intergovernmental authority that 
organizes and controls activities in the deep seabed. 64 The ISA has 
developed standard terms for exploration contracts, which read: “Any 
dispute between the parties concerning the interpretation or application of 
this contract shall be settled in accordance with Part XI, section 5, of the 
Convention.”65 The current draft standard terms for exploitation contracts 
is substantially the same.66
3. International Criminal Law
In international criminal law (ICL), unlike in international investment 
law and the law of the sea, it is very difficult to argue that the non-state 
actor in question—the individual on trial—consented, even impliedly, to 
the jurisdiction of the judicial body. One thus should question how 
international criminal courts and tribunals acquire jurisdiction ratione 
personae over individuals.
Interestingly enough, scholars tend to sidestep this question.67 The 
few that have addressed it rely on a single theory: states delegate their 
punitive power to international criminal courts and tribunals by way of 
                                                
63. UNCLOS, supra note 10, art. 187(c) (emphasis added).
64. Id. art. 157(1).
65. Decision of the Council of the International Seabed Authority Relating to Amendments to 
the Regulations on Prospecting and Exploration for Polymetallic Nodules in the Area and Related 
Matters at Its Nineteenth Session, ISA Doc. ISBA/19/C/17, at annex IV, sec. 25.1 (July 22, 2013);
Decision of the Assembly of the International Seabed Authority Relating to the Regulations on 
Prospecting and Exploration for Cobalt-Rich Ferromanganese Crusts in the Area at Its Eighteenth 
Session, ISA Doc. ISBA/18/A/11, at annex IV, sec. 25.1 (Oct. 22, 2012); Decision of the Assembly of 
the International Seabed Authority Relating to the Regulations on Prospecting and Exploration for 
Polymetallic Sulphides in the Area at Its Sixteenth Session, ISA Doc. ISBA/16/A/12/Rev.1, at annex 4, 
sec. 25.1 (Nov. 15, 2010).
66. INT’L SEABED AUTH., DEVELOPING A REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR MINERAL 
EXPLOITATION IN THE AREA 76, annex VI, Sec. 43 (2016).
67. See, e.g., Micaela Frulli, Jurisdiction Ratione Personae, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 527, 532–33 (Antonio Cassese et al. eds., 2002).
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treaty (e.g., International Criminal Court), U.N. Security Council resolution 
(e.g., International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda), or occupying authority (e.g.,
Nuremberg, Tokyo, Iraq).68 As the International Military Tribunal held:
The Signatory Powers created this Tribunal, defined the law it 
was to administer, and made regulations for the proper conduct 
of the Trial.  In doing so, they have done together what any one 
of them might have done singly; for it is not to be doubted that 
any nation has the right [thus] to set up special courts to 
administer law.  With regard to the constitution of the Court, all 
that the defendants are entitled to ask is to receive a fair trial on 
the facts and law.69
C. Lex Generalis
In light of this examination of international investment law, law of the 
sea, and international criminal law, there are three general theories for how 
non-state actors may consent to the jurisdiction of an international judicial 
body: (1) the non-state actor concludes an agreement with the state; (2) the 
non-state actor consents to jurisdiction by unilateral act; and (3) the state 
delegates power it has under domestic law to the judicial body acting under 
international law. The first two theories have been invoked in the context 
of international investment law, the first theory in the context of the law of 
the sea, and only the last theory in international criminal law.
International 
Investment Law
Law of the Sea International 
Criminal Law
Agreement X X
Unilateral Act X
Delegated Power X
                                                
68. See, e.g., 1 KAI AMBOS, TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 57 (2013); Robert 
Cryer, International Criminal Law vs State Sovereignty:  Another Round?, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 979, 985 
(2006).
69. Trial of the Major War Crimes Before the International Military Tribunal, Judgment (Oct. 
1, 1946), reprinted in 41 AM. J. INT’L L. 172, 216–17 (1947).
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If one adopts the voluntarist paradigm for non-state actors, then the 
last theory would not be valid. The first two theories, however, would be 
perfectly acceptable given that they are based on the consent of the non-
state actor. Nevertheless, it would be unlikely for any individual subject to 
an international criminal proceeding to consent to the proceedings against 
him or her. One may thus consider international criminal law to be an 
exception—a justifiable lex specialis. After all, in domestic law, criminal 
cases similarly do not require the consent of the parties. It would thus be 
unrealistic to impose a consent requirement in international criminal law.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Article examined two elements that must be established to make a 
successful claim against a non-state actor: (1) how non-state actors acquire 
obligations under international law; and (2) how international judicial 
bodies acquire jurisdiction ratione personae over non-state actors. 
Interestingly, the five different areas of law examined deal with these two
elements differently, and associated commentators have propounded 
varying theories with regards to the two elements. Thus, there appears to 
be greater divergence than convergence.
This raises the question of whether a lex generalis is appropriate for non-
state actors acting as respondents. Perhaps, unlike the regimes for states and 
international organizations, the regime for non-state actors should exist only as 
lex specialis in particular areas of law. This way, one can better explain why 
there are divergences with regards to the two aforementioned elements in the 
examined areas of law. On the other hand, one can argue that this divergence 
is problematic because the fundamental principles of international adjudication 
should be the same across the board. As a result, a divergence between two 
areas of law actually means that at least one area of law is not treating non-state 
actors as they should be treated.
Regardless of which perspective one takes, the ultimate conclusion of 
this Article is that non-state actors acting as respondents before 
international judicial bodies must be taken seriously as subjects of 
international law. Taking them seriously means that they should, for the 
most part, have the same protections that states have: (1) non-state actors 
should not be subject to obligations under international law unless one can 
point to a concrete source of international law that imposes such an 
obligation on them; and (2) international judicial bodies should not have 
jurisdiction ratione personae over non-state actors without their consent.
Only by respecting these principles, though perhaps with a few exceptions,
can one hope to develop a legitimate system for non-state actors acting as
respondents before international judicial bodies.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Those involved in peace negotiations often face the dilemma of 
balancing demands for justice with the imperative of stopping the conflict 
as quickly as possible.  There are abiding ethical and moral debates 
surrounding this tension between peace and justice. In Syria—where the 
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death toll has exceeded 470,000, 11 million have been displaced, and there 
are over 14,000 documented cases of death by torture1—the peace versus 
justice puzzle is a living dilemma with which those involved in the peace 
process grapple with on a daily basis.
Is it morally permissible to allow conflict (and the attendant human 
suffering) to continue, so as to advance the possibility of achieving justice
in the form of accountability against the perpetrators of the violence?  
Alternatively, if justice is set aside to achieve peace more rapidly, and
accountability is delayed or even prevented, is the resulting harm (including 
a possible return to conflict) acceptable? The debate between peace and 
justice lives in delegation meetings, offices of legal advisors, foreign
ministries, and state governments.  In the midst of a crisis, negotiators and 
those who advise them often must confront the tradeoff between peace and 
justice.  Indeed, the questions being debated in the Syrian peace process 
reflect this lingering puzzle that negotiators have grappled with for decades.  
Individuals must determine their priorities in this regard and create a 
pragmatic strategy towards achieving that outcome. It is important to 
understand the primary tenants of the peace versus justice puzzle in order 
for those involved in a particular peace process to best solve this puzzle.
This article does not propose to answer the weighty question of which 
approach best resolves the conundrum of peace and justice, nor does the 
article intend to recommend a solution to the complex intricacies of 
attempting to merge the two together.  Rather, this article strives to examine 
a timely facet of this multidimensional puzzle: how to successfully 
accommodate the desire for justice by artfully weaving tenets of
accountability into a peace process, without undermining a peace process.  
One answer to this pressing question is that the best method is to avoid 
justice in the peace process altogether.  This is the peace-first approach.  
Another, competing answer, is that the most salient choice is to treat justice 
as a foundational building block of the peace process.  This is the justice-
first approach.  There is also a third answer, which suggests that the most 
effective method for solving the puzzle is to strike a delicate blend of 
justice with peace.
As illustrated by the experiences of a rich array of countries that have 
grappled with these questions, there is no clear consensus on the degree of 
justice that ought to be brought in to a peace process, nor when and how
justice ought to be introduced.  There is, however, a clearer sense that 
however these questions are ultimately resolved, there should be at least a 
modicum of justice.  Although there is an increasing trend towards a
                                                                       
1. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT: EVENTS OF 2016 571 (2017), https://www.
hrw.org/sites/default/files/world_report_download/wr2017-web.pdf [hereinafter HRW WORLD REPORT:
EVENTS OF 2016].
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holistic role of justice in the peace process, the question of “how much 
justice” remains unresolved.
The Syrian conflict provides a particularly useful foil in examining 
this puzzle.  After initial uncertainty as to which approach would take 
primacy in the Syrian peace process, the failure of pivotal efforts to 
introduce accountability measures at the United Nations (U.N.) Security 
Council placed the conflict squarely with the peace-first approach.  Since 
then, however, actors have persistently pursued efforts to weave in justice 
into the peace process, through efforts to document violations, to lay the 
foundation for victim catharsis, and to engage in new and creative options 
for prosecutorial activity.
This article will first explore the peace-first approach: the priorities of
the supporters of this approach, the potential advantages to pursuing peace-
first, and case studies of peace processes that have successfully and 
unsuccessfully followed this approach.  Next, this article will examine the 
justice-first approach in a similar manner. After analyzing the assumed 
dichotomy between peace and justice, the article will explore the potential
(although limited) overlap between these two approaches, identifying the 
perspective that justice and peace may be compatible in cases where justice 
is artfully woven into peace. The article will also identify the limitations to 
this approach. Finally, the article will contextualize the peace versus justice 
puzzle, with reference to the Syrian conflict. Through an exploration of 
each of these topics, the article seeks to examine the puzzle of 
accommodating a drive for accountability, without undermining the ability 
of the parties to halt a conflict.
II. THE “PEACE-FIRST” APPROACH
“The quest for justice for yesterday’s victims of atrocities should not be pursued in 
such a manner that it makes today’s living the dead of tomorrow.”
Anonymous United Nations Official2
The peace-first approach can best be understood by first understanding 
the general perspective and priorities of the approach and then diving 
deeper to examine how the approach is implemented in practice.  This 
section will begin by discussing the tenants of the peace-first approach and 
identifying the primary categories of practitioners that support it.  Next, the 
section will explore the advantages of the peace-first approach in peace 
processes. The section will then focus on actions that can be taken to 
implement the peace-first approach in the peace process.  Finally, to 
illuminate the nuances of the approach, this section will explore the case
                                                                       
2. Anonymous, Human Rights in Peace Negotiations, 18 HUM. RTS. Q. 249, 258 (1996) 
[hereinafter Human Rights in Peace Negotiations].
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studies of South Africa, Bougainville, and Yemen and how the peace-first 
approach manifested in each context.
A. Prioritizing Ending the Conflict
As suggested by its name, the peace-first approach prioritizes ending 
the conflict above all other interests.3 The singular role of negotiators is to 
seek an agreement that brings the most immediate end to the violence.4 All 
other goals and concerns that may impede immediate peace should be 
pushed aside.  In this way, the approach is single-minded and pragmatic:  
peace is the priority and any obstacle to peace should be avoided or 
eliminated.
There is a tension between ideal outcomes in peace processes and the 
outcomes that parties are in fact able to agree to at that moment.5 The 
peace-first approach will always opt for the latter—the most immediate 
resolution of the conflict should be pursued.6 Rather than allowing the 
violence to continue while negotiators pursue a more ideal resolution, 
ceasing the violence takes precedence.  Indeed, achieving justice against 
individuals and parties that committed atrocities during the conflict may be 
a goal of some parties in the peace process, but it may not be possible to 
achieve peace while also pursuing justice.7 As with any other interest, if 
the pursuit of justice will prolong the conflict, justice should not be sought.8
The peace-first approach is often associated with parties to the peace 
process who have committed atrocities, with the aggressor and frequently
with mediators.  The peace negotiator’s role is to end the conflict, not to 
assume the role of a prosecutor and assign responsibility or call for justice.9
As articulated by United States (U.S.) Ambassador Richard Holbrooke—a
key figure in mediating the Bosnia’s Dayton Accords—when asked as to 
why he continuously declined to indicate Serbian President Slobodan 
Milosevic's guilt for the war and atrocities in the former Yugoslavia,10
                                                                       
3. Id. at 251.
4. Id. at 255–56.
5. Id. at 249, 252.
6. See id. at 252.
7. I. William Zartman, Negotiating Forward- and Backward-Looking Outcomes, in PEACE 
VERSUS JUSTICE: NEGOTIATING FORWARD-AND BACKWARD-LOOKING OUTCOMES 1, 6 (I. William 
Zartman & Victor Kremenyuk eds., 2005).
8. Id.
9. Human Rights in Peace Negotiations, supra note 2, at 256.
10. Michael P. Scharf & Paul R. Williams, Functions of Justice and Anti-Justice in the Peace-
Building Process, 35 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 161, 186 (2003).͒
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“[t]his is tough slogging, and my job was not to make moral judgments, [ . . 
. ] and the highest goal here was to avoid war and bring peace.”11
B. Benefits of the Peace-First Approach
The peace-first approach’s prioritization of ending the conflict has
advantages. Bringing immediate peace saves lives and ends human 
suffering. 12 Additionally, peace ends harm to the environment and
destruction of infrastructure, which are by-products of the conflict, and 
reconstruction efforts may begin sooner. 13 The focus on peace also 
encourages national reconciliation and social reconciliation.14
1. Saving Lives
Ending the conflict as soon as possible results in lives being saved and 
human suffering ceasing more rapidly.  Pursuing objectives other than 
peace may prolong the conflict and thus result in more casualties and harm.
Although atrocities may have been committed, ending the conflict as
quickly as possible prevents more from occurring.15
2. Ending Harm to the Environment and Infrastructure
Conflicts have disastrous impacts on the natural environment and 
infrastructure. Achieving peace not only ends the harm being caused to the 
environment and infrastructure, but also allows reconstruction efforts to 
begin in the state sooner than if the conflict was to continue.  By 
prioritizing peace, the natural environment can be protected and efforts to 
heal it can be initiated.  Additionally, prioritizing peace allows the state and 
its people to begin rebuilding its infrastructure—such as homes, hospitals, 
schools, roads, and power supplies—sooner. More immediate 
                                                                       
11. Hearings on the Nomination of Hon. Richard C. Holbrooke to Serve as U.S. Ambassador 
to the United Nations:  Hearings Before the Comm. on Foreign Rel. U.S. Sen., 106th Cong. 101–02 
(1999) (statement of Hon. Richard C. Holbrooke).
12. Human Rights in Peace Negotiations, supra note 2, at 250.
13. U.N., Dep’t of Econ & Soc. Affairs, Peacebuilding Support Off., Peacebuilding 
Commission, Working Group on Lessons Learned, Economic Revitalization in Peacebuilding and the 
Development of Service Based Infrastructure 1, 4 (Nov. 22, 2010), http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/
pdf/doc_wgll/desa_pbso_background_paper.pdf [hereinafter Revitalization in Peacebuilding].
14. See Orlaith Minogue, Peace vs. Justice:  The Utility of Amnesties, 29 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS
306, 308 (2010); Dwight G. Newman, The Rome Statute, Some Reservations Concerning Amnesties, 
and A Distributive Problem, 20 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 293, 304–06 (2005).
15. See Human Rights in Peace Negotiations, supra note 2, at 258.
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reconstruction in turn prevents the compounding of harmful byproducts of 
the conflict, such as lack of access to medical attention or education.16
3. Promoting Reconciliation
Achieving peace without pursuing justice can lead to national and 
social reconciliation.  Undertaking prosecutions can allow animosity 
between the national and societal factions to continue to fester.  Granting 
amnesty and achieving peace may instead lead to forgiveness and 
reconciliation. 17 Offering amnesty can encourage “gestures of 
reconciliation which can contribute to reestablishing normal relations in the 
life of a nation which has been divided.”18
C. Achieving Peace-First in Practice
There are a number of diplomatic tools available to pursue a peace-
first approach.  These include limiting peace negotiation participants to 
those with the ability to actually end the violence (the guys with guns so to 
speak); accommodating and at times appeasing those interests, minimizing 
the role of justice mechanisms; and at times providing blanket amnesty.
1. Singular Objective of Ending the Conflict
To achieve peace, it is necessary to be singularly focused on ending 
the conflict.  The focus of any agreement is a cessation of hostilities 
coupled with subsequent demobilization, demilitarization, and reintegration 
of combatants.19 Where necessary some sort of power sharing arrangement 
can be established to induce the parties to cease hostilities.20 The mandate 
and means for deploying peacekeepers or monitors is also a priority, and 
the establishment of some mechanisms to coordinate international 
assistance for reconstruction.  The mediators and the parties must resist
pressure to expand their mandate to include topics such as deep 
constitutional or electoral reform (beyond creating a framework or process 
                                                                       
16. Revitalization in Peacebuilding, supra note 13, at 4, 7–8.
17. Newman, supra note 14, at 304.
18. Treaties, States Parties and Commentaries, INT’L COMMITTEE RED CROSS, https://ihl-
databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Comment.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=C6692EB184B
56F56C12563CD0043A476 (last visited Apr. 22, 2018) (discussing the purpose of Additional Protocol 
II’s amnesty provision).
19. See Johannes Langer et al., Peace v. Justice:  The Perceived and Real Contradictions of 
Conflict Resolution and Human Rights, in 8 CRITERIOS - CUADERNOS DE CIENCIAS JURÍDICAS Y 
POLÍTICA INTERNACIONAL 165, 167 (2015) (Colom.).
20. Id.
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for some future progress on these issues), the creation of new human rights 
bodies, and most certainly the establishment of complicated mechanisms 
for accountability. 21 The mediators and the parties must avoid the 
temptation to be diverted or tempted to use the peace process to create a 
modern inclusive democratic state.22 That is the task of the parties—with 
assistance from the international community—only after the conflict has 
ended.
2. Negotiating with the Guys with Guns
To end a conflict, it is necessary to induce those actively engaged in 
the conflict to cease hostilities.  It is not necessary to have the consent of 
civil society, refugees, internally displaced persons, marginalized 
populations, and women (unless they are armed actors).  Including non-
armed actors distracts from the ability of the mediator to navigate the 
interests of the armed actors and creates space to introduce issues unrelated 
to bringing about an immediate end to the conflict.  Only on the rarest
occasions do armed combatants place accountability on the table as a key 
interest.  Likely this is because anyone engaged in armed activity perceives 
that they may be brought before a tribunal; especially in light of the morally 
equivalent approach of seeking to “hold all sides accountable” even when 
one party is responsible for the overwhelming majority of atrocities. Only 
armed combatants should be at the negotiation table, and the mediator 
should engage exclusively with their interests.
3. Accommodation and Appeasement
Frequently it is necessary to accommodate or even appease the 
interests of the armed actors.  While there is an emerging global consensus 
on issues such as democratic reform and the protection of human rights, 
these are seldom the objectives of all the major armed groups participating 
in the conflict.  At times one of the armed groups is interested in promoting 
the demise of a repressive regime or defending a marginalized population 
from oppression.  At other times the armed group is just interested in “their 
turn at the table” of corruption and repression.
There is always one major armed group—often the government—that
is interested in retaining the status quo, and it is unlikely that the status quo
is a democratic and human rights-respecting political structure.  Frequently,
it is in the interest of one or more of the armed groups to avoid 
accountability for any crimes that may have been committed by it or its
                                                                       
21. Id.
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forces during the conflict.23 Given that nearly every conflict in the past few 
decades involved the commission of war crimes or crimes against humanity 
by at least one of the armed actors, there is little appetite for accountability.  
It is the job of the mediator to find a way to embrace the political reality 
and accommodate these less than ideal or altruistic interests to get the 
armed actors to cease the killing.24
4. Minimizing Justice
To accommodate or appease the armed actors it is often, if not always, 
necessary to minimize the creation of any mechanisms of justice that may 
be used to hold the armed actors accountable for war crimes.25 Who, after 
all, would sign an agreement that might bring an end to a conflict, only to 
find that he will be tried for war crimes, delegitimized in the eyes of his
community, and incarcerated, preventing him from enjoying the fruits 
(legitimate or otherwise) of his armed actions?
In fact, recent statistical research indicates that for conflicts between 
2002 and 2013, the involvement of the International Criminal Court (ICC)
in a conflict significantly decreased the probability of reaching a timely end 
to the conflict.26 The author of this research points out that the pursuit of 
justice may undermine peace by “threatening leaders’ political survival and 
personal freedom.”27 Moreover, an armed party may also be incentivized to 
continue the conflict to make the gathering of evidence against them more 
difficult.28 Even justice-based mechanisms that are not prosecutorial, like 
truth commissions, should be avoided because they may also prolong 
negotiations and the conflict.  The mediators must always remember that no 
matter how morally appealing it may be to create accountability for war 
crimes, assigning responsibility or punishing bad acts is not the purpose of 
the peace process—the only concern is ending the conflict.29
                                                                       
23. Id. at 170–71.
24. See Langer et al., supra note 19, at 170–71.
25. Id. at 170.
26. Alyssa K. Prorok, The (In)compatibility of Peace and Justice?  The International Criminal 
Court and Civil Conflict Termination, 71 INT’L ORG. 213, 214–15 (2017).
27. Id. at 215.
28. Id. at 222 (prohibiting evidence gathering undermines investigators’ ability to develop 
sufficient evidence to start a case).
29. See Human Rights in Peace Negotiations, supra note 2, at 256.
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5. Amnesty
In addition to minimizing the creation of accountability mechanisms, it
may be necessary to simply agree upon a blanket or conditional amnesty.30
Because actors may be unwilling to step down from power or cease 
hostilities so long as they or their associates face the possibility of
punishment, amnesties may be leveraged as a trade-off.31 In some instances 
there may be no alternative to granting amnesty as a precondition, so as to 
end the conflict more rapidly.32 While morally unappealing, so is the 
prospect of the further loss of life. Amnesty has been an integral part of 
numerous peace agreements, including Bougainville, 33 Sierra Leone, 34
South Africa,35 and Yemen.36
D. Case Studies
The peace-first approach has been tried and implemented in many 
conflicts.  South Africa is often used as the archetype of success for the 
approach and the model of the benefits of prioritizing peace.37 In 1948, the 
white National Party became the governing party of South Africa.38 The 
party consolidated its power and instituted the statewide program of 
                                                                       
30. PAUL R. WILLIAMS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, PEACE WITH JUSTICE?: WAR CRIMES AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 29 (2002).
31. Darryl Robinson, Serving the Interests of Justice:  Amnesties, Truth Commissions and the 
International Criminal Court, 14 EUR. J. INT’L L. 481, 495 (2003).
32. Minogue, supra note 14, at 307.
33. Amnesty:  Bougainville Peace Agreement, Art. 331, PEACE ACCORDS MATRIX,
https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/provision/amnesty-bougainville-peace-agreement (last visited Apr. 22, 
2018) [hereinafter Bougainville Peace Agreement]; Amnesty:  Lincoln Agreement, Art. 10, PEACE 
ACCORDS MATRIX, https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/provision/amnesty-bougainville-peace-agreement (last 
visited Apr. 22, 2018) [hereinafter Lincoln Agreement].
34. Amnesty:  Lomé Peace Agreement, Art. IX, PEACE ACCORDS MATRIX,
https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/provision/amnesty-lom-peace-agreement (last visited Apr. 22, 2018).
35. S. AFR. (INTERIM) CONST., art. 251, 1993.
36. AMNESTY INT’L, YEMEN’S IMMUNITY LAW: BREACH OF INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS
11 (2012), https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/24000/mde310072012en.pdf; Yemen:  
Amnesty for Saleh and Aides Unlawful, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Jan. 23, 2012, 1:55 PM), https://www.hrw.
org/news/2012/01/23/yemen-amnesty-saleh-and-aides-unlawful [hereinafter Yemen].
37. Elizabeth Sidiropoulos, South Africa’s Regional Engagement for Peace and Security,
FUNDACIÓN PARA LAS RELACIONES INTERNACIONALES Y EL DIÁLOGO EXTERIOR [FRIDE]
[FOUNDATION FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND FOREIGN DIALOGUE] 1, 7 (2007), 
http://fride.org/descarga/south.africa.comment.pdf.
38. NIGEL WORDEN, THE MAKING OF MODERN SOUTH AFRICA: CONQUEST, APARTHEID,
DEMOCRACY 102–04 (5th ed. 2012) (1994).
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apartheid, or racial segregation for the promotion of white interests. 39
Political violence during the apartheid era led to approximately 75,000 
people detained without trial, widespread torture, and 21,000 deaths, with
14,000 of these deaths occurring between 1990 to 1994.40
Negotiations between the all-white apartheid South African 
government and the anti-apartheid political parties, including the African 
National Congress (ANC), resulted in the 1993 interim constitution of 
South Africa, which formed the foundation for the first non-racial general 
elections in South Africa.41 The interim constitution included an amnesty
clause providing that all persons and parties shall be granted amnesty for 
“acts, omissions and offences associated with political objectives and 
committed in the course of the conflicts of the past” through a mechanism 
determined by the newly elected Parliament.42 This provision laid the 
foundation for a mechanism to determine conditional amnesties.  The
express purpose of the amnesty was to advance national “reconciliation and 
reconstruction.”43 Notably, key party negotiators, such as Dullah Omar, the 
ANC representative and future South African Minister of Justice, have 
confirmed that a peace agreement would not have been reached without the 
amnesty clause in the interim constitution.44
After elections, in 1995 the Parliament passed a law establishing the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission. 45 The Truth Commission was 
designed to give effect to the amnesty clause in the constitution by granting 
amnesty to all persons who made a “full disclosure of all the relevant facts 
relating to acts associated with a political objective committed in the
                                                                       
39. See LEONARD THOMPSON, A HISTORY OF SOUTH AFRICA 187–90 (3d ed. 2001) 
(recounting the institutionalization of the apartheid era in South Africa by the National Party through 
consolidation of resources and legislative activities); see also RODNEY DAVENPORT & CHRISTOPHER 
SAUNDERS, SOUTH AFRICA: A MODERN HISTORY 379–83 (5th ed. 2000) (describing the National 
Party’s dominance in government and removal of the coloured vote to prevent any dilution of this 
power).
40. HUMAN RIGHTS COMM. OF S. AFR., A CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY: ANALYSING THE 
REPRESSION OF THE APARTHEID STATE (Max Coleman ed., 1998).
41. See S. AFR. (INTERIM) CONST. art. 251, 1993; see Paul Lansing & Julie C. King, South 
Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission:  The Conflict Between Individual Justice and National 
Healing in the Post-Apartheid Age, 15 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 753, 757–58 (1998) (enumerating the 
specific voting changes made by the 1993 Constitution that would allow for the first multi-racial 
election in South African history).
42. S. AFR. (INTERIM) CONST. art. 251, 1993.
43. Id.
44. LYN S. GRAYBILL, TRUTH & RECONCILIATION IN SOUTH AFRICA: MIRACLE OR MODEL?
59 (2002).
45. Id.
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course” of apartheid.46 While not without controversy, most commentators 
consider the amnesty-based peace process to have been successful in 
bringing an end to the South African conflict and laying the foundation for 
a lasting peace.47
Another conflict where a peace-first approach prevailed during the 
peace process was the Bougainville civil war, fought between the 
government of Papua New Guinea and the region of Bougainville.48 In this 
case the parties agreed upon an unconditional blanket amnesty.49 The 
brutal civil war between the government of Papua New Guinea and the 
Bougainville Revolutionary Army lasted nearly a decade and resulted in the 
deaths of 15,000 to 20,000 civilians and fighters—ten percent of the 
Bougainville population.50 The conflict was characterized by war crimes 
and atrocities, including razing villages and attacks on civilians by the 
government, and rape and torture by both parties.51 The peace agreements, 
which rendered a plan for Bougainville to become an autonomous entity 
with the right to eventual hold an independence referendum, included a
provision that granted “amnesty and pardon” to all persons involved in 
crisis-related activities or convicted of offenses arising out of crisis-related 
activities. 52 Despite a relative failure to fully implement the peace 
agreement, the amnesty is generally considered to have successfully moved 
Bougainville into a period of lasting peace.53
The ongoing conflict in Yemen has also seen attempts to resolve the 
conflict using a peace-first approach.  The conflict began in 2011 when,
caught up in the momentum of the Arab Spring, Yemeni students rose up 
demanding social change.54 What started as a peaceful protest demanding 
improved living conditions and jobs turned violent when government 
                                                                       
46. Promotion of National United and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995 (2005), http://www.
justice.gov.za/legislation/acts/1995-034.pdf (S. Afr.).
47. See, e.g., Charles P. Trumbull IV, Giving Amnesties A Second Chance, 25 BERKLEY J.
INT’L L. 283, 293, 295, 314 (2007).
48. Peter Reddy, Reconciliation in Bougainville:  Civil War, Peacekeeping and Restorative 
Justice, 11 CONTEMP. J. REV. 117, 117–19 (2008).
49. See id. at 117.
50. Id. at 117, 119.
51. Id.
52. Bougainville Peace Agreement, supra note 33; Lincoln Agreement, supra note 33.
53. Reddy, supra note 48, at 119.
54. See Khaled Fattah, Yemen:  A Social Intifada in A Republic of Sheikhs, 18 MIDDLE E.
POL’Y 79, 81 (2011) (describing the 2011 “Youth-led Revolt” in Yemen and what factors contributed to 
the societal unrest within the country); see also Sheila Carapico, Yemen Between Revolution and 
Counter-Terrorism, in WHY YEMEN MATTERS: A SOCIETY IN TRANSITION 29, 30 (Helen Lackner ed., 
2014) (depicting instances of cultural transformation, including women’s participation in protests, 
blossoming during the Yemen Revolution).
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security forces killed fifty-two protestors. 55 This event fractured the 
government with many generals, ambassadors, and government leaders 
defecting. 56 Government security forces targeted and killed anti-
government organizers, summarily executing demonstrators, arbitrarily 
detaining persons of interest, performing acts of torture, and treating 
civilians to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.57 Within a year, over 
2000 people had been killed and more than 22,000 injured.58
With the conflict turning in the favor of the opposition, the Gulf Co-
operation Council stepped in to negotiate an end to hostilities and a transfer 
of power agreement. 59 The peace agreement brokered by the Gulf 
Cooperation Council and approved by the U.N. approved peace deal,
provided immunity for Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh and his 
aides.60 The agreement—President Saleh signed in November 2011 and the 
sitting Yemeni Parliament passed granted immunity to Saleh from 
prosecution for any crimes during his thirty-three-year tenure. 61
Specifically, the peace agreement provided that President Ali Abdullah 
Saleh was entitled to “complete immunity from legal and judicial 
prosecution” for any acts that occurred during his presidency and until the 
date the law was passed.62 The agreement also shielded from prosecution 
those who served under Saleh, by providing that immunity is granted to 
                                                                       
55. Fattah, supra note 54, at 81–82.  But see Mohammad Farazmand, The Nature of 2011 
Arab Uprisings:  A Comparative Analysis, 2 IRANIAN REV. FOREIGN AFF. 7, 15 (2011) (marveling at the 
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Saleh and remaining peaceful in the face of government violence).
56. See, e.g., Carapico, supra note 54, at 34–35 (listing the different categories of individuals 
who resigned in outrage of the March 18 sniper attack).
57. E.g. U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report on the Visit by the Office of the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights to Yemen, ¶¶ 32–43 U.N. Doc. A/HRC/18/21 (Sept. 16, 2011).
58. Ahmed al-Haj, Yemen Says More Than 2,000 Killed in Uprising, WASH. POST (Mar. 18, 
2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/yemen-says-more-than-2000-killed-in-upris
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et al., Yemenis Oust Saleh Regime (Yemen Revolution), 2011–2012, GLOBAL NONVIOLENT ACTION 
DATABASE (Aug. 28, 2012), https://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/yemenis-oust-saleh-regimeyem
en-revolution-2011-2012 (summarizing the different protests and events that resulted in the death of 
Yemenis during the year of the Yemen Revolution).
59. See Wojciech Grabowski, The Role of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in The 
(De)Stabilization of Yemen, in ARAB AND MUSLIM WORLD IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 127, 131–35
(Rafaá OĪarowski & Wojciech Grabowski eds., 2016) (reviewing the elements of the GCC’s power 
transfer proposal and its failure to resolve the issues at the heart of the Revolution).
60. Yemen, supra note 36.
61. Id.
62. Law No. (1) of 2012, Granting Immunity from Legal and Judicial Prosecution arts. 1, 5 
(Yemen).
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“officials who have worked under the President—in state civil, military and 
security agencies—in connection to politically motivated acts carried out 
during the course of their official duties[.]”63 In exchange, Saleh was to 
leave office within thirty days, transferring power to his Vice President.64
Yemen is in the midst of a brutal civil war, and until recently it was 
President Saleh who co-led a coalition rebelling against the government 
installed by the peace agreement.65 There is nearly unanimous agreement 
among commentators that the amnesty played a key role in permitting the 
former President to retain his political influence and plot a return to power 
through civil war.66
III. THE “JUSTICE-FIRST” APPROACH
“If you want peace, work for justice.”
Pope Paul VI67
The justice-first approach will be explored in a similar format to the 
previous section on the peace-first approach.  First, the tenants of the 
justice-first approach and the primary categories of practitioners that 
support it will be identified.  Next, the section will explore the advantages 
of taking a justice-first approach in peace processes.  The section will then 
focus on actions that can be taken to implement the justice-first approach in 
the peace process.  Finally, the section will examine the case studies of 
Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Uganda and Sudan.
A. Prioritizing Accountability
The “justice-first” approach advances the notion that accountability 
through prosecution must be an integral aspect of any negotiated agreement
or post-conflict plan.68 While the justice-first approach does seek peace, the 
approach supports the idea that quick peace should not come at the cost of 
the pursuit of justice.69 While peace may be achieved temporarily through a 
peace-first approach, durable, long-term peace cannot be achieved without 
justice.  Although insisting upon accountability mechanisms may prolong 
                                                                       
63. Id. art. 2.
64. Yemen’s Saleh Agreed to Transfer Power, AL JAZEERA (Nov. 24, 2011), http://aljazeera.
com/news/middleeast/2011/11/2011112355040101606.html.
65. See id.
66. See id.
67. Pope Paul IV, Homily on World Peace Day (Jan. 1, 1972).
68. Scharf & Williams, supra note 10, at 170.
69. See id.
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the conflict, the eventual peace that is created is more likely to be 
sustainable. The justice-first approach is willing to cope with a longer 
conflict in order to achieve a sustainable peace.
The justice-first approach has garnered much support.  Victims 
frequently demand a retributive approach towards perpetrators due to the 
grave nature of human rights violations.70 Parties to a conflict who have 
disproportionately suffered crimes at the hand of the opposing party 
generally support the justice-first approach, as do individual victims. 71
Additionally, many states, particularly those who helped found the ICC and 
who have ratified the Rome Statute, tend to promote a justice-first approach 
to peacemaking.72 Countless international non-government organizations 
(NGOs) are dedicated to promoting justice for crimes committed and to 
preparing for future prosecutions or other justice mechanisms, and even 
more NGOs not directly involved have taken a firm stance that justice 
should be an inextricable part of peacemaking.73
B. Benefits of the Justice-First Approach
With the formalization of international laws on war crimes, crimes 
against humanity, and other atrocities as well as the establishment of 
prosecutorial mechanisms to hold perpetrators accountable, the justice-first 
approach recognizes that this progress is meaningless if justice is waived.  
Furthermore, the justice-first approach asserts that the implementation of 
justice mechanisms assists in creating stable peaceful societies in post-
conflict states. Justice mechanisms promote this by establishing individual 
responsibility and denying collective guilt, delegitimizing institutions and 
war criminals responsible for the commission of atrocities, establishing an 
accurate historical record, providing victim catharsis, and promoting 
deterrence.74
                                                                       
70. CHANDRA LEKHA SRIRAM, CONFRONTING PAST HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS: JUSTICE 
VS. PEACE IN TIMES OF TRANSITION 6–7 (2004); see also Reddy, supra note 48, at 119.
71. See SRIRAM, supra note 70, at 6–7.
72. See Catherine Gegout, The International Criminal Court:  Limits, Potential and 
Conditions for the Promotion of Justice and Peace, 34 THIRD WORLD Q. 800, 800 (2013).
73. See JULIANE KIPPENBERG & PASCAL KAMBALE, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: HOW NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS CAN CONTRIBUTE TO 
THE PROSECUTION OF WAR CRIMINALS 14–18 (Alison Des Forges & Richard Dicker eds., 2004), 
https://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/africa/icc0904/icc0904.pdf.
74. Scharf & Williams, supra note 10, at 170.
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1. Denying Collective Guilt
If justice is not pursued, guilt may be assigned to an entire population
rather than the individuals responsible for the crimes. 75 Additionally, 
because justice mechanisms attach responsibility to specific persons, they 
lessen the risk that victims and third parties will view an entire group or 
population as to blame for the harm. 76 By avoiding a perception of 
collective guilt, a post-conflict society may reconcile and heal.
2. Delegitimizing Institutions and War Criminals
Justice mechanisms delegitimize institutions and leaders responsible 
for the commission of atrocities.  Justice can advance a sustainable end to 
conflict by punishing perpetrators and removing wrongdoers from 
leadership and delegitimizing their ideology. 77 Furthermore, justice 
mechanisms identify the institutions responsible for crimes and helps
provide a basis for dismantling them.78
3. Establishing an Accurate Historical Record
Justice mechanisms can establish an accurate historical record of the 
conflict, which contributes to long-term peace.  The “collective historical 
record” that prosecutions produce provides legitimacy to the new post-
conflict government while delegitimizing the former regime. 79 Such a 
record also allows societies to learn from the past, have a mutual 
understanding of the actions of all parties, and move towards communal 
reconciliation based on a shared understanding of the truth.80
4. Facilitating Victim Catharsis
Holding violators accountable through justice mechanisms facilitates 
victim catharsis. Enduring peace requires justice and accountability 
because when the underlying cause of a conflict goes unaddressed and 
                                                                       
75. Id.
76. Id. at 171.
77. See Laurel E. Fletcher, A Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing?  Transitional Justice and Effacement 
of State Accountability for International Crimes, 39 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 447, 450 (2016); Scharf & 
Williams, supra note 10, at 170.
78. Richard J. Goldstone, Justice as A Tool for Peace-Making:  Truth Commissions and 
International Criminal Tribunals, 28 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 485, 490 (1996).
79. RUTI G. TEITEL, GLOBALIZING TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: CONTEMPORARY ESSAYS 105 
(2014) (finding that historical accounts provide states with self-knowledge shining a light of past 
offenses and abolishing these abuses in the new societal order).
80. See Scharf & Williams, supra note 10, at 174–75.
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victims do not receive redress, the risk of returning to conflict remains 
high.81 This is particularly true when perpetrators of violence or human 
rights abuses are granted amnesty and therefore escape punishment.  In the 
absence of formal justice the victims and other individuals who feel 
wronged may engage in extrajudicial means to achieve justice, including 
violence.82 Through trials, victims are also able to recover—or establish—
dignity as the possessors of legal rights, which, in turn, come with legal 
remedies.83 In recognizing victims and providing them legally ordered 
restitution, prosecutions also provide a venue for victims to heal.84
5. Deterrence
Accountability also promotes long-term peace by deterring future 
atrocities.85 Post-conflict trials remove and punish leaders who perpetrated 
gross violations, preventing such individuals from committing further 
violations. 86 Conversely, if persons, particularly leaders, are not held 
responsible, they may feel emboldened by their impunity and be more 
likely to interfere with the peace-building process or commit future 
crimes.87 The incorporation of justice mechanism “are a foundational and 
forward-looking affirmation that no group, including public officials and 
the armed forces, is above the law and that the new democracy will not 
tolerate such behavior.”88 The implementation of justice mechanisms can 
reinforce broader security and justice reforms to support the post-conflict 
state’s ability to strengthen rule of law and establish a framework for 
sustainable peace.89 In this way, the justice-first approach believes future 
                                                                       
81. Peace Versus Justice:  A False Dilemma, ICTJ (May 9, 2011), https://www.ictj.org/news/
peace-versus-justice-false-dilemma.
82. TOVE GRETE LIE ET AL., POST-CONFLICT TRANSITIONS WORKING PAPER NO. 5: POST-
CONFLICT JUSTICE AND SUSTAINABLE PEACE, WORLD BANK POLICY RESEARCH WORKING PAPER 5
(2007).
83. Reed Brody, Justice:  The First Casualty of Truth?, NATION (Apr. 12, 2001), https://www.
thenation.com/article/justice-first-casualty-truth (concluding that the immunity from justice that a small 
group of elites in Haiti received which allowed them to get away with murder and plunder for 
generations left the majority of poorer citizens with the impression they had not rights).
84. Antoine Hol, The Theatre of Justice:  On the Educational Meaning of Criminal Trials, in
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: IMAGES AND MEMORIES 71, 83–84 (Chrisje Brants et al. eds., 2013).
85. Prorok, supra note 26, at 214.
86. LIE ET AL., supra note 82, at 5.
87. Scharf & Williams, supra note 10, at 171.
88. Brody, supra note 83.  But see RUTI G. TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 11 (2000) (arguing 
that trials are backward-looking at the same time).
89. U.N. Secretary-General, Guidance Note by the Secretary-General:  United Nations 
Approach to Transitional Justice (Mar. 2010), https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/files/TJ_Guidance_Note
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crimes can be deterred by demonstrating that such crimes will be punished, 
developing the institutions capable of punishing any future crimes, and 
establishing a strong framework for rule of law.
C. Achieving Justice-First in Practice
To implement a justice-first approach to peace, it is necessary to 
ensure that an accountability mechanism exercises jurisdiction over those 
who may be responsible for the commission of atrocities.  The mechanism 
may be an existing court or tribunal, or it could be one created for the 
particular conflict by the Security Council, created by the U.N. in 
agreement with the state and endorsed by the General Assembly, or by the 
parties to the peace process.90 The mechanism may also be active during 
the peace process, or it may come into force after the process, but with no 
retroactive jurisdiction.91
Peace processes are more likely to confer jurisdiction to an 
accountability mechanism when the peace process is inclusive of the 
interests of all key stakeholders, not just the armed combatants.  While the 
armed actors are less likely to seek the inclusion of an accountability 
mechanism, civil society, victims, marginalized populations, and other 
groups who were harmed during the conflict and did not, themselves,
commit atrocities are likely to seek justice.  A transparent peace process is 
more accessible to these stakeholders and makes it more likely that they 
will be able to assert their interests for insertion in the peace agreement.
Accountability mechanisms are most likely to be fair, balanced, and 
successful in states that emerge from conflict as democracies.  The peace 
process itself should model the democratic process and inclusive 
representation that is hoped to be achieved in the state.
There are a number of justice-based mechanisms that can be employed 
to further the justice-first approach.  These include referral to the ICC; the
creation of an ad hoc tribunal; the establishment of hybrid tribunals; the 
creation of domestic war crimes chambers, the application of universal 
jurisdiction, and the avoidance of amnesty. Notably, the parties can 
                                                                       
_March_2010FINAL.pdf; Padraig McAuliffe, Transitional Justice’s Impact on Rule of Law:  Symbol or 
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2018] Williams, Dicker & Paterson 435
activate some of these mechanisms, while others are activated by the 
international community.
1. The International Criminal Court
The ICC can prosecute crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, 
and war crimes.92 The ICC can exercise jurisdiction over atrocities if:  (1) 
the atrocities were committed by or on the territory of states that have 
subjected themselves to the jurisdiction of the court, (2) the U.N. Security 
Council refers the matter to the court, or (3) the state refers the matter to the 
court.93 The court also has jurisdiction over nationals of state parties to the 
Rome Statute, regardless of where the individual’s acts took place.94
States that are parties to the Rome Statue may find the court exercising 
jurisdiction and indicting key players in the midst of the peace process or 
shortly thereafter.  The ICC has ongoing investigations and cases involving,
Burundi, Georgia, the Côte d’Ivoire, and Kenya, which were initiated by 
the ICC itself. 95 The ICC also unilaterally initiated preliminary 
examinations in Afghanistan, Colombia, Guinea, Nigeria, Ukraine, and in 
Iraq.96
During a peace process, the U.N. Security Council acting under 
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, may determine that the conflict presents a 
threat to international peace and security and confer jurisdiction on the 
ICC.97 The Security Council made such referrals in the case of Sudan 
(Darfur)98 and Libya.99 In the case of Sudan, the court indicted Omar Al-
Bashir, the President of Sudan for genocide,100 and in the case of Libya the 
court indicted Muammar Gaddafi for crimes against humanity.101
                                                                       
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Situations Under Investigation, INT’L CRIM. CT., https://www.icccpi.int/pages/situations
.aspx (last visited Apr. 22, 2018).
96. Preliminary Examinations, INT’L CRIM. CT., https://www.icc-cpi.int/pages/preliminary-
examinations.aspx (last visited Apr. 22, 2018).
97. U.N. Charter ch. VII.
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International Criminal Court by United Nations Security Council Referrals, ACCORD (July 21, 2017), 
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99. S.C. Res. 1970, ¶ 4 (Feb. 26, 2011); Aregawi, supra note 98.
100. Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09, Case Information Sheet, (Apr. 6, 2017), 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/darfur/albashir/Documents/AlBashirEng.pdf.
101. Prosecutor v. Gaddafi, ICC-01/11-13, Warrant of Arrest, (June 27, 2011), 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2011_08351.pdf.
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States may also refer matters to the ICC on their own initiative, as was 
the case with the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (DRC), Uganda, and Mali.102 These states all referred the matter to 
the court while the conflict was still ongoing and arrest warrants, 
indictments, or convictions were issued against political and armed leaders 
during the peace process or directly after.103 For instance, in the DRC, 
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo founded and led the rebel group, the Union of 
Congolese Patriots, and was a key actor in the Ituri Conflict.104 The ICC 
issued a warrant for Lubanga’s arrest while the peace process was 
underway, and Lubanga was arrested and indicted.105 The ICC also opened 
preliminary examinations in Gabon and Palestine at the request of the 
states.106 Such a referral may happen during a conflict, retroactively by a 
new government, or by including a commitment to refer in the terms of a 
peace agreement.107
2. Ad Hoc Tribunals
On a number of occasions the Security Council, or the General 
Assembly acting with a member state, created an ad hoc tribunal to cement 
a role for justice in the peace process or as part of the transition process.108
Such tribunals were created for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.109 The
Yugoslavia Tribunal was formed and began its investigations and 
indictments while the peace process was ongoing, and the Rwanda Tribunal 
was established at the conclusion of the conflict.110
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3. Hybrid Tribunals
Hybrid tribunals are a mix of international and domestic actors and can 
be created by the international community, the parties themselves, or in 
collaboration. 111 The U.N. Security Council, at the request of the 
government of Sierra Leone, created the Special Court for Sierra Leone,112
and the General Assembly in cooperation with Cambodia created the 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (“Cambodia
Tribunal”).113 The Sierra Leone Tribunal conducted prosecutions based on 
both international and domestic law for crimes committed during the Sierra 
Leone Civil War, which began with a Liberian-led coup attempt.114 The 
tribunal tried and convicted a number of high-level officials, including 
Liberian President Charles Taylor.115 The Cambodia Tribunal was created
in 2001 to try cases based on international and domestic law for acts 
occurring under the Khmer Rouge from 1975 to 1979.116 To date, the 
tribunal has indicted five high-level Khmer Rouge officials, leading to three 
convictions117 and two suspensions of proceedings—one due to the death of 
the defendant118 and one due to the defendant’s poor health.119
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119. Associated Press in Phnom Phen, Cambodia’s War Crimes Tribunal Releases Former 
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4. Domestic Tribunals
Domestic courts and tribunals may also be utilized to prosecute 
atrocities and can be written directly into the peace agreement. Pre-existing 
state courts can be used, especially if the state has strong legal institutions 
and the courts have jurisdiction over atrocities.  Alternatively, a new 
domestic tribunal specifically focused on prosecuting atrocities that 
occurred during the conflict can be created. In Uganda, the International 
Crimes Division (ICD), a special division in the High Court of Uganda, was 
established in accordance with the comprehensive peace agreement 
between the government and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), a rebel 
group.120 The ICD’s prosecutorial efforts are complementary to the ICC’s
ongoing LRA prosecutions. 121 In Colombia, under the 2016 peace 
agreement between the government and the Revolutionary Armed Forced 
of Columbia (FARC), FARC members who provide false testimony, fail to 
make an honest confession, or refuse to confess at all to the truth 
commission can be prosecuted in the Colombia criminal justice system.122
5. Universal Jurisdiction
Universal jurisdiction is the “assertion of jurisdiction over offences 
regardless of the place where they were committed and the nationality of 
the perpetrator or the victim.”123 The basis of universal jurisdiction is found 
in both the Geneva Conventions and customary international law.124 A
state may exercise universal jurisdiction by enacting state-level universal 
jurisdiction legislation and then proceeding with investigations and trials, or
by the state courts assert international law, rather than state law.125 One of 
the first instances of states exercising universal jurisdiction were the 
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prosecutions of former Chilean dictator, Augusto Pinochet in courts in both 
Spain and England.126 Ultimately, both Spanish and British courts made 
their decisions grounded in universal jurisdiction as codified in their 
domestic laws,127 and these cases set off a firestorm, bringing universal 
jurisdiction front and center in efforts to hold violators accountable for war 
crimes and crimes against humanity.128
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6. Barring Amnesty
Many scholars argue that amnesty for crimes against humanity, war 
crimes, and genocide is in and of itself a violation of international law.129
The U.N. has also established guidelines that prohibit its representatives 
from supporting amnesty provisions. 130 Indeed, the international 
community tends to hold that perpetrators of war crimes and human rights 
violations should be held accountable. 131 Moreover, some argue that 
customary international law also obligates states to bring perpetrators of 
international crimes to justice.132 Parties may be legally obligated to pursue 
justice mechanisms as a part of the peace process.
In some states, there is a combination of the above-mentioned 
accountability mechanisms.  For instance, in Bosnia, the ad hoc Yugoslavia 
Tribunal was initiated during the conflict and later, after the peace 
agreement, domestic prosecutions began as well.133 In Rwanda, the ad hoc
Rwandan Tribunal functioned simultaneously with domestic 
prosecutions.134 Additionally, in Rwanda, the gacaca courts, traditional 
justice system, provided community-level truth and reconciliation.135 In
Colombia, the ICC has begun preliminary investigations in parallel to the 
domestic prosecutorial process.136
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to refer to cases of capital punishment, not post-conflict situations.  Id.
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http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/pdf/Backgrounder%20Justice%202014.pdf.
136. See generally OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, REPORT ON 
PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION ACTIVITIES 2014 (2014), https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/OTP-Pre-
Exam-2014.pdf [hereinafter 2014 REPORT].
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D. Case Studies
The justice-first perspective can be seen in the peace processes and 
peace agreements of many states.  The International Criminal Tribunal for 
the former Yugoslavia was established through U.N. Security Council 
resolution while the conflict in Bosnia was ongoing.137 During the ongoing 
peace process, the Yugoslavia Tribunal was granted the authority to begin 
indicting individuals perceived as responsible for atrocities. 138 The
President of the self-proclaimed Republka Srpska Radovan Karadžiü and 
his commanding general, Ratko Mladiü, were indicted for war crimes,
which prevented them from even attending the peace negotiations at 
Dayton.139 The indictments issued by the ICC provided the international 
community with moral clarity as to who was responsible for the conflict, 
and helped to provide a rationale for when the U.N. Security Council 
ordered a no fly zone and eventual air strikes against the Serbian forces to 
halt the genocide. In Dayton, Serbia was represented by Slobodan 
Miloševiü, and during the negotiations, the New York Times quoted a 
Yugoslavia Tribunal official saying “[w]e cannot deny that (Milosevic) is a 
suspect.”140 Miloševiü was indicted in 1999, four years after signing the 
Dayton Accords,141 he was arrested in 2001, and died in prison in 2006 
while his trial was ongoing.142
In post-genocide Rwanda, prosecution of perpetrators of the genocide 
was embraced as the means for the restoration of law and order in the 
state.143 Justice was a priority in reconciliation and transitioning after the 
violence.  The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, established by 
the U.N. Security Council, prosecuted high-level perpetrators of the 
genocide while domestic tribunals addressed lower-level perpetrators.144
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https://www.africaportal.org/publications/challenges-of-transitional-justice-in-rwanda/.
144. Id. at 1–2.
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Additionally, the gacaca courts, a traditional justice system, provided truth 
and reconciliation at the community-level.145
In some instances, the ICC has also begun prosecution efforts through 
its own initiative or at the request of states while parties are negotiating or 
after parties have reached agreement, thus prioritizing justice through its 
own volition.146 In 2004, the Ugandan government referred its conflict with 
the LRA to the ICC.147 In 2005, in Uganda, the ICC issued arrest warrants 
for high-level members of the LRA, including its leader Joseph Kony,
while negotiations between the LRA and the government were ongoing.148
All suspects remain at large, except Dominic Ongwen, who surrendered 
himself in 2015.149 A draft comprehensive peace agreement in 2008, which 
was ultimately not signed by Kony, also prioritized justice, providing for a
special chamber in the Ugandan courts to prosecute LRA leaders.150 Based 
on the draft peace agreement language, the International Crimes Division is 
a special Division of High Court of Uganda and is designed to operate in 
parallel to the ICC.151
In Sudan the ICC also issued arrest warrants to begin prosecution 
efforts for atrocities that took place in Darfur while the peace process was 
underway.152 The arrest warrants included a warrant for the President of 
Sudan, Omar al-Bashir.153 The Sudanese government strongly protested the 
ICC’s actions and has refused to cooperate with investigations or the arrest 
warrants. 154 Regional institutions, including the African Union, voiced 
support of the Sudanese government’s protests.155
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IV. PEACE WITH JUSTICE
“We have learned that the rule of law delayed is lasting peace denied, and that 
justice is a handmaiden of true peace.”156
Kofi Annan, former Secretary General of the United Nations
The purpose of this section is to identify the core components of a 
third approach to the peace versus justice puzzle: peace with justice.  The 
peace-first approach highlights the obstacles to peace (and the resolution of 
conflict) posed by the pursuit of justice.  The justice-first approach on the 
other hand, underscores the impossibility of sustainable peace absent 
genuine accountability.  The “peace with justice” approach, meanwhile, 
advances the notion that peace and justice are not quite so mutually 
exclusive as the former two approaches would indicate—rather, in certain 
circumstances parties to a negotiation can artfully weave the two 
together.157 There are a variety of techniques by which to accomplish 
this. 158 This section will provide a brief overview of the “peace with 
justice” approach, followed by a discussion of the primary mechanisms or 
techniques for pursuing both peace and justice.  The complicated interplay 
of these various mechanisms is illustrated by the diverse attempts to build a 
“peace with justice” framework in Colombia, Sierra Leone, the Côte
d’Ivoire, and Cambodia.159
There is an emerging third approach to the peace versus justice puzzle.  
This approach claims that parties to a conflict can mutually pursue peace
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158. See, e.g., Renée Jeffery, Sequencing Transitional Justice Mechanisms:  Lessons from the 
Solomon Islands, MIDDLE E. INST. (Mar. 4, 2014), http://www.mei.edu/content/sequencingtransitional-
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and justice.160 This approach rejects the perceived tensions between peace 
and justice as a “false dichotomy.” 161 Under this approach, peace and 
justice are mutually reinforcing, as opposed to mutually exclusive.162 The 
question, then, becomes not which goal to pursue, but rather when and 
how.163 Although this third approach introduces an intriguing concept, 
there are ultimately important limitations to this approach as well.164
The primary tenets of the “peace with justice” approach can be 
summarized as:
1) peace and justice are inextricably connected to both reinforce 
and complement one another;
2) the promotion of both, regardless of how complex and 
difficult, should be pursued;
3) there is a grave need for peace, but it should be found in 
conjunction with recognition of the demand for justice; and
4) when mishandled, peace and justice may clash, but peace 
should never justify impunity.165
Supporters of this approach argue that law is a cornerstone to any 
peace-building mission, and thus, pursuing peace with justice seems a 
logical step in transitioning a state from conflict to sustainable peace.166 By 
integrating peace with justice during a post-conflict transitional period, 
peace-builders can provide oversight both to the laying down of arms and
efforts at capacity-building to administer justice.167 Additionally, when 
peace is combined with justice, the perception of justice may shift from the 
retributive to the restorative, such that states and citizens more effectively 
seek reconciliation.  Under this view, a framework for long-term peace that 
contemplates more than an immediate end to a conflict relies on justice to 
be both sustainable and enduring.168 In support of this argument, states can 
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take a variety of steps to intertwine peace and justice.  These actions 
include a “sequencing” approach and a “holistic” approach. 169
Additionally, states often incorporate a range of justice-oriented 
mechanisms that sometimes expand beyond the notion of direct 
accountability.  Further mechanisms for interlacing peace with justice 
include:
1) non-state justice mechanisms; 
2) reparations; and 
3) truth-seeking.170
A. Methods to Meet the Needs of the State Post-Conflict
States could use any of these methods, with consideration to which 
method most meets the needs of the post-conflict state in question. 
1. Sequencing
As the term suggests, the approach of “sequencing” involves the 
strategic phasing of various transitional justice mechanisms.171 Rather than 
asking if peace or justice should be pursued, the question then becomes 
when and how states should pursue both objectives.172 With sequencing, 
there is no need to compromise justice for peace as justice will be pursued 
after parties reach a peace agreement. 173 This perspective accepts that 
justice may be a necessarily long-term goal, but also recognizes the 
importance of justice and underscores that accountability will eventually 
manifest. 174 However, opponents of this process argue that under this 
approach justice will not occur quickly enough to satisfy citizens and 
victims, because it takes time to gain the capacity, legitimacy, and
independence to review claims or overturn amnesties.175
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2. Holistic
Additionally, states can accomplish peace and justice through holistic 
measures. 176 These measures involve non-prosecutorial accountability 
measures that contribute actively to peace while simultaneously supporting 
justice.177 Potential mechanisms under this holistic understanding include 
truth and reconciliation commissions, local or traditional justice, public 
acknowledgment mechanisms, and/or institutional reform.178 Alternative 
methods of justice may be more successful than prosecutorial means of 
justice.179 This framework broadens the approach to transitional justice 
beyond merely institutional responses, so as to incorporate broader political 
and social involvement.180 Further, these non-prosecutorial mechanisms 
have similar justice goals to traditional prosecutions:
1) discovering, clarifying, and acknowledging past abuses;
2) responding to victims’ needs;
3) contributing to justice and accountability;
4) outlining institutional responsibility and recommending 
reforms; and 
5) promoting reconciliation and reducing conflict.181
3. Non-State Justice Mechanisms
Non-state justice mechanisms, sometimes referred to as traditional 
justice, incorporate indigenous and customary practices into the transitional 
justice process.182 For instance, gacaca courts, local community courts 
inspired by the Rwandan traditional courts, emerged as a traditional 
mechanism to assist Rwanda’s national courts with trials of the 130,000 
people imprisoned following the Rwandan genocide. 183 The U.N. 
Secretary-General emphasized the vital role of “indigenous and informal 
traditions for administering justice or settling disputes,” while conforming 
                                                                       
176. Gready & Robins, supra note 158, at 344.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. See Achieving Peace with Justice, supra note 161, at 209, 212–13, 227.
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with international law to ensure the inclusion of all groups in the justice 
process.184
4. Reparations
Granting reparations, meanwhile, is an internationally recognized 
method of restoring victims of serious crimes to their financial, physical, or 
psychological position before suffering the harm in question.185 Victims’ 
reparations can take multiple forms, including restitution, compensation, 
rehabilitation, satisfaction, and guarantees of non-repetition.186 Whatever 
the form of reparations, the purpose of the mechanism is to provide a 
meaningful response to the harm suffered, that can be tailored to the 
specific context, needs, and priorities of the victim in question—and in 
doing so, this mechanism can theoretically meet at least some of the 
underlying purposes of accountability.
5. Truth-Seeking
Truth-seeking is the process of investigating past human rights 
violations to determine what happened, why it happened, and to what effect 
in order to prevent future abuses.187 Mechanisms for truth-seeking include 
truth commissions, commissions of inquiry, and fact-finding missions.188
Truth commissions are either non-judicial or quasi-judicial bodies that 
investigate past abuses to establish the truth of the violations and to publish 
a final report that can make policy recommendations, disseminate victims’ 
voices, and serve as a historical record.189 There have been over forty truth 
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commissions over the last three decades,190 highlighting the popularity (and 
potentially the utility) of these mechanisms.  Depending on the objective 
pursued, truth commissions allow for both the victims to tell their story and 
the perpetrators to admit the crimes they committed in order to promote 
forgiveness and reconciliation. 191 Similar to truth commissions, 
commissions of inquiry and fact-finding missions investigate past human 
rights abuses to discover the truth but follow narrower mandates192 that 
focus on a particular event, category of crime, or time period.193
B. Peace with Justice in Colombia
The peace process in Colombia reflects one manifestation of the peace 
with justice approach.  In particular, elements of both peace and justice 
approaches were integrated into the agreement that was ultimately adopted 
in Colombia in December 2016. 194 This agreement, between the 
Colombian government and the FARC, included the establishment of a 
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justice mechanism that offers amnesty.195 The provisions of the agreement 
emphasize the importance of “consolidating peace and realizing the rights 
of victims,” the “promot[ion of] a stable and lasting peace,” and the 
Colombian state’s responsibility to “investigate, clarify, prosecute and 
sanction serious violations of IHRL [international human rights law] and 
IHL [international humanitarian law].” 196 These provisions reflect the 
blend of peace and justice that the agreement strives to accomplish.
In particular, the peace deal included provisions to establish a 
Comprehensive System for Truth, Justice, Reparations and Guarantees of 
Non-Repetition (Comprehensive System) to carry out a comprehensive 
transitional justice plan, based on a 2015 “Special Peace Jurisdiction” 
agreement between the Colombian Government and the FARC.197 The 
Special Jurisdiction for Peace was designed to include both a Peace 
Tribunal and Judicial Panels to address cases of “serious violations of 
human rights and humanitarian law” committed by FARC members.198
Although the justice mechanism has prosecutorial functions, the
agreement provides categorically that any perpetrators, who confess to 
atrocities, will be exempt from prison, jail, or any “equivalent” form of 
detention.199 Instead, those who confess will be given “‘sanctions’ that 
have a ‘restorative and reparative function’ . . . [.]”200 These sanctions 
entail “projects” that will be designed to aid victims of the conflict.201
FARC members, who were not primarily responsible for the commission of 
the most serious crimes and who wholly confessed their acts, will receive 
either amnesty or alternative penalties such as community service and acts 
of reparation.202
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If, however, FARC members refuse to confess, provide false 
testimony, or fail to make an honest confession in a timely manner, they 
will be prosecuted in the Colombian criminal justice system—although they 
may achieve a reduced sentence by making a partial confession.203 Those 
who take responsibility but do not do so in a timely manner may face a five 
to eight year prison sentence.204 Those who do not confess at all and are 
found guilty will serve a fifteen-to-twenty year prison sentence. 205
Conversely, an individual who committed gross human rights violations—
such as gender-based war crimes and crimes against humanity—will not be 
eligible to receive amnesty and will face criminal prosecution.206 Even 
then, those who immediately confess their crimes may receive a less severe
punishment, such as a non-prison detention restriction on their liberty.207
The contours of the 2016 peace agreement draw on earlier Colombian 
practice.208 In many ways, the 2016 agreement followed the accountability 
framework that had been previously utilized to demobilize various anti-
FARC paramilitary groups, in particular the Justice and Peace Law in 
2005. 209 To support demobilization, the Law allowed individuals that 
participated voluntarily to take part in a truth-telling process via a special 
prosecution tribunal.210 If fighters participated in this truth-telling process, 
they were eligible for reduced sentences or even amnesties.211 In practice, 
these mechanisms provided around ninety percent of the paramilitary 
members with what is essentially de facto amnesty.212
The peace agreement introduced in 2016 attempted to draw from this 
past Colombian experience, so as to strike a fine balance between peace and 
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justice.213 Indeed, Colombian President Santos, one of the architects of the 
peace agreement, highlighted in reference to the agreement that “perfect 
justice would not allow peace.”214 Instead, President Santos argued that the 
deal “achieves as much justice as possible while transitioning from conflict 
to peace.”215 Ultimately, the system proposed was closer to an amnesty 
based truth and reconciliation commission, than a true direct accountability 
system.216
In October 2016, the (already signed) peace agreement was put to a 
popular referendum.217 To the surprise of many, 50.24% of the population 
voted to reject the peace agreement, and the referendum failed.218 The 
primary concerns of those who voted to reject the peace agreement 
centered, in large part, on the balance of justice interlaced into the 
agreement.219 For instance, one major concern was the legal immunity for 
rank-and-file soldiers of the FARC,220 who were allegedly responsible for 
crimes including murder, kidnapping, and rape against civilians.221 Another 
concern was the lack of defining details for the tribunal in which FARC 
leaders were to be tried, combined with the opportunity for FARC leaders 
to receive reduced sentences or potentially even amnesty in return for early 
confessions.222
An additional barrier to adopting the agreement was the agreement’s 
commitment to provide FARC fighters with a monthly stipend for two
years, and the provision of $2500 payments to individual ex-combatants to 
start a business.223 The ability of the FARC to restructure into a political 
party under the peace deal was also a divisive issue.224 Moreover, the 
agreement permits FARC members not serving prison sentences to run for 
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office, and grants the FARC ten congressional seats for two terms.225 In 
other words, there was a poignant concern—held by various international 
human rights organizations in addition to the Colombian population—that 
those most responsible for the commission of atrocity crimes would not be 
held sufficiently accountable for their participation in the conflict.226
Following the rejection of the peace agreement in the October 2016 
referendum, the draft agreement was submitted to the Colombian Congress 
for revisions.227 Colombia’s Congress approved a revised version of the 
agreement,228 and the public did not vote on the revised document.229 The 
Agreement included over fifty changes to the version introduced in the 
referendum.230 The new provisions of the agreement clarified the process 
for prosecuting FARC members responsible before the special court.231
However, the new agreement did not provide for prison sentences for those 
who confessed to war crimes.232 The reasoning for this was that doing so 
would cause the FARC to walk away from the peace agreement.233 The 
new agreement also included a provision requiring the FARC to relinquish 
assets, some of which were acquired through drug trafficking, to contribute 
to a fund for compensating victims. 234 The agreement also did not 
introduce limitations to the FARC’s ability to engage as a political party.235
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Ultimately, in December 2016 the revised peace agreement went into 
effect,236 and preparations for its implementation began.  In assessing the 
justice framework introduced as a result, it is also worth noting that 
Colombia has also ratified the ICC, and therefore, the domestic mechanisms
under the agreement will operate while ICC investigations and preliminary 
examinations in Colombia continue to function in parallel.237 The ICC 
opened a preliminary examination of the situation in Colombia in June 
2004, on alleged crimes against humanity and war crimes. 238 This 
preliminary examination is ongoing as of 2018, and most recently has 
included field visits by the ICC to clarify various aspects of the Special 
Jurisdiction for Peace.239
C. Peace with Justice in Sierra Leone
Sierra Leone presents another instance of peace interwoven with 
justice, although distinct from the Colombian context.  In particular, the 
Sierra Leone experience illustrates the practice of providing broad amnesty 
via a peace agreement, combined with targeted, high-level prosecutions.
The 1999 Lomé Peace Agreement contained an amnesty provision that 
prevented prosecutions for acts criminalized under Sierra Leonean law.240
In 2000, a hybrid Truth and Reconciliation Commission was established 
with the broad purpose of truth-telling and establishing a historical record 
of atrocities.241 In 2002, however, the Special Court for Sierra Leone (a 
hybrid tribunal) was established by U.N. Security Council Resolution 1315, 
with the purpose of prosecuting crimes under both international law and 
Sierra Leone’s domestic law.242
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Controversy arose in relation to the interpretation of the amnesty 
provisions of the Lomé Peace Agreement, in light of the prosecutorial 
framework of the Special Court.  In theory, the amnesty provisions of the 
peace agreement would have prevented the Special Court from pursuing 
charges for acts criminalized under Sierra Leonean law.243 However, the 
Special Court itself interpreted the amnesty provision as inapplicable to the 
prosecution of international crimes.244 This interpretation found support in 
the U.N.’s approach as the guarantor of the Lomé Agreement; in clarifying 
the peace agreement, the U.N. stated that the amnesty and pardon article 
was inapplicable to international crimes of genocide, crimes against 
humanity, war crimes, and other serious violations of international 
humanitarian law. 245 On this basis, the Special Court proceeded with 
prosecutorial action for a select pool of high-level perpetrators, culminating 
its work with the conviction of former Liberian President Charles Taylor.246
D. Peace with Justice in the Côte d’Ivoire
Following the atrocities suffered by civilians in the Côte d’Ivoire’s 
2010–2011 post-election crisis, 247 newly-elected President Ouattara
established a Special Investigation and Examination Cell, composed of 
judges and prosecutors, to take steps against those most responsible for 
atrocity crimes.248 In 2015, the Special Cell charged more than twenty
individuals, including high-level commanders from both sides. 249 A
national truth commission, the Dialogue, Truth, and Reconciliation 
Commission (CDVR), was also established in 2011 to investigate 
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violations.250 By the time the CDVR’s mandate concluded in 2014, the 
entity took statements from more than 72,000 Ivorian nationals.251 The 
final report was provided to President Ouattara, who did not make the 
report publicly-available but did commit approximately $16.2 million to 
indemnify victims on its basis. 252 A new commission, the National 
Commission for Reconciliation and Indemnification of Victims, was 
established in March 2015 to oversee a reparations program for victims of 
an even wider range of abuses, committed between 1990 and 2012.253 This 
package provided a blend of peace-prioritizing mechanisms with measures 
for justice that expanded beyond traditional direct accountability.
Additional aspects of direct accountability also filtered into the Côte 
d’Ivoire context.  For instance, in January 2016 the ICC initiated a joint 
trial of former president Laurent Gbabgo and Charles Ble Goude for crimes 
against humanity committed in the course of the post-election crisis.254 The 
ICC also sought Simone Gbagbo, the former first lady who remained in 
Ivoirian custody where she was tried and convicted for “crimes against the 
state.” 255 When the ICC claimed that she should be prosecuted for atrocity 
crimes in The Hague, the Côte d’Ivoire charged her with crimes against 
humanity and retained jurisdiction as a form of “positive 
complementarity”256 although she was ultimately acquitted of the specific 
crimes against humanity charges. 257 Meanwhile, former President 
Gbagbo’s trial started in 2016, and he remains in ICC custody as 
prosecutions continue.258 In 2015 Ouattara was peacefully re-elected.259
Although not all issues are settled (for example, protests broke out in 2016 
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in relation to various constitutional reforms) violence has largely settled and 
economic growth is on the horizon.260
E. Peace with Justice in Cambodia
Lastly, the Cambodian context provides an instance of peace with 
justice, via sequencing.  After a decade-long armed conflict between 
Cambodia and Vietnam, the Paris Peace Accords were signed in 1991.261
The Paris Peace Accords formalized an arrangement that maintained the 
Cambodian Khmer Rouge in political power despite its responsibility for 
significant atrocities in Cambodian territory.262 In doing so, and in its more 
general avoidance of addressing the issue of atrocity crimes, the Paris Peace 
Accords effectively provided the Khmer Rouge with impunity.263 In effect, 
the Cambodian peace process prioritized peace and stability, over
accountability.
Justice, however, was eventually introduced into the Cambodian 
context in a later period, following the securement of peace.  More than 
fifteen years after the signing of the Paris Peace Accords, efforts for direct 
accountability culminated in the establishment of the Cambodian Tribunal
(a hybrid tribunal) in 2006.264 The court was established by agreement 
between the U.N. and the government of Cambodia.265 The purpose of the 
court was to prosecute those most responsible for violations of international 
law and other grave crimes. 266 Although an imperfect prosecutorial 
mechanism, to date the court has convicted three perpetrators.267
The experiences of Colombia, Sierra Leone, the Côte d’Ivoire, and 
Cambodia display the diverse methods by which to pursue a “peace with 
justice framework.”  These case studies illustrate, to various degrees, the 
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potential utility of developing transitional mechanisms for justice, 
providing general amnesties combined with targeted prosecutions, or 
sequencing justice mechanisms following the establishment of peace and 
stability.  Although not without its limitations, this approach demonstrates 
that in certain circumstances parties to a negotiation can choose to 
interweave peace with justice, rather than pursuing one at the total expense 
of the other.
V. THE SYRIAN CRISIS
The purpose of this section is to explore the interplay between the 
approaches of peace-first and justice-first in the context of the Syrian 
conflict.  The Syrian conflict is characterized by initial uncertainty as to 
whether the peace-first approach or the justice-first approach would take 
predominance in the peace process.  After a pivotal failed effort at the U.N.
Security Council to instill significant justice measures into the Syrian 
context, the Syrian process evolved towards a peace-first approach by those 
seeking to end, or at least manage, the conflict.  However, despite the 
traction that the peace-first approach has gained in the Syrian context, there 
are persistent efforts by key actors to weave accountability into the peace 
process.  While these efforts have had a relatively minor impact on the 
process, and it is clear the approach to resolve the Syrian crisis will not be 
one of justice-first, it remains to be seen whether the final stretch of the 
peace process is driven by a peace-first approach, or whether a peace with
justice approach is able to emerge. The seedling efforts towards 
accountability that are being instilled into the process now, may ultimately 
lay the foundation for moving towards a more focused accountability in the 
future.
In order to explore the interplay between the approaches of peace-first
and justice-first in the context of the Syrian conflict, this section will briefly 
review the origins of the conflict, its “spill-in” and multi-dimensional 
nature, and the U.N. peace process established to resolve the conflict.  The 
section will then trace the efforts of various key stakeholders to weave 
justice into the peace process through several mechanisms such as U.N.
Security Council referral to the ICC, the establishment of a Commission of 
Inquiry and an International, Impartial, Independent Mechanism, the 
creation of a number of documentation efforts, a proposal for a Hybrid 
Tribunal, and the use of universal jurisdiction.
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A. Origins of the Conflict
The Syrian conflict began with a small group of children writing anti-
government graffiti in Dara.268 They were arrested and tortured, sparking 
nationwide protests, and leading to a multi-dimensional civil war now in its 
eighth year.269 These nationwide protests against the Assad regime swept 
across the country beginning March 2011, 270 coinciding with the Arab 
Spring movement that swept through Yemen, Libya, Tunisia, and Egypt.271
The Assad regime responded with force and opposition groups began to 
organize, and arm themselves, leading to the formation of the Free Syrian 
Army.  The Free Syrian Army began to use force in defending against 
attacks by the Assad regime, and by mid-2011, what began as peaceful 
protests had transformed into a full-fledged internal conflict.272 Fighting 
has been near-constant since 2011.273 The conflict has also since expanded 
to include a vast number of differing Syrian opposition fighting brigades, as 
well as foreign terrorist organizations such as Jabhat al Nusra and ISIS.274
Since its inception, the Syrian conflict has been marked by widespread 
and brutal atrocities.  The conflict has been characterized by a death toll 
exceeding 470,000 along with more than 11 million displaced, 275 the 
documented torture to death of more than 14,000, 276 the use of 
internationally prohibited chemical weapons, inherently indiscriminate 
barrel bombs, cluster munitions, and the indiscriminate use of incendiary 
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weapons in civilian-populated areas.277 While many of the actors involved 
in the conflict are responsible for atrocities, the vast majority have been 
(and continue to be) committed by the Assad regime.
B. Syria—A Multi-Dimensional Spill-In Conflict
In the Syrian conflict there are least six main groups of domestic 
forces, along with their international allies, engaged in at least five distinct
conflicts.278 While most wars run the risk of spilling-over into neighboring 
states, in the case of Syria the war has spilled into the country, with nearly a 
dozen external actors directly supporting parties to the conflict and in a 
number of instances deploying their own forces inside Syrian territory.279
The Syrian parties engaged in the conflict include:280
1. Government of the Syrian Arab Republic:  The current Syrian 
government, which has been under the executive rule of Bashar 
al-Assad since July 2000.281
2. Free Syrian Army (FSA):  Formed in August of 2011 by 
defectors from the Syrian regime, the Free Syrian Army is one of 
the predominant Syrian armed opposition groups, comprised of 
more than fifty fighting factions.282
3. Kurdish Forces:  The People’s Protection Units (YPG) is a 
Kurdish force that has been active in the Syrian conflict.283 The 
YPG is considered a terrorist organization by the Turkish 
government, and has been linked to the long-term insurgency war 
in Turkey.
4. The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF):  A primarily Kurdish 
force that also includes local Arab militias, the SDF is comprised 
in large part by YPG fighters.284 The SDF are forces particularly 
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active in northern Syria and benefit from U.S. support in anti-
ISIS operations.285
5. Al Qaeda:  Al Qaeda in Syria is comprised largely of non-
Syrians, with only limited Syrian membership, and over the 
course of the conflict has transformed into a range of Al Qaeda 
“linked” organizations, most famously known as “Jabhat al-
Nusra.”286 Most recently, this entity has been renamed “Hayat 
Tahrir al-Sham,” or HTS.287
6. ISIS:  Infamously active in Syria, ISIS in this context is 
comprised of both Syrian and non-Syrian fighters.288
Third party states and paramilitary organizations engaged in the 
conflict include:289
1. Russia:  Russia established an air base inside of Syria at the 
invitation of the Assad regime in 2015 and deployed bomber and 
fighter aircraft as well as special forces. 290 Russia regularly
attacks the Free Syrian Army, the Syrian Democratic Forces, and 
occasionally ISIS.291
2. Iran: Iran deployed military forces and a significant number 
of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) al-Quds 
Force.292 Iranian forces on the ground in Syria may outnumber 
the military forces of the Syrian regime.293 Iranian forces fight 
on behalf of the Assad regime and engage primarily in operations 
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against the Syrian Opposition, including the Free Syrian Army, 
and the Syrian Democratic Forces.294
3. Hezbollah:  Hezbollah is quite active in the Syrian conflict, 
and as of 2016 an estimated 7000 Hezbollah fighters were based 
in Syria. 295 Hezbollah largely fights in support of the Assad 
regime, and as such engages primarily in operations against the 
Syrian Opposition, including the Free Syrian Army.296
4. Turkey:  Turkey deployed several thousand forces into 
Syria, 297 both to protect civilians from attack by the Syrian 
regime and to prevent Kurdish forces from holding contiguous 
territory along the Turkish border.  Turkey also deploys monitors 
for the de-escalation zones.298 In 2017, Turkey largely succeeded 
in securing a swathe of territory in northern Syria known as the 
“Euphrates Shield” area.299 Early in the conflict Turkey downed 
a Russian MiG fighter, which had crossed into its airspace,300 but 
more recently acts in close cooperation with Russia.
5. The United States:  The United States provides assistance, 
including weapons, to both the Free Syrian Army and the Syrian 
Democratic Forces.301 The United States has also conducted air 
strikes against Al-Qaeda and ISIS as part of a US-led coalition 
focused on the elimination of ISIS.302 Further, the United States 
has deployed approximately 2000 special forces and an artillery 
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unit inside Syria.303 The majority of the United States military 
efforts in the Syrian context are aimed towards the elimination of 
ISIS.304 Notably, in April of 2017, the United States launched a 
substantial cruise missile attack against air assets of the Assad 
regime, in retaliation for the regime’s chemical weapons attack 
on Khan Sheikhoun.305 In April of 2018, the United States, this 
time joined by the United Kingom and France, responded to the 
regime’s chemical weapons attack on Douma with additional 
targeted strikes against regime military and research assets.
6. United Kingdom, France, and other EU states:  These states 
provide assistance to the Free Syrian Army and have conducted 
air strikes and deployed special forces against Al-Qaeda and 
ISIS, particularly as part of the US-led coalition.306
7. Saudi Arabia:  Saudi Arabia provides funding and weapons to 
the Free Syrian Army, and allegedly to Al-Qaeda. 307 As a 
significant supporter of the Syrian opposition, Saudi Arabia is 
particularly focused on anti-Assad engagement.308
8. Qatar: Qatar provides funding and weapons to the Free 
Syrian Army, and allegedly to Al-Qaeda.  The majority of 
Qatar’s engagement in the Syrian context is particularly focused 
on anti-Assad engagement, but not necessarily in cooperation 
with Saudi Arabia.309
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9. Jordan:  Jordan provides support to the Free Syrian Army. 
Jordan is also an active participant in overseeing de-escalation 
zones in Syrian territory, particularly those in the south.310
10. International Al Qaeda: International Al-Qaeda in Syria has 
been active in the conflict since 2012.  At the outset of its 
participation, Al-Qaeda openly claimed the goal of removing 
Assad and creating an Islamic state.  Al-Qaeda has continued to 
present itself as anti-Assad force throughout the duration of the 
conflict.311
11. International ISIS: An offshoot of what was once Al-Qaeda 
in Iraq, International ISIS in Syria became particularly prevalent 
beginning in 2013, capturing significant portions of Syrian 
territory and eventually claiming of Raqqa as its de facto
capital.312 At the peak of its power, approximately ten million 
people lived under ISIS control. 313 ISIS engaged in offenses 
against Syrian opposition armed groups, the Assad regime, SDF 
forces, members of the US-led coalition, and others.  As of late 
2017 the US-led coalition seeking to eliminate ISIS claimed that 
nearly ninety-eight percent of ISIS-held territory has been 
liberated.314
The U.N. launched peace negotiations soon after the beginning of the 
conflict.315 The peace negotiations have proceeded through a variety of 
iterations and have produced a certain measure of momentum and 
accomplishments.316
The initial peace negotiations were headed by former U.N. Secretary 
General Kofi Annan and yielded what has become known as the Geneva 
Communiqué. 317 The Communiqué, endorsed by the U.N. Security 
Council, provided for a new constitution, free and fair elections, the 
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establishment of a transitional governing body on the basis of mutual 
consent, and other components that have collectively come to form the core 
of the negotiating topics in the Geneva peace negotiations.318 The second 
phase of the peace negotiations was headed by Lakhdar Brahimi319 and
produced some limited momentum for a Transitional Governing Body 
designed to create an interim arrangement to transition President Assad 
from power and set the framework for a new constitution and elections.320
The talks stalled when the Assad regime refused to engage in substantive 
negotiations on a political solution.321
Renewed momentum for the peace negotiations culminated in the 
adoption of U.N. Security Council Resolution 2254 in December 2015, 
ushering in the third phase of the peace process.322 Staffan de Mistura 
headed the third phase and while producing little in the way of specific 
accomplishments has continued to provide a venue for the parties in the 
event a desire for serious negotiations emerges.323 The third phase has also 
expanded to include a parallel process in Astana, Kazakhstan managed by a 
Russian, Iranian and Turkish Troika focused on de-escalation zones 
(ceasefires for certain defined areas within the Syrian territory).324 Through 
this process a series of de-escalation zones have been established.325 The 
de-escalation zones have been somewhat successful in limiting the 
                                                                       
318. Id.
319. Yasmine Saleh & Shaimaa Fayed, Syria Agrees to Ceasefire During Eid Holiday:  
Brahimi, REUTERS (Oct. 24, 2012, 5:39 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-crisisbrahimi/
syria-agrees-to-ceasefire-during-eid-holiday-brahimi-idUSBRE89N0G820121024.
320. Syria Peace Talks Break Up as UN Envoy Fails to End Deadlock, GUARDIAN (Feb. 15, 
2014, 10:17), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/15/syria-peace-talks-break-up-geneva.
321. Id.
322. S.C. Res. 2254, (Dec. 18, 2015).
323. Tom Miles & Stephanie Nebehay, U.N. Calls Syria Talks a ‘Big Missed Opportunity’, 
Seeks New Ideas, REUTERS (Dec. 14, 2017, 2:04 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-
crisis-syria-un/u-n-calls-syria-talks-a-big-missed-opportunity-seeks-new-ideas-idUSKBN1E82TD; Tom 
Miles, U.N. Says Planning for Syria Talks Toward End of January, REUTERS (Dec. 22, 2015, 5:37 AM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-un/u-n-says-planning-for-syria-talks-toward-end
-of-january-idUSKBN0U513B20151222.
324. Jun Pasaylo, Astana Talks to Fortify Syria Ceasefire Accord, GEOPOL MONITOR,
http://www.geopolmonitor.com/astana-talks-fortify-syria-ceasefire-accord/ (last visited Apr. 22, 2018); 
Syrian War:  All You Need to Know About the Astana Talks, AL JAZEERA (Oct. 30, 2017), 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/10/syrian-war-astana-talks-171029160554816.html.
325. Final De-Escalation Zones Agreed on in Astana, AL JAZEERA (Sept. 15, 2017), 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/09/final-de-escalation-zones-agreed-astana-170915102811730.ht
ml.
2018] Williams, Dicker & Paterson 465
violence, although violations by the regime and its allies continue.326 At 
various times during these three phases the U.N. Security Council has 
adopted resolutions supporting the peace negotiations and ratifying various 
minor outcomes.327
Whatever momentum the Astana and Geneva processes may have 
introduced for a political settlement, it is important to bear in mind that 
Assad’s position has been strengthened by the facts on the ground.328 In 
particular, with the support of Russia and Iran, the Assad regime has made 
sweeping gains in retaking territory from ISIS and the Syrian Opposition.329
Absent a fundamental change in the military landscape, the Assad regime is 
likely to maintain a significant military advantage on the ground.  Given 
this entrenchment, the likelihood of direct accountability for Assad or any 
other high-level perpetrators is diminished, at least for the immediate 
future.
C. Seeking to Weave Justice into the Syria Peace Process
As noted above, the Syrian peace process began with uncertainty 
towards how to resolve the peace versus justice puzzle—would a peace-first 
approach take hold, or would efforts towards instilling justice take 
primacy?  International actors took the debate to the U.N. Security Council, 
testing the waters of the peace versus justice puzzle with resolutions aimed 
at creating critical accountability measures.  However, these efforts were 
quickly chilled by Russian and Chinese vetoes.  In the wake of these vetoes, 
the Syrian conflict has become characterized by heavy reliance on the 
peace-first approach.  However, there are persistent and ongoing efforts to 
introduce at least a measure of justice into the peace process, and the 
balance towards a peace with justice approach may yet tip in the future.
To track the efforts to weave justice into the peace process this section 
will discuss the positions of the parties and mediators toward justice in the 
Geneva peace negotiations; the actions of the Security Council and the 
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General Assembly, the initiatives of civil society and non-state actors, and 
the use of universal jurisdiction by some European states.
1. Peace Negotiations
The parties and mediators to the Syrian peace negotiations have a 
mixed record of attempts to introduce accountability measures into the 
negotiations.  The Syrian Opposition has incorporated a measure of justice 
into their proposals, whereas the regime has not meaningfully addressed 
accountability.330 The U.N., meanwhile, has been lukewarm at best on the 
issue of accountability.331 In defense of justice, so to speak, the Syrian 
Opposition has staunchly refused any negotiation proposals that would 
permit the Assad regime to remain in power and thereby avoid 
accountability.  The Syrian Opposition also has refused to countenance any 
proposals that would result in Assad or members of his regime securing de 
facto or de jure impunity.332
On the proactive side, the Opposition has been clear that any peace 
agreement should result in a tangible mechanism for accountability.  The 
Opposition has produced a range of public material proposing various broad 
frameworks for accountability that could be incorporated into a peace 
agreement.333 For instance, in its September 2016 Vision Statement, the 
Syrian Opposition calls for a specific transitional justice committee 
composed of diverse and competent judges and lawyers, with the aim of 
balancing “between reconciliation efforts, on the one hand, and 
accountability, on the other.” 334 The committee is charged to fulfill 
international transitional justice standards, and develop mechanisms “to 
ensure accountability, reparation for the victims [ . . . ] achieve institutional 
reform, propose mechanisms to investigate violations and crimes, and keep 
records related to human rights violations.”335
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Notably, the Syrian Opposition has not made any calls for the creation 
of an ad hoc or hybrid tribunal or other comprehensive accountability 
mechanism. The Opposition also has not yet proposed the application of 
retroactive jurisdiction of the ICC, by which the (future, transitional) Syrian 
state would submit to the ICC’s jurisdiction to prosecute crimes within its 
jurisdiction taking place on Syrian territory from the onset of the conflict.336
The Assad regime, meanwhile, has rejected all claims for accountability for 
violations committed in the course of the conflict.  Indeed, the regime has 
refused to address the general issue of accountability for war crimes in any 
genuine way.337 Rather, the regime has focused attention exclusively on 
accountability for supposed “terrorists,” a term that the regime utilizes for 
entities that oppose the Assad government.338 The U.N., meanwhile, has 
taken a relatively tepid stance in the peace negotiations on issues relating to 
justice.  In fact, none of the U.N. mediators have ever called for direct 
accountability in the context of the U.N.-led peace negotiations.
2. The U.N. Security Council
Given the lack of intensive engagement by the parties in relation to 
accountability measures in the context of the peace process, as well as 
larger uncertainty on the geopolitical level, it was unclear in the early stages 
of the Syrian conflict which approach within the peace versus justice puzzle
would take hold. There were multiple efforts to introduce justice into the 
Syrian context via the U.N. Security Council, which reflected an early 
testing ground to determine which approach might come to take primacy in 
the Syrian conflict. However, few of these efforts at the U.N. Security
Council found success; following this failure to move forward with 
important accountability mechanisms, the peace-first approach took rapid 
hold over the Syrian peace process.
For instance, in 2014, some members of the U.N. Security Council put 
forth a draft resolution to refer the situation in Syria to the ICC.339 The
resolution received widespread public support by member states of the 
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United Nations.340 Within the Security Council, thirteen of the Council’s 
fifteen member-states voted in favor of the resolution.341 However, both 
China and Russia vetoed the resolution.342
The U.N. Security Council has also attempted to lay the foundation for 
accountability in relation to the use of chemical weapons in Syria.343 In this 
regard the Security Council has experienced a mixed record.  While the 
Security Council has succeeded in taking steps that allow for a measure of 
information-gathering, Russia has constrained these efforts by exercising its 
veto power to prevent a strong foundation for accountability.344
In August 2015, the U.N. Security Council issued Resolution 2235 to 
establish a joint mission between the Organization for the Prohibition of 
Chemical Weapons (OPCW), and the U.N. Joint Investigative Mechanisms 
(JIM).345 The mandate of the OPCW-JIM was to identify those responsible 
for the use of chemical weapons in Syria.346 In August 2016 and again in 
November 2016, the OPCW-JIM presented reports that, for the first time, 
attributed responsibility for the use of chemical weapons inside Syria to the
Assad regime’s armed forces.347 In a subsequent report, the OPCW-JIM 
determined that the Assad regime was responsible for the use of chemical 
weapons in the infamous attack on Khan Sheikhun on April 4, 2017.348
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In relation to what would be done on the basis of attribution to the 
Assad regime, Virginia Gamba—the Head of the OPCW-JIM—declared
that the OPCW-JIM “believes that those with effective control in the 
military units referred to in this report or others responsible for the use of 
chemicals as weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic must be held 
accountable.”349 To support such accountability, the OPCW-JIM had the 
authority to conduct further investigations to determine the specific 
individuals involved in perpetrating or organizing the particular incidents in 
question.350
In response to this growing momentum towards accountability for the 
Assad regime for the use of chemical weapons, Russia cast a veto in 
October 2017 to prevent the renewal of the OPCW-JIM’s mandate (which 
was scheduled to expire in mid-November 2017).351 As a result of the 
Russian veto, this second potential avenue for accountability through the 
UN Security Council was halted.352 From this pivotal point, the Syrian 
peace process evolved into a heavily peace-first oriented approach.
3. The U.N. General Assembly
In addition to efforts by the U.N. Security Council to introduce 
mechanisms for justice into the Syrian context, the U.N. General Assembly 
has created two primary initiatives.  The first is the U.N. Commission of 
Inquiry (COI), which is mandated to investigate the commission of 
atrocities.  The second is the International, Impartial, Independent 
Mechanism (IIIM), which was mandated to collect, analyze and preserve 
evidence of the commission of atrocities.353
The COI is a documentation mechanism with a mandate to investigate 
“all alleged violations of international human rights law since March 2011” 
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inside Syria.354 The COI has produced more than twenty reports since its 
inception in August 2011, documenting numerous violations of 
international law after interviewing thousands of witnesses and victims and 
analyzing significant physical evidence.355 Although the COI’s mandate 
and purpose represents a fundamentally important task in laying the 
foundation for future prosecutions, the COI has struggled to succeed.  
Indeed, in August 2017, Carla Del Ponte—former prosecutor for the 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda Tribunals and one of the three members of the 
COI—resigned from the COI in protest of its failure to be effective.356 In 
particular, Ms. Del Ponte noted the serious impact of the COI’s limited 
powers—without a more sufficient mandate, in her view the COI has “no 
possibility of seeking justice for victims.”357 In addition, Ms. Del Ponte 
pointed to the inaction of the U.N. Security Council in response to the 
COI’s work.358 In describing her decision to leave the COI, Ms. Del Ponte 
said, “[i]t was all about the inaction of the security council because if you 
look at all the reports we have published, we have obtained nothing in terms 
of injustice.  It is unbelievable.”359
The IIIM is a mechanism under the purview of the U.N. General 
Assembly that was established in part due to Russia’s repeated veto of 
Security Council efforts to refer Syria to the ICC.360 The IIIM prioritizes 
the collection, analysis, and preservation of evidence of human rights 
violations and war crimes—as opposed to directly engaging in 
investigations of the acts themselves. 361 The COI is one of the many 
sources from which the IIIM obtains evidence. Additional sources for the 
IIIM include individuals, states, NGOs, and regional organizations. At the 
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present, the IIIM does not publicly disclose its findings and 
recommendations.362 The overarching policy of the IIIM is to essentially 
compile as much evidence of human rights violations and war crimes in
Syria as possible and share that information with groups seeking to 
prosecute those crimes once it has vetted them for commitment to similar 
goals and standards as the IIIM.363
The IIIM is designed to support other entities engaging in
prosecutorial efforts, including regional organizations and states pursuing 
options under universal jurisdiction, by sharing evidence with these 
entities.364 As a result, the IIIM could potentially increase the number of 
claims brought against perpetrators in Syria.365 The IIIM may also support 
any future prosecutions brought by the ICC in the event a new Syrian 
government submits to its retroactive jurisdiction, or prosecutions brought 
by a future hybrid court for Syria.366 Alternatively, if the IIIM deems that 
no such prosecution will effectively come to pass, the IIIM could release 
the information as part of a truth commission.
4. Civil Society
In addition to justice efforts put forth by the U.N., civil society has 
taken steps to introduce justice mechanisms into the Syrian context.  In 
particular, despite the obstacles to direct accountability in the short-term, a 
range of groups are engaging in efforts to at the least establish a record of 
violations, and potentially to support future efforts for justice.367 Given the 
advent of new technology combined with burgeoning political will and 
resourcing, efforts to generate and preserve documentation have 
proliferated.368 In particular, civil society groups have utilized complex 
documentation mechanisms that could support accountability as well as a 
range of expanded justice mechanisms, including reparations, truth-telling, 
and memorialization.369 Taken in combination with U.N. documentation 
efforts such as those pursued by the COI, civil society documentation 
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368. Id. at 16.
369. ERESHNEE NAIDU, SYRIA JUSTICE & ACCOUNTABILITY CENTRE, SYRIA:
DOCUMENTATION AND ITS ROLE IN MEMORIALIZATION (2013), http://syriaaccountability.org/wpcon
tent/uploads/SJAC-Documentation-Memorialization-Memo-2013_EN.pdf.
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efforts have contributed to a relatively rich pool of documentation material 
to support various future justice-related efforts.
For instance, the Commission for International Justice and 
Accountability (CIJA), is an international NGO that has been heavily 
engaged in gathering and processing a significant pool of evidence relating 
to atrocity crimes.370 In the course of its work, CIJA has gained access to 
more than 700,000 pages from Syrian Government’s Intelligence and 
Security agencies.371 The purpose of CIJA is to lay the foundation for 
future prosecution “along the lines of Nuremberg,” according to its 
Executive Director.372
Similarly, The Syria Justice and Accountability Centre (SJAC) is 
another entity that gathers intensive documentation in relation to atrocity 
crimes in Syria.373 SJAC analyzes the materials that it receives according to 
international law, with the purpose of promoting justice and accountability, 
and preserving evidence in order to “advance transitional justice and peace-
building.”374
Furthermore, the Syrian Accountability Project (SAP) is an 
internationally-recognized platform that is documenting war crimes and 
crimes against humanity taking place in the Syrian context.375 The project 
is led by David Crane, the former Chief Prosecutor for the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone.376 In addition to gathering documentation, SAP analyzes the 
collected materials with reference to such relevant legal frameworks as 
international humanitarian law, international criminal law, and domestic 
Syrian criminal law.377
These efforts, while not in and of themselves necessarily sufficient for 
a comprehensive justice initiative, could provide fundamental support for 
diverse accountability mechanisms in the future.
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5. Regime Defectors
Defectors from the Assad regime have also contributed significantly to 
the tapestry of justice mechanisms taking place in the Syrian context.  The 
“Caesar Photographs,” for instance, is a particularly striking documentation 
and awareness effort.378 A former Assad regime forensic photographer, 
who is called by the alias “Caesar,” smuggled more than 55,000 photos of 
the bodies of detainees tortured or starved to death by the Assad regime.379
The photographs were a component of the Syrian security branch’s efforts 
to develop a formal record of deaths in their detention centers; each body is 
marked with an identification number. 380 The photographs have been 
highly effective as awareness-raising tools and establish a poignant record 
of atrocities taking place in Syrian.  The photographs have already been 
utilized to support justice efforts. For example, in Spain, a case was lodged 
against the Syrian government for “state terrorism” on the behalf of a 
Syrian-Spanish woman who recognized her brother among the photographs 
of victims. 381 Although the case itself has not resulted in a clear 
prosecutorial path, this step illustrates the potential utility of the 
photographs—and other related documentation efforts—in supporting 
future prosecutorial efforts, if and when the time is right.
These efforts to document atrocity crimes support preparation for 
future prosecutions, whether by the ICC, by a future hybrid tribunal, or by 
third party states under a theory of universal jurisdiction (discussed further 
below).  The justice-related impacts of the Caesar project have already 
reverberated among policy makers, for instance prompting the United 
States Senate to introduce a bill in April 2017 after the Khan Sheikhoun gas 
attack by the Syrian regime.382 Among the measures included within the 
bill, was the call to establish a hybrid court for Syria to prosecute Assad and 
his regime.383 The bill was modeled on a previously-produced draft statute 
known as the “Chautauqua Blueprint” for an extraordinary tribunal for 
atrocity crimes in Syria, drawn up by chief prosecutors of several 
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international criminal tribunals under the initiative of the Public 
International Law & Policy Group.384
6. Universal Jurisdiction
Perhaps the most creative of current efforts to pursue accountability in 
Syria is the steadily growing list of countries that are attempting to use 
universal jurisdiction to prosecute those responsible for atrocities. 385
Universal jurisdiction is the legal construct, which provides that any 
national court in any country can prosecute any individual from any country 
for the gravest of international law crimes, including “crimes against 
humanity, war crimes, genocide, and torture.” 386 Although specific 
procedures vary, typically the prosecuting state needs the defendant to be 
within its territory before its domestic courts have the power to arrest and 
try that person.387 Prosecuting universal jurisdiction cases poses several 
steep logistical obstacles, such as gathering evidence and compelling 
appearances, which have rendered it an inefficient or otherwise morally 
questionable practice, even if it is occasionally an effective means of 
pursuing justice.388
In the Syrian context, Sweden, Finland, Germany, Switzerland, and 
Spain have had moderate successes with prosecuting certain individuals 
from the Assad regime’s security forces, but have been unable to detain or 
convict higher-level officials or military officers.389 In the Spanish context, 
a case was filed against nine high-ranking security officers of the Assad 
regime, but the case was dismissed before it could go to trial due to 
domestic interpretation of the Spanish court’s jurisdiction. 390 In the 
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Swedish context, meanwhile, a successful prosecution was completed, 
although the individual in question was a relatively low-level Syrian 
perpetrator and the evidence was sufficient to convict only for violating 
human dignity, as opposed to a crime attached to more serious 
punishment.391 In Germany, criminal complaints have been filed against 
high-level members of the Assad regime, under a theory of universal 
jurisdiction.392 The outcome of these complaints remains to be seen.  In 
general, both the evidentiary collection problem and the means to compel 
suspects to appear before courts that are asserting universal jurisdiction
continue to be challenges in Syria.
7. The International Criminal Court
Syria has signed but not ratified the Rome Statute, thus precluding the 
ICC’s jurisdiction over the atrocity crimes being committed in Syria.393
Although Syria could be referred to the ICC via U.N. Security Council 
referral, as set forth above, such a referral was vetoed by Russia and China 
in 2014 394 and almost certainly would be vetoed again.  However, 
eventually, it may be possible to make use of retroactive ICC jurisdiction.  
When Assad does finally depart Syria (one way or another), the Syrian 
people, and the international community could pressure the new Syrian 
government to ratify the Rome Statute, and then prosecute Assad and other 
high-level perpetrators implicated in the Syrian war at the ICC.395
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VI. CONCLUSION
Ultimately, there are no easy answers in regard to the Syrian crisis, or 
to the fundamental puzzle of peace, justice, and the potential combination 
thereof.  The case of Syria illustrates an immense weight of international 
crime balanced against the impossibility of immediate options for direct 
accountability—balanced, on the other side, against the immense 
importance of securing peace and halting hostilities.  Ultimately, the last 
chapter on accountability in Syria remains to be written.  Although after an 
initial period of certainty, the Syrian context thus far has come to reflect the 
predominance of a peace-first approach.  Yet, the record is clear that, if 
nothing else, justice is persistent. Moreover, given the rich array of players 
in the Syrian context paired with the intensity of the conflict, sustainable 
peace is likely to be elusive without at least a measure of justice.  The 
tilting balance, however, of both how much justice, and the nature of that 
justice, is unclear.  It is possible that Syria will go the path of Colombia, 
with a mechanism that focuses, in its essence, on the transitional elements 
of justice.  Alternatively, Syria may take on the Sierra Leonean model, with 
prosecutions for the most high-ranking perpetrators, and alternative 
mechanisms for mid-to-low-level perpetrators.  Appeasement is unlikely to 
win the day in Syria, and although it is likely that a “justice-first” approach 
is no longer truly feasible in this challenging context, the menu of options 
for weaving justice into peace remain. It is possible that, through these, the 
long arm of justice will eventually reach the Syrian context.
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